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To better understand the interaction between the farm business and the farm 
household, this study identifies those factors that explain participation in two major 
sources of non-production income of farm households: off-farm employment by the 
operator and the spouse and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). In addition, we 
investigate the effects of these decisions on farm efficiency and productivity.  
Since there is always trade-offs between computational demands and model 
generalization, it is difficult to develop an empirical model that accommodates all of 
the interrelationships among these decisions. In this study, three specific econometric 
models are estimated to test if these decisions are made jointly, sequentially or 
independently by the farm household. Although the focus of each model differs, our 
empirical findings are quite robust across models.  
Our results show that CRP participation depends generally on some 
characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, land quality, and the circumstances in 
the local economy. It appears that CRP acres response positively to CRP price but it 
decreases with the increase of low land quality. Environmental factors also play a role 
of CRP participation. The farm household located in areas where the EBI scores for 
land currently enrolled are high is more likely to participate in CRP. Our empirical 
 findings also support the reduction in the likelihood of CRP participation due to the 
increase in decoupled payments. Similar evidence is found for the decision of the farm 
household to engage in off-farm work. Older farmers or those who have fewer years in 
farming are more likely to work off the farm. In addition, the operator’s education has 
a positive effect on the probability of participation in off-farm work.  
Another unique finding of this study is the qualification of the impact on farm 
productivity of CRP participation and the off-farm work decision of the farm operator. 
It appears that participation in CRP lowers the technical efficiency and productivity, 
but participation in off-farm work increases technical efficiency and productivity. 
These results may imply that efficiency is more adversely affected when land is 
withdrawn from production without also withdrawn labor. However, the reverse is not 
true.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
Introduction  
It is now widely accepted that to meet the challenges of future agricultural 
policy design in the future, we must understand farm household behavior in a more 
complex policy context that recognizes the diverse nature of farms with respect to 
farm size, farm production and business organization, and environmental performance. 
We must also recognize the increasing interconnection between decisions made by 
farm businesses and farm households, and their effects on the well-being of farm 
families (Kuhn and Offutt 1999; Offutt, 2002).  
With the conservation compliance provisions introduced in the 1985 farm bill, 
the importance of environmental goals was elevated to prominence along side 
traditional commodity policy objectives. Some farmers can receive not only 
commodity payments, but they can be also compensated for the environmental 
benefits as a by-product of farming. The number of provisions offering farmers 
incentives to participate in environmentally related programs has increased, with 
overall spending to rise by 80% under the new farm legislation—to a 10-year total of 
$38.6 billion. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), the largest program targeting 
land use, pays farmers $2 billion / year to remove 34 million acres from agricultural 
production. Through participation in particular environmental programs, some farm 
household labor has also has been released from agricultural production.  
Another critical factor determining farm household income is the commitment 
by many farm households to off-farm work. When farm commodity prices are 
relatively low, the non-farm incomes of many farm households can exceed net farm 
income (Huffman 1991). Off-farm income not only supplements farm household 
1 
income, it also reduces the variability of the farm household income (Mishra and 
Goodwin 1997). Multiple job-holdings by farm household members in the United 
State have become a well established strategy for the farm household to diversify 
household’s financial position. The proportion of farm operators working over 200 or 
more days has risen to over 30% compared to 6% in the years following World War II 
(the 1994 Census of Agriculture). 
To guide the direction of the agricultural policy design in the future, it is 
necessary to gain a better understanding of the factors affecting decisions of farm 
households. The primary focus of this study is to identify those factors that may affect 
farmers’ participation in environmentally-related programs, which are increasingly 
incorporated into farm legislation (including those designed to retire sensitive land 
from production and those to promote conservation on land remaining in production).  
Understandably, the level of participation is also critical to enable assessment of 
farms’ total contribution to environmental improvement. By knowing how 
participation differs regionally, by type of farming, and by household composition, we 
can also form a better foundation for predicting participation in similar state and local 
programs. Without this capacity, it is difficult to target payments to producers willing 
to retire the most environmentally sensitive lands.  
It is also reasonable to assume that environmental program participation is 
interrelated with other programs and economic opportunities available to farm 
households. Among the possible alternatives, the decision of the farm households to 
engage in off-farm work is particularly interesting, since conservation program 
participation by the farm household releases land from farming, while participating in 
off-farm work, pulls family labor off the farms.1 Because family labor and farm land 
                                                 
1The inter-linkage between decisions to remove land from production by placing it in conservation 
programs, etc. or to retain it in production is strengthened by the new farm bill through its expansion of 
funds for conservation on working lands.    
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are two critical inputs of farm production, it goes without saying that releasing these 
two inputs directly affects the income and input intensity on the farm, and these 
decisions jointly determine a farm’s contribution to environmental goals, agricultural 
supply and agricultural productivity, as well as farm household income and wealth. As 
such, the second focus of this study is to understand the interrelationship between CRP 
participation and off-farm work of the farm household members. 
Research Objectives 
As stated above, the overall purpose of this research is to analyze the 
relationship of conservation program participation behavior and off-farm work of the 
farm household. Specific objectives are: 1) to identify factors related to decisions to 
participate in CRP; 2) to identify the extent to which off-farm labor decisions of the 
farm family members are related to CRP participation: are these two decisions 
determined jointly, sequentially or independently? 3) to identify the factors that 
determine the extent of CRP participations and off farm work as measured by the 
acreage commitment to CRP and off-farm hours worked; and 4) to quantify the effect 
of these participation decisions on the farm productivity and technical and scale 
efficiencies. 
To accomplish these objectives, this study makes contributions to both theory 
and empirical methods. The theory generalizes the conventional agricultural 
household model by accounting for production and price risk, technical efficiency and 
decoupled payment programs. Moreover, we incorporate environmental effects into 
our model by recognizing the fact that the true value of the agricultural production 
should include the environmental benefit generated as a by-product of participation in 
CRP. Indeed, the optimal decisions of the farm household toward conservation 
program participation and off-farm jobs are affected by environmental effects, along 
with other economic factors. 
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From an empirical perspective, different modeling strategies for these two 
decisions are specified in order to test for the appropriate decision making process.  
Given the appropriate decision making process, we develop empirical methods that 
allow us to analyze not only the acreage and off-farm hours response, but also the 
effects of these decisions on farm productivity and technical and scale efficiencies. 
While the focus of this work is on the decisions to participate in CRP and the farm 
operator’s participation in off-farm work, we also extend our empirical framework to 
the three-choice case which includes the spouse’s decision work off the farm.   
While it is true that to date there have been numerous attempts to model these 
important decisions of farm households separately, there has been much less effort to 
model them jointly. Further, many studies have been conducted for specific states or 
regions and have relied on unique data sets collected specifically for that purpose or 
on existing farm record data that contained the necessary information. In the past, the 
data needed to do a more comprehensive, national study of these joint decisions has 
not been available, but this roadblock has been largely removed, as the Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data of U.S Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) has become available. This is the annual national survey of farm households 
that contains detailed information about both farm businesses and farm households. 
Our empirical analysis is based on 2001 ARMS data.2
Organization of the Study 
To accomplish our study objectives, we precede in several steps. In the next 
chapter, we provide an historical perspective on off-farm work and the participation to 
CRP. Some detail on our dataset is also provided.   
In Chapter 3, we provide a theoretical framework of the farm household 
decisions to participate in conservation programs and off-farm work. Specially, we 
                                                 
2 We will introduce the details about the data used in this study in Chapter 2. 
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generalize the conventional farm household model by accommodating not only the 
production and price risk faced by the farmers, but also the technical efficiency of 
farm production. To help inform our empirical analysis and develop testable 
hypotheses, we derive the reduced forms of the optimal response in terms of acreage 
enrolled in conservation program and the hours worked off the farm.  
We proceed with the empirical analysis in three sections (Chapters 4-6). 
Focusing on the CRP, given off-farm work as an exogenous choice, we analyze the 
participation decision and payment and acreage equations in Chapter 4 based on a 
multiple stage sample selection model. We also discuss the effects of CRP 
participation in terms of the farm technical efficiency and productivity. In this analysis, 
the distinction is made between those farms enrolling all or only a fraction of their 
farm lands in CRP. Relaxing the exogeneity assumption of off-farm work by the farm 
operator related to CRP participation, we focus on a two-choice sample selection 
model in Chapter 5. The analysis in this chapter includes two parts. The first part 
analyzes and compares three hypotheses of potential decision making processes of 
these two choices to determine if these two decisions are determined jointly, 
sequentially, or independently. Three conventional discrete choice models (bivariate 
probit, multinomial logit and nested multinomial logit) and a new proposed 
econometric model (sequential bivariate probit) are estimated to capture different 
choice decision making processes. The appropriate decision making process is 
consequentially determined based on several non-nested tests (Vuong test, Haussman-
Wu Specification test, and Likelihood Dominance Criterion tests) to access the 
performance of these models. Given the appropriate decision making process, we 
proceed to the second stage response accounting for sample selection bias and thus 
identifying the effects of these two decisions on farm productivity and technical and 
scale efficiencies. Chapter 6 generalizes the model of the two-choice decisions by 
5 
considering the spouse’s choice to the off-farm work, which is also jointly determined 
with the participation decisions to CRP and the off-farm work decision of the farm 
operator. The second stage response equations are estimated and discussed in detail in 
this chapter. 
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary and a discussion of the major conclusions 
to be drawn from the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
REVIEW OF CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM AND OFF-FARM 
WORK 
Introduction 
Since our research objective is to discuss the potential interrelationship 
between CRP and off-farm job participation by farm households, some background on 
the extent of these two decisions will help to place the empirical analysis into proper 
perspective. Along with this background, we also introduce the dataset used in this 
study, especially the frequency of participation in CRP and off-farm work by the 
operators and spouses of farm households.  
Conservation Reserve Program  
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was introduced in the Farm Bill 
Security Act (FSA) in 1985. The program proponents sought to reduce excessive 
erosion, stabilize land price, and slow chronic excess agricultural production. Of these 
benefits, the reduction of soil erosion was the most important primary goal (Zinn 
1997). Secondary goals of CRP were to protect the long-term capacity to produce food 
and fiber, reduce sedimentation, improve water quality, create fish and wildlife 
habitats, curb production of surplus commodities, and provide farm income support. 
Under this system, land owners, operators, and tenants could submit per-acre bids, the 
monetary compensation they would require in order to retire their land from 
production, and provide the appropriate cropping history of eligible land to county 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service offices. Bids less than or equal to 
the maximum acceptable rental rate based on a county basis were considered to be 
eligible. However, the maximum rental rate was calculated for each tract based on the 
inherent productivity of its soils and county average cropland rental rates, and the rates 
7 
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were never explicitly known by the bidders. If the bid is accepted, a contract to receive 
annual rental payment equal to the value of the submitted bid in exchange for 
removing their land from agricultural production is written. In addition to an annual 
per-acre rental payment, the farmer may also request a one-time cost share payment to 
partially offset the cost of conservation practices.3  
The CRP was re-authorized and modified, especially the bidding mechanism, 
by the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (1996 FAIR Act). 
The maximum rental rate is established for each tract and each bid is evaluated 
through an environmental benefit index (EBI) with elements and scoring limits known 
to the bidders. The EBI is calculated according to the land characteristics to improve 
the environmental benefit from increasing wildlife habitat, water and air quality 
improvement, on farm erosion reduction, and the location of the land in a conservation 
priority area. As of April 2004, the total acea enrolled in CRP was approximately 34 
million acres with 658 thousand active contracts (Table 2.1). There have been 28 
enrollment periods and  CRP acre enrollments are varied over these years. For 
example, the total acres enrolled in CRP of 1998 (18 million acres) is over half of the 
total CRP acreage enrollment (Table 2.1).  
It is also true that the acres enrolled in CRP and per acre annual payments 
differ by state (Table 2.2). The state with the maximum CRP acre enrollment is Texas 
(3,967,513 acres); only 33 acres are enrolled in state of Arizona. The per-acre CRP 
payment is highest in Maryland ($120/acre), and only $9/acre in Arizona (Table 2.2). 
Nationally, average per acre-payment is $47/acre. 
 
3 The details of the bid system are also described in Vukina et al. (2003) 
Table 2.1: CRP Acreage Enrollment as of April 2004
Periods Before 1997 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
1 to 12 111,740 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 111,740
13 435,234 159,352 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 594,586
14 0 99,117 461,289 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 560,406
15 0 0 16,178,980 356,167 0 0 0 0 0 0 16,535,147
16 0 0 1,775,297 4,078,831 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,854,128
17 0 0 113,044 103,637 0 0 0 0 0 0 216,681
18 0 0 0 0 4,750,726 0 0 0 0 0 4,750,726
19 0 0 0 135,137 131,086 0 0 0 0 0 266,223
20 0 0 0 0 0 2,249,912 0 0 0 0 2,249,912
21 0 0 0 0 106,071 12,648 0 0 0 0 118,719
22 0 0 0 0 33,387 171,443 0 0 0 0 204,830
23 0 0 0 0 0 220,668 247,174 0 0 0 467,842
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 289,461 150,186 0 0 439,647
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 198,049 53,203 0 251,252
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,664,077 141843 1,805,920
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11,448 168,168 0 179,616
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 114,101 2665 116,766
Total 546,974 258,469 18,528,610 4,673,772 5,021,270 2,654,671 536,635 359,683 1,999,549 144,508 34,724,144
* Summarized from FSA (2004)    
9 
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Table 2.2: CRP Enrollment by State as of April 2004
State Number of Contracts Acres (ha) Payment ($/Acre)
ALABAMA 10,157 484,466 45
ALASKA 64 29,524 33
ARIZONA 1 33 9
ARKANSAS 3,931 189,936 48
CALIFORNIA 520 147,136 31
COLORADO 12,499 2,289,555 31
CONNECTICUT 26 318 66
DELAWARE 679 7,473 100
FLORIDA 1,945 88,207 37
GEORGIA 8,261 308,832 39
HAWAII 1 19 93
IDAHO 5,418 789,006 38
ILLINOIS 64,403 996,559 101
INDIANA 28,138 282,931 88
IOWA 90,745 1,888,571 103
KANSAS 41,372 2,869,686 38
KENTUCKY 13,648 333,825 73
LOUISIANA 3,415 238,108 46
MAINE 844 23,359 50
MARYLAND 6,125 84,253 120
MASSACHUSETTS 17 121 103
MICHIGAN 14,312 258,200 71
MINNESOTA 54,296 1,762,824 58
MISSISSIPPI 19,749 931,264 41
MISSOURI 32,884 1,553,935 66
MONTANA 17,836 3,423,007 33
NEBRASKA 24,794 1,191,164 54
NEVADA 1 151 16
NEW HAMPSHIRE 17 196 52
NEW JERSEY 136 2,406 49
NEW MEXICO 2,621 596,093 31
NEW YORK 2,411 58,381 43
NORTH CAROLINA 7,146 121,497 59  
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Table 2.2: (Continued)
State Number of Contracts Acres (ha) Payment ($/Acre)
NORTH DAKOTA 35,143 3,356,038 33
OHIO 22,869 275,269 83
OKLAHOMA 8,855 1,035,874 32
OREGON 3,023 495,781 48
PENNSYLVANIA 7,116 151,632 76
PUERTO RICO 20 671 89
SOUTH CAROLINA 8,677 213,420 35
SOUTH DAKOTA 24,394 1,456,279 40
TENNESSEE 8,093 273,102 58
TEXAS 24,068 3,967,513 35
UTAH 1,037 200,279 30
VERMONT 117 1,390 76
VIRGINIA 4,163 62,041 52
WASHINGTON 10,731 1,379,378 52
WEST VIRGINIA 152 2,292 59
WISCONSIN 30,321 621,726 68
WYOMING 1,098 280,419 27
U.S 658,289 34,724,144 47
* Summarized from FSA (2004)  
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Off-Farm Work by Farm Households 
Part time and multiple job holdings among the farm household members is not 
new, and has been evident for United States farms for over fifty years. Many farm 
households combine farming with a variety of other pursuits, since off farm work by 
farm operators and their spouses has traditionally been viewed as an action necessary 
to save the farm by providing resources to pay farm bills or to repay debt (Ahearn and 
Lee 1991). In past years, off-farm employment was also considered temporary and as 
a income supplement (Mishra, et al. 2002). Due to the low price and income 
elasticities for agricultural products and technological advancements during the past 
three decades, supplies of many agricultural commodities have grown more rapidly 
than the demand, in many cases leading to low farm incomes. At the same time, the 
growing real wage rate from the off-farm sector provided incentives for the farm 
household members to take jobs off the farm to compensate low farm incomes. As 
such, the long term trend for participating on the off-farm job of the farm household 
operator increased by 24% from 1979-1999 and 65% for his or her spouse (Mishra, et 
al. 2002 ).  
Traditionally, married women were considered to specialize on the household 
production and men to specialize on farm production. However, with increasing in the 
wage rate of the off-farm sector, the spouse is more likely to work in the paid off-farm 
market, thus the household tasks may now be shared between spouses. The U.S 
historical data supports this long term trend. To date, almost 70% of farm households 
have either the operator, spouse, or both engaged in off-farm employment (Mishra, et 
al. 2002).  
ARMS Data 
The primary farm household data used in this study are from the 2001 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), which is conducted by the 
12 
National Agricultural Statistics Service of the United State of Agriculture (USDA). 
ARMS data are USDA’s primary vehicle for collecting and disseminating data on a 
wide range issues about resource use and farm financial conditions. The relationship 
between agricultural production, resources, and the environment is reflected in this 
dataset. Moreover, the data record program participation decisions and related 
payments received by the farm households. Importantly, ARMS data contain the 
information on the farm household relative to several environmental program 
participations, including CRP, CREP, and EQIP, one of which is the primary focus of 
this study. Since the objective of this paper is to understand the response of 
participation in CRP and the off-farm labor market participation of the farm household, 
we limit our sample to the agricultural farm household farms.4  
Distinction between Livestock and Crop Farm Households  
Since crop and livestock farms produce different agricultural commodities, it is 
likely that these two different types of farm households allocate their household 
resources to available programs in different ways. In addition, this distinction is also 
important because one of our objectives is to investigate the effects of CRP 
participation and off-farm work on farm productivity. To do this, we focus on crop 
farms in order to avoid the difficulty in accounting for major differences in farm 
technology between crop and livestock operations. Furthermore, two different types of 
CRP participants have been recognized in the literature: “whole” CRP farms and 
“partial” CRP farms (Sullivan, et al. (2004)). The whole CRP participants are those 
who enroll all or most cropland in CRP and have no sales of agricultural commodities, 
while the partial CRP farms are those who only enroll part of the cropland in CRP.5  
To place these groups of farm into perspective with the entire sample of farms in the 
                                                 
4 Version 1, phased III of ARMS data in the year 2001 is used in this study.  
5 We distinguish and analyze the decision making process of these two types of farms in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  
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ARMS data, we compare them in terms of several important variables in Table 2.3.  
To begin, we focus on the comparison between livestock and crop farms. The 
proportions of these two types of farms are 52% and 48%, respectively, and the 
operator and farm characteristics of these two groups are similar. However, more 
operators of livestock farms commit to off-farm work than for crop farms (66% vs 
56%). A slightly smaller fraction of spouses on livestock farm households works off 
the farm than for crop farm households (49% vs 52%). More important for our 
purpose is the fact that only 2% of livestock farms are in CRP; this is much lower than 
the participation rate of crop farms (23%). The average acres enrolled in CRP is also 
quite different (4 vs 163 acres).  
In comparing the CRP participants and the non-CRP participants of the crop 
farms, we find that the CRP participants are slightly older on average and have more 
farming experience. However, CRP participants are also those with larger farms on 
average. The operated areas for CRP participants and non-CRP participants average 
607 and 346, respectively. As for the commitment to the off-farm work, our data show 
similarity for both farm operators and spouses between these two groups.  
If we further limit our attention to the CRP participants of the crop farms, we 
find that the small farms are more likely to enroll the entire land into CRP, and whole 
farm participants are also older. 
T able  2 .3 : D istinction B etween D ifferent Farm  T ypes in AR M S D ata  
All L ivestock
All C R P= 0
Variable All Partia l W hole
Sam ple Proportion 1 0 .5 2 0 .4 8 -- -- -- --
O pera tor Age 5 4 5 3 5 5 53 60 57 6 2
O pera tor E xperience 2 3 2 1 2 5 25 27 30 2 5
O pera ting Acres 41 1 4 15 40 7 346 607 1 ,035 29 9
O wn 22 0 2 26 21 1 155 396 471 34 2
R ent In 20 7 1 98 21 9 205 264 591 2 8
R ent O u t 1 5 9 2 4 14 53 28 7 1
C rop Sale 2 5 ,17 9 2 ,9 92 54 ,88 3 58 ,642 42 ,434 10 1 ,502 0
Livestock  Sale 2 4 ,82 5 39 ,25 9 5 ,50 1 5 ,335 6 ,053 1 4 ,083 28 5
R isk 4 .4 4 .3 4 .4 4 .7 3 .7 5 .1 2 .6
Low Land Q uality 0 .2 7 0 .3 0 0 .2 3 0 .25 0 .18 0 .14 0 .2 2
C R P 0 .1 2 0 .0 2 0 .2 3 -- -- 0 .10 0 .1 3
O P 0 .6 2 0 .6 6 0 .5 6 0 .56 0 .55 0 .52 0 .5 8
SP 0 .5 0 0 .4 9 0 .5 2 0 .52 0 .53 0 .55 0 .5 1
C R P Acres 1 8 4 16 3 -- 163 151 17 1
C R P Acres/C rop Land 0 .0 7 0 .0 2 0 .1 2 -- 0 .59 0 .25 0 .9 0
C R P Acres/O pera ting Land 0 .0 5 0 .0 1 0 .1 1 -- 0 .46 0 .18 0 .6 5
C R P Per Acre Paym ent 6 2 5 1 6 5 -- 65 77 5 6
H our_O P 1 ,20 9 1 ,3 04 1 ,08 0 1 ,105 995 744 1 ,18 1
H our_SP 86 8 8 47 96 8 920 825 885 78 2
W age_ O P 2 8 2 7 2 9 31 23 29 1 8
W age_ SP 1 7 1 9 1 5 16 15 15 1 5
*    A ll variables are sum m arized  from  A RM S 2001, and  weighted  by fu ll sam ple weights
Farm  T ype
C rop
C R P= 1
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Crop Farm Households 
Since the objective of this study is to understand the participation decisions in 
CRP and off-farm work of farm households, we limit our attention to the sample of 
farm households, and we exclude some large corporate operations, etc. We also limit 
our attention to farms classified as crop farms because of our interest in examining the 
effect of CRP participation and off-farm work on farm productivity. As always in a 
data set of this magnitude and complexity, a few observations were eliminated because 
of the erroneous coding of information or due to missing data when some respondents 
refused to answer particular questions. The final sample count is 2,223.6  
Although the ARMS data contain valuable information of the farm household, 
they do not provide any information of local area characteristics and the physical 
conditions related to the environment, which are likely to be factors in determining 
off-farm work and the CRP participation decisions of the farm household. As such, we 
utilize some auxiliary data from other sources. The economic characteristics of the 
local areas are merged into our ARMS dataset based on the county level from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis income files in 2000, the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
employment files in 2000, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the 1990 Census of 
Population, STF-3 file.7  
Since one policy goal of CRP is to promote the environmental benefits to 
society, physical (environmental) conditions are likely to play a special role in the 
participation decision of the farm household. Therefore, three variables representing 
the different land quality at the county level in which the farm is located are specified. 
                                                 
6 In most of the content, the sample size we use is 2,223. However, we lose some sample by specifying 
the spouse’s characteristics in the three choices analysis (Chapter 6). In that Chapter, the same size is 
2,102. Since the sample statistics of these two different samples are very close, we only list the data 
information based on sample size 2,223 in Table 2.4. 
7 The same local economy dataset is also used by El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn (2004). We express 
appreciation to them for sharing the data. 
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We define land quality by accounting for the growing season length and the land 
capability classification index. The data on growing season length, drawn from the 
global economic model, are developed to reflect long-run agricultural and 
environmental sustainability (Darwin and Ingram (2004)). In their paper, the growing 
season variable is the estimate of the length of the rain-fed growing season. The land 
capability classification index, defined by Natural Resources Conservation Survey 
(NRCS), is used for developing the erodible cropland index. This index is calculated 
based on quantifiable factors in the universal soil loss equation.8
Another critical factor that may determine the CRP participation is the 
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI), which is designed by Farm Service Agency 
(FSA) and NRCS based on each ERS region. The EBI score assigns a weight for each 
category of environmental benefit to each offered parcel. There is a handbook that lists 
specific details on how points are to be assigned for each conservation practice and 
land characteristic (USDA 1997).9 The index, along with a cost factor, is critical in 
determining the bids that can he accepted for CRP enrollment. Due to the 
unavailability of the accurate information about EBI assigned to each farm household 
from the ARMS data, we utilize the EBI index from Jaroszewski (2000) to document 
average EBI scores for land currently enrolled in CRP. Descriptions of the variables 
included in the analysis are in Table 2.4. 
 
8 We express our appreciation to Roger Claassen for making the data available. The variables are 
defined as:  LQH96 = "high" land quality = GS*(LCC1+LCC2); LQM96 = "medium" land quality = 
GS*(LCC3+LCC4); and LQL96 = "low land quality = GS*(LCC5+LCC6+LCC7+LCC8), where LCCi 
= percentage of land in the county that is in soil capability class i, and GS = the ratio of the mean rain-
fed season to the mean irrigated season. 
9 The components of EBI are: Wildlife habitat, Water quality Benefit from water erosion reduce, Wind 
reduction, Long-term benefit from of Cover beyond the contract period, Air quality benefit, 
Conservation propriety areas enrollment, and Cost factor.  
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for Crop Farms
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean Std.
Program Participation 
CRP_CREP If the household enroll in CRP or CREP (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.23 0.42
WHOLE_CRP If the household enroll in CRP or CREP as whole-farm(=1); otherwise (=0) 0.13 0.34
PARTIAL_CRP If the household enroll in CRP or CREP as partial-farm(=1); otherwise (=0) 0.10 0.30
OP If the operator works off farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.56 0.50
SP If the spouse is work off farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.53 0.50
Price and Level of Participations
P_CRP_C Per acre CRP payment 64.70 0.71
WAGE_OP Operator's off-farm job wage 29.00 0.74
WAGE_SP Spouse's off-farm job wage 15.50 1.36
A_CRP_C Acre enrollment in CRP of the agricultural household 162 293
HOUR_OP Annual working hours on off farm job of the operator 1,080 842
HOUR_SP Annual working hours on off farm job of the spouse 968 813
Environmental Characteristics
EQIP If participate in EQIP (=1), otherwise(=0) 0.00 0.05
EBI Environmental benefit index 61.67 3.85
LQH_96 Index of high quality land of 1996 0.33 0.25
LQM_96 Index of medium quality land of 1996 0.29 0.15
LQL_96 Index of low quality land of 1996 0.23 0.19
Operator Characteristics
OP_TECH If the the off-farm job of the operator is works as a technician(=1); otherwise (=0) 0.12 0.32
OP_JOBR3 If the operator works off-farm for health insurance or benefit from federal government (=1); otherwise(=0) 0.03 0.18
OP_RET If the operator is retired (=1); otherwise(=0) 0.11 0.31
OP_ED_C Education level of the operator (years) 13.08 2.45
OP_EDSQ Square terms of education level of the operator (year) 177 65
OP_AGE Age of the operator 54.57 13.71
OP_AGESQ square term of operator age 3.17 1.52
OP_EXP Years of the operator working on farm job 25.50 63.00
OP_EXPSQ Square of years that the operator works on farming job 4,618 123,835
OP_EXP_F Operator's experience for the off-farm job 7.34 10.33
RAISE_OP If the operator was raised on the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.79 0.41
RISK Risk preference rating of the operator; =0 if risk averse, 10 if risk loving 4.43 2.46  
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Table 2.4: (Continued)
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean Std.
Spouse Characteristics
SP_AGE Age of the spouse 52.67 13.38
SP_AGESQ Square term of spouse age 2,953 1,425
SP_ED_C Education level of the spouse (years) 13.35 2.09
RAISE_SP If the spouse was raised on the farm (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.53 0.50
SP_HMAK If the spouse is a home maker (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.25 0.43
Farm and Household Characteristics
NETWORT1 Household networth value divided by 100,000 4.61 15.70
DEBT_RAT Ratio of total debts to total assets 0.20 2.34
H_SIZE Number of household members 2.74 1.26
H_SIZE06 Number of household members under 6 years old 0.13 0.47
H_SIZE13 Number of household members under 13 years old 0.24 0.65
CROP17 If the cash grain farm, (=1),otherwise (=0) 0.71 0.46
CROP456 If vegetable, fruit, or nursery farm, (=1),otherwise (=0) 0.21 0.41
AMTA_A Per acre AMTA (Agricultural Market Transition Act) payment 5.42 12.57
LDP_A Per acre LDP (Loan Deficiency Payment) payment 8.25 18.63
CROPSIZ1 Operating acreage for cropland divided by 1,000 0.32 0.68
TENANCY Self-own acreage devided by total acreage 0.95 2.08
DIST_OP Distance from home to the off-farm job 9.88 93.10
AGDIST if the operator participates in other local agricultural preservation program (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.05 0.22
MILES Miles from home to nearest town with population of at least 10,000 22.82 20.82
Location and Local Economic Condition
UNEMP LMA’s unemployment rate (%), lagged one year 4.18 1.85
URBAN Percent of labor market area’s population living in urban areas, based on 1990 census of population 56.06 22.17
MANUF LMA’s employment in manufacturing (%), lagged one year 13.84 6.90
TRADE LMA’s employment in wholesale and retail trade (%), lagged one year 20.32 2.35
AGRIN LMA’s income from agriculture (%), lagged one year 4.21 6.82
SERV LMA’s employment in service (%), lagged one year 26.17 4.97
REGN1 If the household is located in ERS region 1(Heartland) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.28 0.45
REGN2 If the household is located in ERS region 2 (Northern Crescent) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.16 0.37
REGN3 If the household is located in ERS region 3 (Northern Great Plains) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.08 0.27
REGN567 If ERS region 5 (Eastern Uplands), 6 (Southern Seaboard), 7 (Fruitful Rim) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.29 0.45
REGN9 If the household is located in ERS region 9 (Mississippi Portal) (=1); otherwise (=0) 0.05 0.22  
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Table 2.4: (Continued)
Variable Names Variable Definitions Mean Std.
Production Performance
OUTPUT Crop and livestock sale ($1,000) 60 219
HOUR Hours working on the farm by operator and spouse 1,694 1,401
LC_C Operating cost, including livestock expense,crop expense,energy expense ($) 36,267 98,346
LAND Operated acres (ha) 407 923
CAPITAL Value of total non-current assets minus the principal operator dwelling ($1,000) 466 1,600
LABOR Hired labor cost ($) 9,823 61,908
* Note: All variables are weighted by full sample weight  
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Participation Rates in CRP and Off Farm Work 
For purposes of this analysis, some of the most critical pieces of sample 
information are the frequencies of CRP participation, off-farm labor supply of the 
operator and spouse of the farm household. We summarize these frequencies for these 
three decisions in Table 2.5.10  
If we consider each of these three choices as a binary choice, the data contain 
eight different combinations of participation possibilities. Table 2.5 lists the sample 
frequency of these eight possibilities. Among all of the eight groups, the participation 
rates vary between groups. The highest rate is 26.4%, for both of the groups that 
operator and spouse participate in off-farm work, and the lowest rate is 2.8%, for those 
who participate in CRP and only the operator works off the farm.11 More detail on 
each pair of decisions is listed in Table 2.6-2.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In subsequent analysis, we pay special attention to different types of CRP participation. Two different 
CRP participation behaviors have been mentioned in the literature (Sullivan et al. (2004). The first class 
is referred to as the whole CRP farms, for those participants that enroll all land in CRP and no longer 
engage in agricultural production. The other class of participant is referred to as the partial CRP farm, 
for those who not only enroll in CRP but also retain some land in production. Our data show that the 
whole and partial CRP farms participation rates are 13% and 10%, respectively, of the overall 23% CRP 
participants (from Table 2.3).     
11 In order to represent the population of the nation, we weight the observations with full sample weight. 
As such, the participation rates reported here can be regarded as the national participation. 
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Table 2.5: Sample Distribution of CRP, Off-Farm Work Particiaption 
Groups CRP OP SP Frequency %
(1,1,1) 1 1 1 200 9.51
(1,1,0) 1 1 0 59 2.81
(1,0,1) 1 0 1 74 3.52
(1,0,0) 1 0 0 142 6.76
(0,1,1) 0 1 1 555 26.40
(0,1,0) 0 1 0 285 13.56
(0,0,1) 0 0 1 366 17.41
(0,0,0) 0 0 0 421 20.03
Total 2,102 100
** weighted with full sample weights  
 
 
 
    
T able 2.6: Sam ple D istribution  of C R P, O P Participations 
C R P 0 1 Tota
0 787 840 1627
% 37.44 39.96 77.40
1 216 259 475
% 10.28 12.32 22.60
Total 1003 1099 2102
% 47.72 52.28
** w eighted w ith full sam ple w eights
O P
l
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T a b le  2 .7 : S a m p le  D istr ib u tio n  o f  C R P , S P  P a rtic ip a tio n s 
C R P 0 1 T o ta
0 7 0 6 9 2 0 1 6 2 6
% 3 3 .5 9 4 3 .7 7 7 7 .3 5
1 2 0 0 2 7 6 4 7 6
% 9 .5 1 1 3 .1 3 2 2 .6 5
T o ta l 9 0 6 1 1 9 6 2 1 0 2
% 4 3 .1 0 5 6 .9 0
* *  w e ig h ted  w ith  fu ll sa m p le  w e ig h ts
S P
l
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.8: Sample Distribution of OP, SP Participations 
OP 0 1 Tota
0 563 441 1004
% 26.78 20.98 47.76
1 343 755 1098
% 16.32 35.92 52.24
Total 906 1196 2102
% 43.10 56.90
** weighted with full sample weights
SP
l
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD MODEL 
Introduction 
For at least four decades, economists have recognized explicitly that the 
household not only buys market goods, but also combines its time to undertake 
activities whose outputs contribute directly to utility maximization. This framework 
explores the interests of economists in the time allocation within the family, since the 
households are not only buyers, but also the producers. The seminal paper by Gary 
Becker (1965) laid the economic foundation for a robust literature addressing labor 
force participation decisions within the context of the household framework. 12  
Becker’s model has been widely applied to the study of family bargaining behavior, 
and the marriage issue which are interesting topics in the field of family economics 
(e.g. Parkman 2004).  
Due to its relative simplicity and the diversity of issues it can address, Becker’s 
framework has also been applied widely by development economists, who expanded 
the model for the study of diverse livelihood strategies of subsistence farms in the less 
or developed countries (Singh et al. 1986). When the household model is applied to 
the field of agriculture, it is more complex due to the special features of agricultural 
production.13 First, the farm household may be involved in several activities off the 
farm in order to sustain the farm household income. The off-farm job participation 
rates in developing countries are documented by Abdulai and Delgado (1999). In the 
US, 55% of farms in the US Agricultural Census Survey of year 1986 reported off-
farm work earning in excess of farm income, and income from off-farm work accounts 
                                                 
12 Pollak (2003) has a comprehensive review of Becker’s contribution and influence to the family 
economics literature. In this paper, he also discussed some potential drawback of the auxiliary 
assumptions imposed by Becker’s theoretical model.   
13 Thirty years earlier, Heady (1952) underscores the complexity as well.  
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for 46% of the total income for farm household in the same year (Ahearn and Lee 
(1991)). Previous studies have also indicated that the long time trend for participating 
in off-farm work by farm household operators increased by 24% since 1979 (Huffman 
(1991); Mishra, et al. 2002). Second, agricultural authorities also implement 
agricultural commodities programs in order to stabilize agricultural markets. Thus, 
when considering farm households, it is also important to consider participation in 
traditional agricultural commodity programs (such as price support) or other programs 
attempting to secure the farm income (decoupled payments). Opportunities to 
participate in these programs complicate the structure of the model.    
Although previous studies have included other special features of agricultural 
production into a household model framework, they have not considered some 
important issues mentioned above.14 This chapter provides a description of the optimal 
farm household labor, both on farm and off-farm labor supply decisions, as well as the 
land allocation decisions given opportunities to participate in the conservation reserve 
program and other government programs. We also consider the effects of risks on 
agricultural production, as well as the effects on technical efficiency or productivity.  
Theoretical Framework 
To focus on the essence of these combined choices (CRP and/or off farm work 
participation), we assume that all decisions are made by one member of the farm 
household—the farm operator.15 There are fixed endowments of time ( E ) and of 
farmland ( A ). Time is allocated to leisure (l), farm production (L), and off-farm work 
(Lm). The household receives income from several sources: agricultural product sales, 
                                                 
14 One of the special features widely included in to the agricultural household model is the agricultural 
production risk. Fabella (1989) and Kanwar (1999) analyzed the optimal labor supply response in 
several versions of risk analysis. Dawson (1988) discussed the optimal labor supply decisions of the 
farm family, including operator, spouse and other family members. Saha (1995) derive the compensated 
optimal response under uncertainty in farm household models.  
15 While the presence of a spouse and children conditions the farmer’s decisions, we abstract from 
complications associated with work on and off the farm by family members.  
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off-farm work at an off-farm wage (w), CRP payment per acre (Pe), and decoupled 
farm payments, (M). Land is allocated between crop production (A), and CRP (Ae). 
Finally, we assume that utility depends not only on farm household consumption (x) 
and leisure (l), but also on the improvement in environmental quality (e) generated by 
land committed to CRP.  
The Production Function, Risk, and Technology 
Agricultural production, y, depends on land and labor, where y = F (L, A) is a 
well-behaved concave production function. We assume that the commodity price, P, is 
random, η+= PP , where P  is the expected price and the random error follows an 
arbitrary distribution with mean zero and variance  ( η~(0, )). To reflect output 
risk, we use the general form proposed by Just and Pope (1979). The efficiency of the 
technology is also incorporated explicitly. The production function 
is:
2
ησ 2ησ
uALhALgALfALF ),(),(),(),( −+= ε . The error associated with output risk, ε, is 
assumed to follow an arbitrary distribution of . An input is regarded as 
risk increasing (decreasing) if g’ (.) is positive (negative). Production efficiency is 
reflected in h(L, A)u, where 
),0(..~ 2εσε dii
),(..~ 2uudiiu σ  is the random noise on a stochastic 
production frontier function. The efficiency of technology, T.E, is given by:  
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 f (L,A) is mean production and h*u  measures efficiency for the mean level of inputs. 
Farm Household’s Maximization Problem 
Given this specification of farm production technology, the agricultural 
household maximizes expected utility, subject to a full income constraint, a time 
constraint, and an acreage constraint.  
The maximization problem of the agricultural household can be written as: 
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We can eliminate l and x by substituting equations (3.2 through 3.4) into equation 
(3.1). The choice variables are land in CRP (Ae), labor in off-farm work (Lm), and 
labor used for agricultural production (L). The maximization problem can be rewritten 
as: 
(3.5) 
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The first-order necessary conditions for interior solutions are:1
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EU −−++=∂
∂ εη = 0, 
where Ui is the first-order derivative of the utility function with respect to argument i. 
The optimal levels of Ae, Lm, and L for the agricultural household are given by the 
simultaneous solution of equations (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8).  
                                                 
1 In order to make the analysis tractable, the marginal utility of leisure and CRP land are assumed to be 
independent. That is: UAeL=ULAe=0 (Fabella 1989; Kanwar, 1999).  
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From equation (3.7), labor is allocated to off-farm work until the ratio of the 
expected marginal utility of leisure to the expected marginal utility of consumption is 
equal to the off-farm wage (w).  
To interpret the other first-order conditions, it is necessary to take the 
expectations of both equations (3.6) and (3.8). In so doing, the first term of equation 
(3.6) can be expanded into: 
(3.9) 
).(
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By taking expectations and applying the appropriate approximation 
(Bohrnstedt and Goldberger (1969)), then substituting these expressions for expected 
values and covariances into equations (3.6) and (3.8), the first-order necessary 
conditions are now: 
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The optimal levels of acre enrollment in CRP, equation (3.10), and labor for 
production, equation (3.11), are more complex compared with standard farm-
household production models, because the optimal decisions depend on the covariance 
of the expected marginal utility with each source of risk, the covariances of the 
random variables of different sources of risk sources, the expected marginal utility, 
and risk characteristics of farm inputs.    
To understand the economic intuition, we examine the set of first-order 
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conditions systematically by isolating four separate cases: 1) price risk only; 2) yield 
risk only; 3) technology efficiency only; and 4) price and yield risk jointly. In so doing, 
the interpretation of equations (3.7) remains the same. We repeat it for completeness, 
but focus on the interpretations of the simplified versions of equations (3.10) and 
(3.11). 
Case 1: Price Risk Only 
If only price risk is considered, the first-order conditions simplify to: 
(3.12) )()( xAxe
e
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A
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The first term in equation (3.12) is the CRP payment multiplied by the 
expected marginal utility of consumption. This, combined with the fourth term, the 
marginal utility of environmental quality multiplied by the marginal contribution of 
CRP land to environmental quality, is the marginal benefit to the household of land 
allocated to CRP. The second term is the revenue foregone from allocating land to 
CRP rather than to production, again multiplied by expected marginal utility of 
consumption, while the third term is the covariance between price risk and marginal 
utility of consumption. At the optimum, the marginal benefit of land allocated to CRP 
is equated to the opportunity cost of land in agricultural production, adjusted for the 
covariance between price risk and the marginal utility of consumption Cov (Ux,η).16 
Thus, assuming concave utility and production functions, when compared with a 
                                                 
16 The sign of this term depends on the risk attitude of the agricultural decision makers. As seen in 
Appendix 3A, if the decision maker is risk averse, this term is negative; and if the decision maker is risk 
loving, this term is positive. 
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farmer who is risk neutral, a risk averse farmer will choose to increase the enrollment 
in CRP. Similarly, the optimal enrollment in CRP for a risk-loving farmer would be 
lower than for risk neutrality.  
Similar arguments can be applied to equation (3.14). Under risk neutrality, the 
farmer would equate the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility of 
consumption multiplied by the expected marginal value product of labor. If the farmer 
is risk averse, the equilibrium expected marginal utility of leisure must fall (amount of 
leisure must increase relative to the risk neutral situation), suggesting that labor 
allocated to agricultural production must fall. 
Case 2: Yield Risk Only 
When only yield risk is considered in the agricultural household model, the 
system of first-order necessary conditions (3.6, 3.7, and 3.8) can be simplified as: 
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The economic interpretation of equation (3.15) is similar to that of the 
corresponding equation in Case 1. At the optimum, the expected marginal benefit of 
land allocated to CRP is equated to the expected opportunity cost of land in 
agricultural production adjusted again for the riskiness of agricultural return. The 
difference is due to the fact that risk in return stems from risk in yield rather than price 
risk. As above, we know that Cov (Ux,ε) < 0 for a risk averse farmer, but, we don’t 
know a priori that a risk averse farmer will place more in CRP than a risk neutral 
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farmer. The answer depends on the sign of gA. If land is a risk increasing input (e.g. gA 
> 0), the optimal acreage in CRP is larger than for the risk neutral farmer. However, 
acreage in CRP will be smaller than for the risk neutral individual if land is a risk 
decreasing input (e.g. gA < 0). From equation (3.17), we know that if labor is risk 
increasing, a risk averse farmer will allocate less labor to agricultural production than 
will a risk neutral farmer. The reverse is true if labor is risk decreasing.  
Case 3: Technology Efficiency Only 
In this case, the first-order conditions are: 
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By construction, technology inefficiency affects the first-order conditions in a 
way similar to that of output risk. Using an argument similar to that for the case of 
output risk, we know that Cov(Ux,u) > 0. Further, inputs can now be either efficiency 
decreasing, the marginal effect (hA) > 0, or efficiency improving, the marginal effect 
(hA) < 0. Thus, relative to the case where the efficiency of the technology is known, 
the optimal land enrolled in CRP will increase if land in agricultural production is 
efficiency decreasing. At the margin, the farmer can avoid the cost of inefficiency in 
production by allocating less land to production and receive payment for enrolling 
land in CRP. From equation (3.20), one can develop similar conclusions about labor 
allocated to farm production relative to the case where technical efficiency is known.  
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Case 4: Price and Yield Risk  
When output risk and price risk are considered jointly in the agricultural 
household model, the first-order necessary conditions can be simplified as: 
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The optimality conditions for the levels of CRP area, equation (3.21), and labor 
for production, equation (3.23), are more complex, compared with standard farm-
household production models, because the optimal decisions depend on the covariance 
of the expected marginal utility with each source of risk, the covariances of the 
random variables of different sources of risk sources, the expected marginal utility, 
and risk characteristics of farm inputs.  
From equation (3.21), for example, land is allocated to CRP up to the point 
where the marginal utility of the CRP payment plus the marginal utility of CRP land’s 
contribution to the environment, is equal to the risk adjusted utility of the value of the 
marginal production forgone. The optimal CRP acreage is not necessary less than in 
the risk neutral case, and this result depends not only on the risk characteristics of land 
in production and the covariance between marginal utility and the two elements of risk, 
but also the covariance term between the two components of risk ( )(ηεCov ). Using 
the results from Appendix 3A, if land is a risk increasing input, land in CRP is still 
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possibly less than in the risk neutral case, if the covariance between the two risk 
factors is high. In this case, the risk-adjusted benefit per unit land in CRP is less than 
its risk-adjusted cost, and the land in CRP falls until the two terms are equal. 
From equation (3.23), labor is employed in agricultural production to the point 
where the marginal utility of the risk adjusted marginal product of labor is equal to the 
marginal utility of leisure. From equation (3.22), the marginal utility of leisure relative 
to consumption is equal to the off-farm wage. 
Comparative Static Analysis   
Clearly, the best way to determine the effects on optimal input use changes in 
risk preferences, farm price variability, CRP payments, government policy, etc. is to 
derive some comparative static results.  
To derive tractable results, we make additional assumptions about the utility 
function. One approach common in the literature on risk is to assume an explicit form 
for the utility function, and also for the distribution of the random variable associated 
with either price or yield (Love and Buccola, 1991; Saha, 1994; Chavas and Holt, 
1996). Perhaps the most common assumptions are that the random variable is 
normally distributed and there is a negative exponential utility that embodies the 
assumption of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). 17   As an alternative, we 
assume that the utility function can be approximated by a second-order Taylor series 
expansion about the mean (Kumbhakar, 2002 and Isik, 2002). Accordingly, we make 
no specific assumptions about the utility function, or about the distribution of the 
random variable.  
We begin by isolating the effects of price risk and output risk and then 
examining the set of first-order conditions systematically. If the price is the source of 
                                                 
17 For example, under the CARA utility preference, the change of the wealth level of the farm 
household is independent of the farm household production decision; this assumption might not be 
reasonable in reality. 
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risk, the first-order conditions from above can be simplified as (see Appendix 3B): 
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The economic intuition behind equation (3.24) is straightforward. The optimal 
CRP acreage is determined when the CRP payment plus the marginal utility of the 
environmental benefit of CRP equals the mean opportunity cost of land in agricultural 
production, adjusted for the risk premium. From equation (3.26) labor is allocated to 
agricultural production up to the point where the marginal utility of leisure is equal to 
the mean marginal value product of land in agricultural production, adjusted for the 
risk premium.   
Effects of Risk Preferences and the Market Price Variability 
The two equations below are the comparative static results reflecting changes 
in CRP acreage for changes in risk preferences, as represented by Arrow’s absolute 
risk aversion coefficient (φ), and exogenous price variability ( ). They are derived 
by taking the total derivative of equations (3.24-3.26), and applying Cramer’s rule to 
obtain:
2
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18 All of the comparative static results are based on the assumption that the contribution of 
environmental externality to the farm household utility is approximated as the first-order derivative. As 
such, the second- order term is ignored in order for the results to be tractable. The comparative static 
results in this paper are derived using the Maple software. 
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Proposition 1: Under price risk, a risk averse farm household will not necessary 
enroll more acres into CRP if the degree of risk aversion or the variability of market 
prices increase. However, if the marginal value of CRP’s contribution to the 
environment to the farm household’s utility is small, the CRP acreage will increase.    
Discussion: From equation (3.27), there are two effects determining the 
optimal CRP acre enrollment. The first term in the {.} is the marginal contribution of 
the consumption multiplied by the effect of leisure. There are three components to the 
consumption effect. For a well-behaved concave production function (f(.)), we know 
that the term  > 0. This guarantees that the sufficiency conditions for 
the first-and second-order Hessian matrix of the maximum utility problem are satisfied. 
Further, the terms, (
)( LLALAL ffff −
lll UwU −φ ) and ( 2ηφσfp − ) should both be positive as well.19 As 
such, we know the consumption effect of {.} should contribute positively to CRP 
acreage.  
If the environmental benefits of CRP are valued by the farm household, the 
marginal utility to CRP acreage is positive. This, combined with the assumptions of 
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Sufficiency conditions for all of the Hessian matrixes to be satisfied are: , 02 >+ AAA fff
0<− Ae fpp , 0<− φwUU lll , , 02 >+ LLL fff 02 >− ηφσfp . These conditions together are 
also sufficient for the positive second-order Hessian matrix.   
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the decreasing marginal utility of leisure and the marginal value of labor in 
agricultural production is greater than the off-farm wage rate, the second term of {.} 
will be negative and will partially or totally offset the positive consumption effect on 
CRP acreage. In sum, the effects of changes in risk preferences and market price 
variability on CRP acreage are ambiguous; the effects depend on the relative sizes of 
these two components. However, as the level of risk aversion increases, farm 
households are more likely increase land in CRP and use less labor in farming if 
marginal utility of leisure is constant or declining slowly, if farmers place little or no 
value on the environmental contributions of land of CRP, or if the marginal value 
product of labor in agriculture is equal to the off-farm wage.  
To discuss the effect of the risk preferences and market price variability on the 
hours worked off the farm, we derive the following comparative static results:  
(3.29)
{
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎨
⎧
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎬
⎫
−+
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
−−+
−+−−−
=∂
∂
+
−
−+
−++
+
444 3444 21
43421
44 344 2143421
44 344 2144444 344444 2143421
)(
)(
2
)()(
2
)()(
22
)(
)(
2
)(
)()(
]])()2([)([
AeAeell
LAAAALll
LALLLAeAALLLALALAeAl
x
x
m
fppfeUU
fffffpU
ffffpfffffffppfpU
U
U
fL
φ
φσ
φ
σ
φ
ηη  
 
(3.30)
{
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎨
⎧
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎬
⎫
−+
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
−−+
−+−−−
=∂
∂
+
−
−+
−++
+
444 3444 21
43421
44 344 2143421
44 344 2144444 344444 2143421
)(
)(
2
)()(
2
)()(
22
)(
)(
2
)(
)()(
]])()2([)([
AeAeell
LAAAALll
LALLLAeAALLLALALAeAl
x
x
m
fppfeUU
fffffpU
ffffpfffffffppfpU
U
U
fL
φ
φσ
φ
φ
σ
η
η
. 
 36 
 
Proposition 2: Under price risk, hours worked off the farm will not necessary increase 
if the farm household is more risk averse or if there is an increase in market price 
variability. However, unless CRP payment is very high, more risk averse farm 
households will work more hours off the farm. 
Discussion: As discussed above, two different effects determine the signs of 
equations (3.29) and (3.30). The first effect comes from the interaction between post-
risk consumption and post-risk leisure. The second effect can be seen as the interaction 
effect between environmental externality and leisure. Given a quasi-concave 
production function and sufficiency conditions from the first-and second-order 
Hessian matrix,20 we can determine the sign of each term in {.}. Unless the term 
containing the CRP payment (Pe) is high enough to dominate other terms, this first 
effect acts to increase the hours worked off the farm. The sign of the second effect 
should be positive for decreasing marginal utility of leisure.  
Similar comparative static results can determine the effect of changes in risk 
preferences and market price variability on farm labor:  
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20 The important conditions are:  ( 0>− eA ppf ), ( ) > 0, 
( ) < 0, (
AALLLALALA fffffff
222 −−
LALLLA ffff − 2ηφσfp − ) > 0, and ( LAAAAL ffff − ) < 0. 
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Proposition 3: Under price risk, hours worked on the farm will unambiguously 
decrease for more risk averse farm households, or if there is an increase in market 
price variability.  
Discussion: As we discussed above, two terms in {.} in equations (3.31-3.32) 
determine the effects on farm labor. The first term in {.} is the interaction  between 
marginal consumption and leisure, while the second term is the interaction between 
the marginal utility of  CRP value to the environmental quality and the first-and 
second-order effects of the utility of leisure. Combining the assumptions of decreasing 
marginal utility of leisure with the quasi- concavity of production, we can conclude 
that both the first-and second-effects in equations (3.31-3.32) contribute negatively 
labor in farm production.  
Effects of Decoupled Payments 
In recent years, decoupled payments, the pure income transfer to the farm 
households, are thought by many to have no effect on farm production decisions, 
particularly in a certain world. However, it is not necessarily true when risk is 
considered explicitly. If the payments are “fully decoupled”, the only effect recognized 
is the “wealth effect”, since decoupled payments will improve the farm income. As 
such, if the risk attitude is independent of farm household wealth, a fully decoupled 
payment has no effect on the optimal farm production decisions (Hennessy, 1998; 
Antou and Mouel, 2004). Since we allow for a “wealth effect” and do not limit our 
attention to the case of CARA, we provide general comparative static results to 
determine the effects of changes in decoupled payments on CRP acreage, off-farm 
work, and labor used on the farm:    
 
(3.33) 
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The parameter (λ) is the elasticity of absolute risk aversion at the expected post-risk 
consumption (Just and Zilberman 1983), and it is defined as:
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∂−= . 
Whenλ  is positive (zero), absolute risk aversion is decreasing (constant).   
 
Proposition 4: Under price risk, the change in CRP acreage, hours worked off the 
farm, and hours worked on the farm are ambiguous relative to a change in decoupled 
payments. These effects depend on the marginal utility of post-risk consumption, 
leisure, and the environmental externality. Specifically, if the environmental value of 
CRP externality is ignored or is small, CRP acreage and off-farm work decrease, and 
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farm work increases with higher decoupled payments. If risk preferences are CARA, 
increasing decoupled payments results in more CRP acreage.      
Discussion: In this case, there are three terms in equation (3.33) that determine 
changes in CRP acreage. The first is the fact that the term outside the {.} is negative. 
Thus, if we can sign the terms in the {.}, the final effect will be in the opposite 
direction. The first term in {.} is the consumption effect, which is positive, but given 
that the marginal utility of leisure is declining, this term’s overall contribution to 
determining the change in CRP acreage is negative. The second term of {.} is related 
to the marginal utility of CRP’s contribution to the environment. This term is negative, 
but when multiplied by the term outside the {.}, the overall effect is positive. The net 
effect of a change in decoupled payments depends on the relative sizes of the two 
effects. Thus, as decoupled payments increase, fewer acres are in CRP if the marginal 
utility of CRP contribution to the environment is ignored or assumed to be very small.  
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion is the fact that decoupled payments 
affect land in CRP acres, even if risk preferences are CARA, the case where λ = 0. In 
this case, the decoupled payment effect on land in CRP still comes from the marginal 
utility of CRP’s contribution to the environment. This is in contrast to some existing 
literature, but in a certain world (φ = 0), we also find that decoupled payments have no 
effect on input allocation of the farm household. 
The effect of decoupled payments on off-farm hours is difficult to disentangle.  
There are three terms in {.} that must be considered. The first term of {.} reflects the 
interaction between the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure, while the second 
term of {.} is the interaction between the marginal utility of consumption and the rate 
of change in the marginal utility of leisure. Again, we can determine that these two 
terms are both positive in {.}, but because the term outside the {.} is negative, a 
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change in decoupled payments reduces the work off the farm. The combined effects of 
these two terms can be regarded as the “income effect” of decoupled payments, and it 
is negative, as one would expect. However, it is the size and the sign of the third term 
in {.} that will ultimately determine the overall effect of decoupled payments on off-
farm work. This third term of {.} is the interaction between the marginal utility of 
leisure and the marginal utility of the environmental effects of CRP.  Since we cannot 
sign ( fffpf ALA
22 )( ηη φσφσ −− ), we cannot sign of this third term either. However, if 
this term is negative, it reinforces the income effect, and the overall effect of 
decoupled payments on off-farm working hours is negative. This would also be true if 
the farmer’s marginal utility for the environmental effects of CRP are low, or rate of 
change in the marginal utility of leisure is small.  
 We encounter similar difficulties in interpreting the effects of changes in 
decoupled payments on farm work in equation (3.35). The income effect, the first term 
in {.}, acts to increase the amount of farm labor as decoupled payments rise, while, as 
in the case of equation (3.34), the remaining term contains the marginal utility of the 
environment, and it cannot be signed.    
Own and Cross Price Effects 
From the first-order conditions of the optimal input allocation of the farm 
household (equations 3.24-3.26), we know that the off-farm wage should affect the 
decision of to enroll land in CRP; CRP payments should also help determine the 
amount worked off the farm. The relative sizes of these own-and cross-price effects 
are examined in the following comparative static results:21  
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21 Due to its complexity otherwise, we impose the condition, Ull=0, to derive the results in equations 
(3.36-3.39).  
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Proposition 5: Under price risk and by ignoring the second-order derivative of utility 
with respect to leisure, CRP acreage and off-farm work increase in response to own 
price changes. However, the cross price effects are ambiguous in general. Specifically, 
if the effect of the environmental externality is small, increasing the off-farm wage 
results in more acreage enrolled in CRP.          
Discussion: Equations (3.36-3.37) are the comparative static results of the own 
price response of CRP acres and off farm worked hours. Given the sufficient 
conditions to insure the first and second order Hessian are satisfied and the concavity 
of the production function, the own price response is unambiguously positive. The 
own price increases provide the direct incentives for CRP acre enrollment and off-
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farm worked hours.  
Equations (3.38-3.39) are the comparative static results of the cross price 
effects. As before, the sufficient conditions and the nature of the production function 
help to determine each term of these two equations. The cross price effect of per acre 
CRP payment to off-farm work is complicated; thus, the effect is undetermined. The 
total effect depends on the nature of production, risk preferences, and the mean market 
price and the per acre CRP payment. Compared to equation (3.38), the cross price 
effect of CRP acreage response to a change in the off-farm wage is clear. Two effects 
determine the total effect of equation (3.39). The first term in {.} is the income effect 
based on the post-risk consumption, which contributes positively to CRP enrollment. 
The second term is the effect of the environmental externality as the off-farm wage 
increases. The effect contributes negatively to CRP acreage. Thus, if the marginal 
contribution of the environmental externality to utility is small or is ignored, it is likely 
that the farm household will increase the CRP acreage with an increase in the off-farm 
wage. As this off-farm wage increases, the farmer will, under these conditions find an 
added incentive to enroll more land in CRP at the going CRP payment.      
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APPENDIX 3A: Covariance Analysis 
)()()())(( hugfhugPxEAPwLhugfPx eem −++−+=++−++= εηεεη  
Assume 0>− hugε  and hugf −+ ε > 0, If 0>η , then . Under the 
assumption of risk aversion, U’(x) < U’(E(x)). Therefore, we have Cov (U
)(xEx >
x’,η ) < 0.  
The same argument can be applied to determine the signs on the other terms. 
Therefore, we know that Cov (Ux’,ε ) < 0 and Cov (Ux’, u) > 0. 
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APPENDIX 3B: Deriving the First-Order Condition Systems 
Using the household consumption constraint (equation (3.2) in the text), the 
expression for the difference in consumption around the expected post-risk 
consumption level follows immediately as:  
(3B1) MApuhfpx ee ++−= )(  
(3B2) )( hugfgpxx −++=− εηε  
If the utility function can be properly approximated around the expected post-risk 
consumption level using a Taylor’s series expansions with only the first two moments, 
the approximation for marginal utility ( xU ) is: 
(3B3) )]([)( hugfgpUUxxUUU xxxxxxx −+++=−+= εηε  
Replacing the expressions for marginal utility in equations (3.6) and (3.7) from the 
text with equation (3B3), the first-order conditions can be expressed as: 
(3B4)
}{ AeeeLLLxxx
e
eUpuhgfphugfgpUUE
A
Eu ++−++−++−−=∂
∂ ]))()]}[(([{(.) εηεηε  
(3B5)   }{ lxxx
m
UhugfgpUUE
L
Eu −−+++=∂
∂ )]([(.) εηε  
(3B6)
}{ leLLLxxx UpuhgfphugfgpUUEL
Eu −+−++−+++=∂
∂ ]))()]}[(([{(.) εηεηε  
If both right-and left-hand sides of equations (3B4) and (3B5) are divided by ( xU ), 
and we substitute Arrow’s measure of absolute risk aversion, (
x
xx
U
Ux −=)(φ ), and 
eliminate the expectation operators, equations (3B4) and (3B5) become: 
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When only price risk is considered, the first-order equation system can be 
simplified as equations (3.24-3.26) in the text. For this case, by taking the total 
derivative of the first-order equation system (3B7-3B9), and applying the Cramer’s 
rule, we can obtain the comparative static results in the text (equations 3.24-3.39).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SEQUENTIAL CRP PARTICIPATION DECISIONS AND FARM 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Introduction 
 By retiring the sensitive cropland from crop production, the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP) has substantially reduced soil erosion and improved the 
environmental quality with a fairly high cost paid to the farms to buy the land out of 
production. The focus of this chapter is threefold. First, there is an analysis of farm 
household toward CRP participation behavior. Second, equations for per acre CRP 
payment and acreage enrollment response are estimated. Finally, the effects of CRP 
participation on technical efficiency, scale efficiency, and productivity of farm 
production are estimated.  
One special feature of CRP is that the CRP participants may be categorized 
into two groups, depending on their degree of participation: whole CRP farm and 
partial CRP farm. The whole CRP farm enrollees are defined as for those farms, 
where most or all the cropland is enrolled in CRP and there are no farm commodities. 
The partial CRP enrollees are those who participate in CRP and maintain a proportion 
of their land in farming. 22 By recognizing the differences between the whole and 
partial CRP participants, rather than simply regarding the CRP participation decision 
as a binary decision, it is possible to isolate the separate effects of factors affecting the 
types of participation. Such a distinction is also essential in determining the effects of 
participation decisions on farm productivity, because whole farm CRP participants 
produce no farm sales. To investigate the effects of CRP participation decisions on 
farm productivity, it only makes sense to compare the partial farm CRP participants to 
                                                 
22 We follow the definition of Sullivan, et al. (2004) to define whole and partial farm CRP enrollees. In 
their report, they also state that “it is useful to synthesize the diversity of program participants into two 
groups-whole farm enrollees and partial farm enrollees.”  
 47 
 
the non-participant groups.     
In contrast to previous studies that focus solely on the binary participation 
case,23 the distinction between whole farm and partial farm CRP participants leads to a 
sequential two-decision model related to CRP participation. In the first, the farm 
household decides on whether or not to participate in CRP. This can be regarded as a 
binary discrete choice decision as in other conventional studies. Next, given that the 
farm household decides to participate in CRP, the second decision by the farm 
household sequentially is whether to enroll the entire farm or only part of it into CRP. 
In drawing this distinction, we can determine if different factors affect two stages of 
this CRP participation decision process. Modeling the CRP participation decision in a 
sequential discrete choice framework also helps to distinguish separate factors 
affecting the degree of participation. To the best of our knowledge, no one attempted 
to model the CRP participation decision in this way.    
Econometric Framework 
When sequential choices are considered, we can view the alternatives by using 
a decision tree, grouping the full set of the potential choices into several subgroups. 
The model structure is in Figure 4.1. This figure also determines the second stage 
equations estimated for each subgroup at each stage. 
                                                 
23 For example, McLean, Hui, and Joseph (1994) analyze the environmental program participation 
decision of Louisiana farmers using the binary logit model.  
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 CRP_Yes CRP_No 
Whole Farm Partial Farm 
A1 A2 A3 
Payment Payment Production 
Acreage Acreage 
Production
 
Figure 4.1: Model Structure of the CRP Sequential Choice 
 
According to Figure 4.1, three different regimes can be realized from the 
observed data. For the whole CRP farms (regime A1), we only observe CRP payments 
and CRP acreage, by definition. For the partial CRP farms (regime A2), one also has 
data on CRP payments and acreage enrolled, and farm production. These farms enroll 
only a fraction of their land in CRP and continue to farm the remaining land. For the 
CRP non-participants (regime A3), we observe only farm production. To sum, we 
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estimate these particular equations: CRP payment, CRP enrollment, and farm 
production.  
To conduct the analysis, we employ a three-stage econometric estimation based 
on Heckman’s self-selection approach (1976; 1979). In the first stage, we focus on the 
sequential CRP participation decisions. Given the estimates of the participation 
equation, the CRP payment and acre equations are estimated based on the observations 
for each regime. In the third stage, we analyze the effects of CRP participation on 
technical and scale efficiencies and farm productivity.   
Sequential CRP Choice Model 
The pioneering work on sequential decisions is the model proposed by Amemiya 
(1985), which he refers to as the sequential probit model. Amemiya’s model regards 
the sequential decision process simply as two uncorrelated binary probit choices. 
However, this particular assumption is not necessary, although it provides for simple 
interpretation and implementation. In subsequent analysis, Abowd and Farber (1982), 
Poirier (1980), Tunali (1986) relax this uncorrelation assumption, and propose the 
sequential choice model allowing for some degree of correlation between the 
sequential choices. Amemiya’s model is simply a special sequential case of this more 
general model. Tunali’s (1986) formulation is most appropriate for our purpose. 24 In 
that model, each choice stage can be specified as the binary probit model, but there is 
correlation between them:  
(4.1)    1111 '* ε+= rzD           D1=1 iff D1*>0 
            2222 '* ε+= rzD          D2=1 iff D2*>0 
                                                 
24 Tunali (1986) studies the sequential choice of migration/re-migration process. That is: if people 
choose to stay, then there is no re-migration decision observable. The same model has been applied to 
the labor market literature by Henneberger and Sousa_Poza (1998). People report their wage only when 
they choose to work. Khanna (2001) applied this model to the field of agricultural economics. She 
studied the nitrogen productivity under the sequential choice of two site-specific technologies adoption. 
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We assume the error terms ( 21 ,εε ) following the bivariate normal distribution: 
, where z are the parameters of interest in each choice equation, r 
is the individual covariance. D
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
]
1
1
[);0,0(
12
12
ρ
ρ
N
1* is the latent variable for CRP participation decision, 
D2* is the latent variable for the partial farm CRP participation decision given the CRP 
participation. 25  
The observability condition of this model can be shown as: 
D1=1 iff the farm household participates in CRP; it is zero otherwise; 
D2=1 if the farm household participates in CRP as a partial CRP farm participant; 
given the initial decision to participate in CRP. D2 is observed only when D1=1. 
Based on this observability rule, our model is one with an incomplete 
classification of the observed outcomes. The probability of participation in each 
regime can be shown as (from equation 4.1): 
(4.2)   
),','()','Pr()0,1Pr()(Pr 122211222111211 ρεε −−Φ=−<−>==== rzrzrzrzDDAob  
),','()','Pr()1,1Pr()(Pr 122211222111212 ρεε rzrzrzrzDDAob Φ=−>−>====  
)'(1)'Pr()0Pr()(Pr 1111113 rzrzDAob Φ−=−<=== ε  
Given these probabilities of the each outcome, this sequential choice model can be 
estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation; the likelihood function is: 
 (4.3)  })'(1{.),','().,','(
32 1
11122211122211 ∏∏ ∏ Φ−−−ΦΦ=
AA A
rzrzrzrzrzL ρρ  
                                                 
25 Since the second stage decisions (whole vs partial CRP farm) are mutually exclusive, only one 
participation equation is needed at this stage. Without loss of generality, we assume the partial CRP 
decision as the second choice decision. 
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Second Stage Equation System 
The second stage outcomes of interest are the CRP per-acre payment, and CRP 
acreage enrollment equations. Since the CRP payment and acreage are observed only 
for those who decide to participate in CRP, there are no equations to be estimated for 
regime A3 in Figure 4.1. Suppose the CRP payment and CRP acreage equations are 
specified as: 
(4.4)    ppp eXP += 'α  
(4.5)    aaap eXPA ++= 'αβ   
where P is the CRP price and A is CRP acreage; ( pap βαα ,, ) are the parameters of 
interest, and ( ) are the individual characteristics. To obtain a tractable result, 
the error terms of equations (4.4-4.5) are assumed to be uncorrelated. However, each 
of them is correlated with equation (4.1) as a trivariate normal distribution. To 
investigate the CRP price effects on CRP acreage, the price variable (P) is specified as 
one of the right hand side variables of equation (4.5).  
ap XX ,
To obtain the consistent estimates of equation (4.4-4.5), two empirical issues 
must be addressed: self-selection and the endogeneity. The first problem can be 
overcome by following Heckman’s approach by adding the appropriate Inverse Mills 
Ratios as new right hand side variables in equation (4.4-4.5) to correct for the self-
selection problem. However, the correction differs by regime. After correcting for the 
self-selection bias, linear regression (OLS) provides consistent estimates of equation 
(4.4-4.5) of each regime. However, applying linear estimation of equation (4.5) after 
accounting for self-selection might still lead to inconsistent estimation if CRP price is 
endogenous to the CRP acreage. To account for the endogeneity between CRP price 
and acreage, we first estimate price equation (4.4) following Heckman’s approach and 
calculate the predicted CRP price for use as an instrumental variable for the observed 
 52 
 
CRP price in equation (4.5). 26  We express the appropriate second stage equations of 
each regime below: 
In regime A1, the expected CRP payment and CRP acreage equations are: 
(4.6) )','|(')0,1|( 22211121 rzrzeEXDDPE PPP −<−>+=== εεα                        
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            2211' λσλσα PPPP X ++=  
(4.7)                        )','|('ˆ)0,1|( 22211121 rzrzeEXPDDAE AAAp −<−>++=== εεαβ
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For regime A2, the expected CRP payment, and CRP acreage equations can be written 
as:  
 (4.8) )','|(')1,1|( 22211121 rzrzeEXDDPE ppp −>−>+=== εεα                        
            
]
1
''
[
),','(
)'(
]
1
''[
),','(
)'('
2
12
221211
122211
22
2
2
12
111222
122211
11
1
ρ
ρ
ρ
φσ
ρ
ρ
ρ
φσα
−
−ΦΦ+
−
−ΦΦ+=
rzrz
rzrz
rz
rzrz
rzrz
rzX
p
ppp
 
            2211' λσλσα pppp X ++=  
                                                 
26 This strategy is commonly used in labor economics (Killingsworth, 1983 and Fernandez, Rodriguez 
and Sperlich, 2001). 
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(4.9)                        )','|('ˆ)1,1|( 22211121 rzrzeEXPDDAE AAAp −>−>++=== εεαβ
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             2211'ˆ λσλσαβ ppppp XP +++=
One should note that the estimated variance of the second stage is incorrect, 
based on an argument similar to that for the binary choice sample selection model 
(Heckman 1979). As such, we have to correct for both endogenous selection for the 
two choices and heteroscedasticity problems.27  
Analysis of Farm Productivity and Efficiencies 
In order to understand the effects of the sequential CRP participation decisions 
on farm productivity, we utilize the two-stage method of moments to estimate the 
production function and the technical efficiency of each farmer in each group. 
Furthermore, we study the relative technical and scale efficiencies, and relative 
                                                 
27Similar to the standard binary choice sample selection model by Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981), 
the variance-covariance matrix of the second stage estimators should be corrected for both endogenous 
selection and the heteroscedasticity problems. The correct variance-covariance matrix is (Greene 1998): 
1
22
2
211
2
1
21 *)*'*]('*'*'*'*)(*'[*)*'( −− Σ+Σ+∏−= XXXGGXXGGXXIXXXV θθσ    
where: 
],,[* 21 λλXX =  
},...,{ 21 Ndiag πππ=∏  
2
2211222
2
2111
2
1 )()'()'( λθλθλθλθπ ++−+−= xzxzi
),','(
),','(
)](2[
2211
22112
2
2
121 ρ
ρφθθρθθ
xzxz
xzxz
−−Φ
−−+−−  
Σ  is the asymptotic covariance matrix of the sequential choice model: 
],,[ 1221 ρ
λ
zz
G jj ∂
∂=              j =1,2 
The first term of the terms in [.] is used for correcting the heteroscedasticity (White (1980)), while the 
second term of [.] is used for correcting the endogenous selection problem for the binary CRP decision, 
and the third term is used for correcting the partial CRP decision.  
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technology differences between groups by decomposing the Malqumist index of Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP). In so doing, we are able to understand the impact of the 
sequential CRP participation decisions on technical and scale efficiencies, and farm 
productivity.     
Estimating the Production Functions 
To begin the analysis related to technical efficiency and productivity, we 
estimate a production function for each of the two groups (Partial CRP participants 
and non-participants). This is possible because farm production and input levels are 
observed for each farmer in these two groups. These two production function can be 
specified as: 
(4.10)                   1111 ' ξβ += XY       and       0000 ' ξβ += XY  , 
where Y1 and Y0 are the production functions for partial CRP participants, and non-
participants, respectively. Accordingly, the conditional expected production levels of 
each group, under the trivariate normality assumption for ( 121 ,, ξεε ), ( 021 ,, ξεε ), are: 
(4.11)  )1,1|(')1,1|( 21111211 ==+=== IIEXIIYE ξβ  
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Using this result, equation (4.11) can be rewritten as equation (4.12):28
                                                 
28 Note that equation (4.12) is the same as the binary choice model for off-farm labor supply only, since 
the non-CRP participants don’t make any decision regarding either whole or partial CRP farm decisions. 
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Under these assumptions, it can be shown easily that the expected values of the 
conditional random errors ( ) are equal to zero. 
Consequently, the OLS estimation of equation (4.14) for each group yields consistent 
estimators for (
)0|(),1|( 10 == IEIE olsols ξξ
01
,,, 01 ρρ σσββ ).  
Estimating the Technical Efficiency Index 
Rather than limiting our attention to a traditional production function to study 
the effects of CRP participation on farm productivity, we exploit the distinct advantage 
associated with a stochastic production frontier. Through this more complex 
specification, it is possible to calculate a technical efficiency index for each farmer.  
Separate production functions for these two groups based on an appropriate 
formulation of the stochastic frontier function can be rewritten as: 
(4.13)    1111111 ' uvYXY
F −+=+= ξβ
              0000000 ' uvYXY
F −+=+= ξβ
where the variables ( ) are assumed to be the frontier production functions of 
each group, respectively. Following Aigner et al. (1977), we assume the random 
variable (v
FF YY 01 ,
i, for i = 0,1), a two-sided error term, has a normal distribution of N~(0, 
σvi2 ). The random variable (u), a one-sided error term, is the non-negative technical 
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efficiency component with a variance σui2. The two components are assumed 
independent. To implement the two stage method of moments, this involves estimated 
the traditional production functions first then decomposing the estimated error of the 
production functions ( 01 ,ξξ ) into two terms (v1, u1, v0, u0).  
To proceed with the decomposition of this error structure, we must first 
recognize that the expected values of the two one-sided error terms (E(u1) and E(u0)) 
are not equal to zero. We can rewrite equation (4.13) as: 
(4.14)   )]([)(' 111111111 uEuvuEYXY
F +−+−=+= ξβ
           )]([)(' 000000000 uEuvuEYXY
F +−+−=+= ξβ
From equation (4.14), two conditions must hold: 
(4.15)        and       )(' 1111 uEYX
F −=β )()]([ 111111 uEeuEuv scf +=+−=ξ  
                 and      )(' 0000 uEYX
F −=β )()]([ 000000 uEeuEuv scf +=+−=ξ  
We can easily see that the parameters ( ) can be calculated using the 
information about (
2
0
2
1
2
0
2
1 ,,, uuvv σσσσ
01 ,ξξ ), if combined with the information about E (u1), and E (u0). 
Although the predicted values of ( ) can be informed from equation (4.13), we 
must specify the distribution of (u
01
ˆ,ˆ ξξ
1, u0) to have the necessary information about (E (u1), 
E (u0)).  
Once the distributions of u1 and u0 are specified, we can obtain estimates of the 
parameters of interest ( ) by utilizing the fact that since E (u20
2
1
2
0
2
1 ,,, uuvv σσσσ 1) are E (u0) 
are constant, the second and third central moments of ( ) should be equal to the 
second and third central moments of (v
01
ˆ,ˆ ξξ
1-u1) and (v0-u0). This amounts to applying the 
two-stage method of moments to estimate the stochastic production frontier (Byrnes 
1991; Huang et al., 2002).29  
                                                 
29 This method was first proposed by Byrnes (1991) who studied the effects of private versus public 
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Perhaps the best way to think about the estimation strategy for the stochastic 
production frontier is in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the traditional 
production functions for each group, ignoring technical efficiency. This is equivalent 
to estimating equation (4.11) from above by OLS. This provides consistent estimates 
of the parameters (
01
,,, 01 ρρ σσββ ), as above. In step two, we decompose the predicted 
errors from the first step ( ) into their two components (random shock and the 
technical inefficiency) and calculate the remaining parameters, ( ).   
olsols
01
ˆ,ˆ ξξ
2
0
2
1
2
0
2
1 ,,, uuvv σσσσ
Under the half-normal distribution, ui is assumed to be . The first 
three moment conditions for u are: 
),0( 2uiN σ+
(4.16)   
iui
uE σπ
2)( =  
(4.17)   22)(
iui
uV σπ
π −=  
(4.18)   33 )41(2)(
iui
uE σππ −−= . 
To solve for the parameters ( ), we must recall the definitions of moments:   22 ,
ii uv
σσ
      (4.19) 2222
2)(
iii uviv
uVm σπ
πσσ −+=+=  
                 333 )
41(2)(
iui
uEm σππ −−== . 
      The consistent estimators of ( ) are then: 22 ,
ii uv
σσ
(4.20) 3/232 )
)/41(2
(ˆ
ππ
σ
−
= m
iu
  and       22
2 ˆ)21(ˆ
ii uv
m σπσ −−= .    
                                                                                                                                            
ownership on cost efficiency. Later, Huang et al. (2002) applied the similar approach to the case of rice 
cultivation in Taiwanese rice industry. In both papers, the analysis only focuses on the binary choice 
problem. Here, we extend and apply their approach to the sequential CRP choice problem.  
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Once the estimators of ( ) have been determined, the components of the two 
errors in the stochastic production frontier can be obtained as:  
22 ,
ii uv
σσ
(4.21)  iuiiscfe σπε ˆ
2ˆˆ −=    and   iuiiFi XY σπβ ˆ
2'ˆˆ += . 
Once the frontier model is estimated, the calculation of the technical efficiency 
index requires point estimates for the random variable u for each farmer. Following 
Jondrow et al. (1982), the expected value of u given the composite error (v-u) under 
the assumption of a half-normal distribution is:  
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Once these conditional expected values are obtained, the technical efficiency index of 
each farmer can be calculated as (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000): 
(4.23)     )ˆ|ˆ( ieuE scfeTE −=
Estimating Productivity Differences between Groups 
One of the main objectives of this study is to examine the farm productivity 
differences between groups of farmers to understand how CRP participation affects 
productivity or efficiency. We cannot directly compare the technical efficiency indices 
from the estimation above because the production environment is assumed to differ by 
group. However, the above results do provide information on differences in technical 
efficiency for farms within each group. Using this information, we can estimate the 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) index proposed by Malmquist (1953) to see the 
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relative productivity differences between groups based on the sample mean of each 
group.30 Using this approach, we can not only see the differences in TFP, but also 
identify the sources of the differences by decomposing TFP into relative differences in 
scale efficiency and the relative differences in technology.31
Although non-parametric data envelope analysis (DEA), where the TFP index 
is based on the distance function, is normally applied along with the Malmquist TFP 
Index, TFP can also be defined using stochastic production methods (Coelli et al., 
1998). Therefore, we consider non-participants (regime A3 of Figure 4.1) as the base 
group, and use the generalized version of the TFP formula outlined by Coelli (2003) 
and Lovell (2003):32  
(4.24)    
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where M(.) represents the relative TFP index of group 1 (Partial CRP participants) 
relative to group 0 (non-participants). V and C superscripts refer to the variable returns 
                                                 
30 Although the TFP index is usually applied to time series data to measure productivity changes 
through time, this concept can also be applied to the cross section data. In some resent studies, 
researchers have applied this approach to make cross-country comparisons in efficiency (Fare et al., 
1994; Thirtle et al., 1995; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1997) and make comparisons for different age groups 
(Tauer and Lordkipanidze, 2000).   
31 Goodwin and Mishra (2004) define the efficiency index or productivity index as the total value of 
output value divided by the total value of inputs. This index number approach explores little 
information about the sources of the productivity differences (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000). 
32 The conventional version of TFP index proposed by Fare et al. (1994) is:  
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In this version, the total factor productivity can only be decomposed into two components: technical 
efficiency and technology. However, the generalized version we use in this study can accommodate not 
only two sources of total factor productivity, but also the scale efficiency. 
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to scale (VRS) and constant returns to scale (CRS) production functions, respectively. 
If M > 1, the TFP of group 1 is greater than that for group 0; we can infer that partial 
CRP participation increases TFP. The term TEkj (yi,xi) represents technical efficiency 
for group j using the level of inputs for group i. Total factor productivity is 
decomposed into three sources. The ratio outside the square brackets (refer to T.C) 
measures the relative difference in technical efficiency between groups 1 and 0, which 
actually measures the relative distance between actual production and the frontier 
function between groups for the VRS technology. The first term in brackets (refer to 
E.C) measures the ratio of scale efficiencies between groups.33 The second term in 
brackets (refer to frontier) measures the relative difference in technologies, which is 
the comparison of the production frontiers between groups. If this term is greater than 
one, the production frontier of group 1 lies above that for group 0. If this is the case, 
the production frontier might be higher for farms participating in CRP participation.    
 
Empirical Results  
As is apparent in the discussion of the econometric methods, we distinguish 
several sets of results. The results for the sequential CRP choice model and the 
specification tests are reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The estimated equations for the 
CRP payment and acreage are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. We report 
the estimated production functions and the estimates of the technical efficiency 
functions in Tables 4.5-4.7, respectively. Finally, the related measures of technical and 
economic scale efficiency and productivity are shown in Tables 4.8. Throughout the 
discussion of these results, the effects of variables on CRP participation, CRP 
                                                 
33 Scale efficiency is measured as the amount by which productivity can be increased by moving to the 
point of technical optimal productive scale (Coelli 1998). In general, scale efficiency measures the 
effect whether firms are operating in the optimal size. In this study, we are interested in measuring the 
difference that how the partial CRP and non-CRP participants utilize the technology to their optimal 
productive scale.         
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payments, and CRP acreages are obvious from the signs on particular variables. 
Therefore, to avoid unnecessary repetition and in an attempt to make the discussion 
more conversational, we describe the results in general terms. 
From Table 4.1, the correlation coefficient between CRP participation and the 
partial CRP farm decision is very high (0.68), and it is also statistically significant at 
5% or higher level. We also test the hypothesis to see if the CRP participation and 
partial CRP farm decision can be regarded as two independent sequential decisions.34 
The likelihood ratio test value is 34, which is higher than the critical value under 5% 
level (x2(0.95,1)=3.84). This result immediately shows that it is appropriate to consider 
CRP participation and the partial CRP farm decisions as a dependent choice structure, 
rather than two independent sequential decisions.  
                                                 
34 If these two sequential decisions are assumed to be independent, the correlation coefficient is zero. 
This constructs the restricted model for likelihood ratio test. 
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T a b le  4 .1 :  S e q u e n t ia l  C h o ic e  E q u a t io n s
V a r ia b le C o e ffic ie n t S td b /S td
C o n sta n t -5 .9 0 5 1 .3 4 2 -4 .4 0 0
O P _ A G E 0 .0 3 4 0 .0 0 3 9 .9 0 7
O P _ E D _ C 0 .0 6 5 0 .0 1 6 4 .0 4 4
R IS K -0 .0 6 4 0 .0 1 8 -3 .6 4 3
O P 0 .2 7 2 0 .0 9 1 2 .9 7 8
E B I 0 .0 5 7 0 .0 2 0 2 .7 8 7
L Q H _ 9 6 0 .3 9 0 0 .1 9 0 2 .0 4 9
L Q L _ 9 6 -1 .1 5 7 0 .3 3 5 -3 .4 4 8
A G D IS T -1 .1 3 0 0 .2 6 7 -4 .2 2 9
A M T A _ A -0 .0 3 5 0 .0 0 4 -8 .1 5 8
C R O P 4 5 6 -1 .8 0 6 0 .2 4 0 -7 .5 3 9
C R O P S IZ 1 0 .2 6 5 0 .0 3 9 6 .8 5 3
R E G N 5 6 7 -0 .3 6 2 0 .1 4 3 -2 .5 2 1
R E G N 9 1 .2 4 0 0 .2 5 6 4 .8 4 8
U R B A N -0 .0 1 3 0 .0 0 2 -7 .1 3 2
C o n sta n t -3 .6 3 8 0 .8 1 7 -4 .4 5 1
O P _ R E T -1 .4 9 4 0 .3 7 0 -4 .0 4 1
O P _ E X P 0 .0 2 0 0 .0 0 6 3 .5 0 1
O P -0 .5 7 1 0 .2 9 5 -1 .9 3 4
R IS K 0 .1 5 4 0 .0 4 6 3 .3 4 6
L Q H _ 9 6 1 .6 7 9 0 .3 8 8 4 .3 3 1
D E B T _ R A T 1 .2 8 6 0 .5 5 7 2 .3 0 9
C R O P S IZ 1 0 .2 5 0 0 .0 6 3 3 .9 5 7
A G R IN -0 .0 2 0 0 .0 1 7 -1 .1 8 6
M A N U F -0 .0 2 5 0 .0 1 6 -1 .6 0 0
T R A D E 0 .1 0 8 0 .0 3 7 2 .8 9 8
R E G N 2 -1 .2 9 3 0 .4 1 1 -3 .1 4 4
R H O 0 .6 8 2 0 .1 4 4 4 .7 3 1
S a m p le 2 ,2 2 3
L o g L -9 4 6
L R  T e st* 3 4
*  T h e  c r i t ic a l  v a lu e  o f  x 2 (0 .9 5 ,1 )= 3 .8 4
   V a r ia b le  d e f in i t io n s  a r e  l i s te d  in  T a b le  2 .4  o f  C h a p te r  2 .
C R P  C h o ic e  E q u a tio n
P a r tia l  C R P  C h o ic e  E q u a tio n
C o r r e la tio n  C o e f f ic ie n t
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 CRP Participation Equation 
The empirical results of the CRP participation equation (the top proportion of 
Table 4.1) are encouraging, and are generally consistent with our household 
production theory. Participation depends generally on some characteristics of the farm, 
the farm operator, land quality and the circumstances in the local economy. There are 
also some differences in participation by major ERS production region.  
Based on these results, the propensity of participation in CRP increases with 
farm size;35 the propensity of CRP participation is lower if the farm is primarily 
engaged in vegetable, fruit or nursery production, rather than cash grain production. 
This finding is not unexpected because of the high production value from the 
vegetable or nursery farming, which reflects the higher opportunity cost for those 
specific farmers to enroll their lands in CRP. It is also perhaps no surprise that the 
receipt of decoupled payments decreases the likelihood of participation in CRP, since 
the farmland must remain in production in order to receive decoupled payments. 
However, the opposite is true if there is land on the farm that is: enrolled in a 
voluntary agricultural district, subject to a farmland preservation easement, or located 
in an agricultural protection zone or zoned exclusively for agricultural use. Farms 
located in agricultural districts generally wish to maintain their land in agricultural 
production, although many districts are in rapidly growing areas where there is 
competition for land for non-agricultural purposes. Therefore, it is hardly surprising 
that, ceteris paribus, these farmers would be less likely to enroll land in a program 
such as CRP that essentially takes land out of production. Another interesting finding 
is that farm households located in the higher EBI score areas have a higher propensity 
                                                 
35 The effect of farm size on CRP differs in the empirical literature. Konyar and Osborn (1990) found 
the negative correlation between farm operating acreage and CRP participation based on county level 
data; while Mclean, Hui, and Joseph (1994) surveyed 113 farmers in Louisiana and found a positive 
relationship.   
 64 
 
for CRP participation. Our finding is consistent with Isik and Yang (2004) and Park 
and Schorr (1997).36 The reasonable explanation might be reflected in the fact the 
bidding process, since higher EBI scores are the points assigned to a farm household 
bid, thus increasing the likelihood that the bid is accepted. Thus, in a very general way, 
this result is consistent with the actual implementation of the program in with 
contracts are accepted in large measures on the EBI ranking.  
Three measures of soil quality in the surrounding area were constructed to 
determine if participation in CRP was related to the quality of the soil resource. Based 
on these measures, participation in CRP rises as the proportion of land in the 
surrounding county is classified as high quality. The probability of participation falls 
as the proportion of low quality of land rises. This result might suggest CRP 
participation may be higher in areas where land is well suited for agriculture. 
Unfortunately, unless one had information about land quality by farm, it would be 
impossible to tell anything about the quality of land that is actually enrolled in CRP, or 
how the land quality on the farm affects a farmer’s decision to participate. However, 
our finding is not inconsistent with those who found the negative relation between soil 
erosion index and CRP participation based on the county level analysis (Goodwin, 
Vandeveer, and Deal (2004); Konyar and Osborn (1990)).   
The effects of the operator’s human capital (age and education) on CRP 
participation vary in the literature. 37  In our analysis, two variables suggest 
participation in CRP is related to the life cycle and human capital of the farm operator. 
The likelihood of CRP participation increases with the level of operator’s age and 
                                                 
36 Park and Schorr (1997) defined the maximum bid price as one of the factors affecting CRP 
participation. Their finding are not be directly compared to our result. However, maximum bid price is 
determined based on EBI score. One might expect that these two measures are highly correlated.    
37 Konyar and Osborn (1990) and Kalaitzandonakes and Monson (1994) both found a negative 
relationship between age and the CRP participation. However, McLean, Hui, and Joseph (1994) found 
the reverse.   
 65 
 
education. As the farm operators get older, committing some land to CRP may be one 
way of reducing operator labor requirements. This may also be a way of holding onto 
farmland assets until they are needed for the retirement years, or so that they can be 
passed on through an estate. The fact that the operator of the farm household working 
off the farm are more likely to participate in CRP may also be a way of reducing farm 
household labor requirements. Finally, it is likely that CRP payments are less variable 
from year-to-year than are returns to farming activity. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
see that the probability of CRP participation falls as a farmer’s preference for risk 
increases. The fact that the likelihood of CRP participation falls as the proportion of 
population that is urban rises would seem to reinforce this explanation.38  
Whole or Partial CRP Farm Participation 
The factors that distinguish between the partial (or whole) CRP participants are 
operator’s characteristic, farm size, government payment, and the economic location 
(the bottom section of Table 4.1). The operators who are retired from farming are less 
likely to be partial CRP participants. This result certainly reinforces the hypothesis that 
older farmers participate in CRP in part to pass farm assets through an estate, and CRP 
payments can be an important supplant to retire income. It is also true that this effect is 
also explained by the fact that the farmers with more farming experience, large farms 
or with high debt to asset ratios are more likely to be partial CRP participants. 
Furthermore, once the decision to participate in CRP is made, partial CRP 
participation is less likely for more risk averse farmers. Farm operators who work off 
the farm are also more likely to the whole CRP participants. For those farmers, there is 
a significant incentive to reduce the land commitment to agricultural production, 
particularly for those with full time jobs off the farm.    
Finally, the local and regional economic conditions determine the partial CRP 
                                                 
38 Duke (2004) also found that the likelihood of participation in CRP is lower in highly urban areas.   
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farms participation. If the local economy depends less on manufacturing or is more 
dependent on wholesale and retail trade, CRP participation is more likely to be partial.  
Exogeneity Tests of the Sequential CRP Choice Model  
In models such as these, there is always concern that variables related to other 
decisions by members of the household are endogenously determined, in this case 
determined along with the decision to participate in CRP (first stage choice). Therefore, 
before leaving our discussion of the sequential CRP participation model, it is 
important to address the issue of whether or not these other binary choices specified in 
these two choice equations are exogenous to the binary CRP or partial CRP choices. 
The results of these tests clearly affect the validity of any policy conclusions involving 
these variables.  
The variables for which this is a concern in this study are related to: off-farm 
work by the operator, participation in agricultural districts or related farmland 
retention activities, and the receipt of decoupled payments. In the model, the first two 
of these decisions are treated as binary choices, while the last is modeled as a 
continuous variable. For the partial or whole CRP farm participation decision (second 
stage choice), the tested variables are: off-farm work by the operator, retire decision of 
the operator, the risk preference of the operator, and the retirement decision of the 
operator. The two variables are treated as the binary choice variables. 
For each of these variables, we test the null hypothesis that these decisions are 
exogenous to CRP or partial CRP farm decisions. We test the null hypothesis that 
these decisions associated with two discrete binary variables are exogenous to CRP 
participation and two variables to partial CRP farm decisions using a method by Vella 
(1993). The tests for the binary variables are slightly different than for the continuous 
variables. For the continuous variable, the test is based on methods by Smith and 
Blundell (1986).  
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These tests involve several steps. For the discrete variable cases, the first step 
is to specify separate participation equations for those variables involved in the tests. 
There are two sets of explanatory variables included in these additional participation 
equations: the first set includes the variables we have specified in the CRP 
participation equation; the second set includes some new variables that are believed to 
determine the variable on which the test is being conducted.39  
Once these additional participation equations are specified, we estimate four 
separate two-equation simultaneous probit models using the method proposed by Vella 
(1993).40 Each two-equation system includes the original CRP equation, plus a second 
equation representing one of the variables to be tested. For each simultaneous probit 
model, we calculate the general residuals for the new participation equations from the 
estimated parameters. Next, we re-estimate the original binary CRP equation by 
including the general residual as a new explanatory variable. If the t-ratios on 
coefficients associated with the general residuals now included in the original binary 
CRP equations are statistically insignificant, then we fail to reject the hypothesis that 
these binary choices are exogenous.41   
A similar procedure is applied to the continuous variable case (e.g., decoupled 
payments).42 Once the new equation is specified, we follow the two-stage method 
proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986) to test the null hypothesis that decoupled 
payment are exogenous to the two-equation system. We can calculate the predicted 
values for decoupled payments. These predicted values are added to the original CRP 
                                                 
39 The specification of these extra variables is based on the goodness of fit from several possible trials.  
40 Empirically, the additional variables used in testing the operator’s decision to work off the farm and 
the retirement decision are: if the operator is raised on the farm and indices relating to the local 
economic importance of manufacturing, services, agriculture, and trade. 
41 Vella (1993) did not derive the asymptotic property for the standard error of the coefficient. 
Alternatively, we adjust the standard error based on the asymptotic theory proposed by Murphy and 
Topel (1985). 
42 Empirically, the additional variables we specify in testing the decision to receive decoupled payments 
decision are the local economic indices for manufacturing, agriculture, services, and trade. 
 68 
 
binary choice model as a new explanatory variable; the model is re-estimated, and if 
the coefficient on this new variable is statistically insignificant, then we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that decoupled payments are exogenous. 
We report the results of these tests of the null hypotheses that these variables 
are exogenous to the CRP probit model or partial CRP farm decisions in Table 4.2, and 
they are encouraging. In all cases, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
corresponding decision is exogenous to the decision to either participate in CRP or 
partial CRP farm.  
 
       
T a b le  4 .2 :  E x o g e n e ity  T e s t
V ar ia b le s T  V a lu e P -V a lu e
O P -0 .2 2 5 0 .8 2 2
A G D IS T 0 .9 2 0 0 .3 5 8
A M T A _ A 0 .7 8 9 0 .4 3 0
O P -0 .0 3 4 0 .9 7 3
O P _ R E T 0 .0 9 2 0 .9 2 7
   V a r ia ble  d e fin it io n s  a re  l is ted  in  T a ble  2 .4  o f  C h a p ter  2 .
F o r  C R P  C h o ic e  E q u a tio n
F o r  P a r tia l C R P  E q u atio n
 
Second Stage Equations 
In developing a complete understanding of factors affecting CRP enrollment, 
we must also estimate an equation for the number of acres enrolled for the CRP 
participants. Since it is expected that the level of payment may influence the amount 
of land enrolled, we estimate a CRP per acre payment equation as well. These results 
are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. As noted above, the inverse mills 
ratios are included in both equations to control for any sample selection bias, and it is 
statistically significant in both. Further, consistent with a tradition for specifying wage 
equations in the labor economics literature, the performance of the payment equation 
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was improved through a semi-logarithmic specification (e.g., the dependent variable is 
the logarithm of CRP payments).  
 
Table 4.3: CRP Payment Equations
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
CONSTANT 2.593 0.502 5.161 2.075 0.244 8.492
OP_EXP 0.042 0.010 4.266 0.042 0.010 4.236
OP_EXPSQ -0.001 0.000 -4.684 -0.001 0.000 -3.222
H_SIZE -0.050 0.032 -1.567 -0.014 0.052 -0.277
AGDIST -0.220 0.391 -0.563 -1.543 0.375 -4.119
CROP456 -0.664 0.554 -1.198 -- -- --
LQH_96 1.534 0.248 6.182 0.719 0.191 3.757
LQM_96 0.988 0.351 2.815 1.102 0.476 2.316
REGN1 -- -- -- 0.532 0.121 4.410
REGN567 -0.437 0.145 -3.019 -0.678 0.340 -1.995
MANUF 0.020 0.007 2.767 0.022 0.004 5.127
TRADE -0.017 0.019 -0.880 -- -- --
IMR_CRP 0.271 0.105 2.572 0.422 0.171 2.460
IMR_WP 0.292 0.117 2.489 0.242 0.204 1.184
Wald Test* 7.71 11.28
Sample 288 109
Adjust-R2 0.361 0.616
* The critical value of x 2 (0.95,2)=5.99; x 2 (0,90,2)=4.61
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
 For Partial-CRP Farm  For Partial CRP Farm
 
The CRP Payment Equation  
Table 4.3 reports the results for CRP payment equations of both partial CRP 
and whole CRP farms. The Wald test results (7.71 and 11.28, respectively) for testing 
whether the Inverse Mills Ratios are jointly equal to zero show the importance of the 
self-selection problem. In both cases, the test results are statistically significant. Since 
the effects of the explanatory variables are similar for both groups, we discuss the 
results in general below.   
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On balance, the factors that affect the size of CRP payments make sense. CRP 
payments are directly related to the proportion of land in the area that is of high quality, 
and payments differ by region. All else equal, they tend to be higher in the Heartland, 
but lower in the Eastern Uplands, the Southern Seaboard, and the Fruitful Rim than in 
the rest of the ERS production regions.43 Payments increase with the percentage of 
local employment in manufacturing, which, in turn, is likely to be related to the 
strength of the regional economy.  
The CRP payment also decreases as the proportion of land on the farm that is 
planted to vegetable, fruit or nursery increases, which might well reflect the fact that 
these farm operators may tend to enroll somewhat poorer quality land in CRP, 
particularly in situations where the most productive land is retained in cash crop 
production.  
The effect of human capital on payment is represented by years of farming 
experience and its squared term. The farmer with more farming experience is likely to 
receive higher payments, but the payment increases at a decreasing rate. This 
experience may well contribute to these farmers’ effectiveness at bidding and selecting 
the most appropriate land to enroll and management practice used on the CRP land.  
The CRP Acres Equation  
Because it is likely that CRP payments and acreage enrolled are endogenously 
determined, we use the predicted per acre payment instead of the observed per acre 
payment as the instrument for payment variable in the CRP acreage equation.44 From a 
policy standpoint, the factors that affect the acreage enrolled in CRP as partial or 
                                                 
43 While these results would seem reasonable, it would be helpful to know how these differences square 
with differences in agricultural land prices or rental rates across these regions. If this were true, then 
there would be some evidence that CRP payments differ in relation to the opportunity cost of land in 
agricultural production by region. 
44 This strategy is commonly used in labor economics (Killingsworth, 1983 and Fernandez, Rodriguez 
and Sperlich, 2001). 
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whole CRP farms are quite interesting (Table 4.4).45  
From Table 4.4, it appeals that land acre enrolled increases with the payment 
per acre (P_HAT). The effect is greater for the partial CRP farm participants, and this 
effect is statistical significant in this equation as well. One would certainly expect 
acreage enrolled to respond to this direct payment incentive.46 It is perhaps one of the 
most significant findings in our analysis because it is inconsistent with much of the 
previous literature, particularly studies based on county-level analysis, where the acres 
enrolled fall as payments rise.47  
Although the number of acres enrolled in CRP increases as the CRP payment 
per acre increases, the negative coefficient on an interaction term for payment and low 
land quality (PLQL) indicates that this effect decreases in areas with higher 
proportions of low quality land. The CRP acre responses to CRP per acre price are 
depicted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for partial CRP farm and whole CRP farms, 
respectively. Accounting for the low land quality index, we find that the overall price 
effects are different between partial and whole CRP farms. For the whole CRP 
enrollees, the overall price effect is negatively response to low land quality of the 
sample, but the overall price effect is positively response to the lower proportion of the 
low land quality. The fact that the positive price effect decreases in areas with high 
proportions of low quality land is consistent with the belief held by some that the 
maximum payment is often set too high in areas attempting to enroll higher quality 
                                                 
45 The Inverse Mills Ratios are included in both equations to control for any sample selection bias, and 
they are statistically significant in both. The Wald test results to test whether the two Inverse Mills 
Ratios are jointly equal to zero are 27.25 and 7.26, respectively, which are statistically significant at 5% 
or higher level.  
46 Suter (2004) found that annual incentive payments affect CREP enrollment in buffer strips, measured 
as a proportion of eligible farmland. His study is based on data aggregated at the county level, but the 
positive relationship between land enrolled and level of payment was only apparent when he used a 
refined estimate of eligible farmland derived from GIS data on the amount of agricultural land along 
streams in the target watersheds. 
47 For example, both Fleming (2004) and Goodwin et al. (2004), who study the CRP acreage response 
based on the county-level data, found a negative relationship between CRP acreage enrollment and the 
annual payment.   
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Table 4.4: CRP Acre Equations
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant 705.676 355.706 1.984 1180.909 669.001 1.765
OP_AGE -- -- -- -1.790 2.677 -0.669
OP_ED_C 76.730 44.471 1.725 2.380 97.162 0.024
OP_EDSQ -2.845 1.661 -1.713 -0.973 3.590 -0.271
OP_EXP -4.471 1.967 -2.273 -- -- --
CROP17 53.370 55.045 0.970 -- -- --
AMTA_A 3.309 2.589 1.278 -11.408 12.710 -0.898
NETWORT1 3.756 1.715 2.190 5.937 35.299 0.168
TENANCY -3.037 6.676 -0.455 -21.637 14.401 -1.502
LQH_96 -999.010 311.566 -3.206 -776.991 409.275 -1.898
LQM_96 -722.776 268.155 -2.695 -536.224 452.445 -1.185
EQIP 21.869 114.393 0.191 -422.721 149.321 -2.831
REGN1 -79.167 42.118 -1.880 -- -- --
REGN3 -68.444 110.067 -0.622 162.854 108.431 1.502
REGN9 -- -- -- -179.874 127.996 -1.405
TRADE -1.996 13.885 -0.144 -7.025 14.829 -0.474
PLQL -15.489 5.319 -2.912 -13.448 12.821 -1.049
P_HAT 2.085 1.082 1.926 1.424 2.538 0.561
IMR_CRP -223.497 117.828 -1.897 -213.480 124.886 -1.709
IMR_WP -221.913 103.311 -2.148 -195.834 116.261 -1.684
Wald Test* 27.25 7.26
Sample 288 109
Adjust-R2 0.335 0.421
* The critical value of x2 (0.95,2)=5.99; x2 (0,90,2)=4.61
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
 For Partial-CRP Farm  For Whole-CRP Farm
 
 
land. It is also consistent with a belief that some farmers, who try to enroll poorer 
quality land into CRP, bid relatively low to ensure acceptance, thus resulting in the 
negative price response. This is supported by our analysis for the whole farm 
participants. It is not surprising that the effect of price becomes negative in areas with 
lower proportion of poor quality land than for partial CRP participants. 
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Figure 4.2: CRP Acre Response to CRP Per-Acre Price (Partial CRP Farm) 
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Figure 4.3: CRP Acre Response to CRP Per-Acre Price (Whole CRP Farm) 
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There are also substantial differences in the CRP acreage by region. Acreage 
enrolled is lower in the Heartland and Mississippi Portal, but higher in the Northern 
Great Plains, Eastern Uplands, the Southern Seaboard, and the Fruitful Rim. Given 
that much of the best farmland in the country is in the Heartland, these results 
reinforce the fact that acres enrolled for CRP participants decline as the proportion of 
land that is of high quality in a locality increases. This is somewhat at odds with the 
results from the CRP participation equation (Table 4.1), where the likelihood of 
participation in CRP is increased as the proportion of land that is of high quality in a 
locality increases. However, our result might be interpreted as a problem in adverse 
selection: farmers may be unlikely to enroll high or medium quality land into CRP; 
they retain it in crop production. It is difficult to know if this finding is consistent with 
one of the primary goals of CRP, the reduction of soil erosion and other environmental 
residuals associated with agricultural production. There is consistency only if it is the 
poorer quality land that is more subject to erosion and more environmentally 
venerable.   
CRP acreage enrollment is also affected by local economic indices. Local areas 
with a higher proportion employed in manufacturing have less land enrolled in CRP, 
which might reflect the opportunity cost of land in non-agricultural uses and work 
against large acreages being committed to programs such as CRP.  
There are also characteristics of the farming operation and households that 
affect the acreage enrollment. Acreage enrolled increases for those farms classified as 
cash grain farms, although the effect is not statistically significant in the acreage 
equation. Acres enrolled decrease with the farming experience of the farm operator but 
increase with the farm operator’s level of education in a nonlinear faction; this 
reinforces the effect from the participation equation.  
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Production Function and Farm Productivity 
As introduced above, we next identify the effect of CRP participation by first 
estimating two separate production functions, one for CRP participants and one for 
non-participants. In order to decompose the economic efficiency, we estimate two 
production function of each group based on variable return to scale and constant return 
to scale technologies. The second step is to estimate the technical efficiency of each 
farm household by decomposing the compound error on the frontier function into 
technical efficiency and random shock components. Given the estimated technical 
efficiency by groups and utilizing Malmquist Total factor Productivity Index (1953), 
we compare the different performance regarding technical and scale efficiencies, 
production frontiers, and total factor productivities of two groups. The comparison is 
based on the sample means of each group. Finally, given the estimated technical 
efficiency, we are able to discuss the factors determining the technical efficiency index 
of each group and the heteroscedasticity between groups.  
The Production Function   
To perform this analysis, we specify two Cobb-Douglas production functions, 
one for partial CRP farms and one for non-participants.48 All of the output and input 
variables are specified in logarithm. Gross cash sales is used as the measure of 
production, while there are four inputs, operating land (LGLAND), variable 
production cost (LGLC_C), hired labor cost (LGLABOR), and capital (LGCA).49 We 
aggregate the expenditures for fertilizer, seeds, plants, fuel, and utilities as a measure 
of the variable production cost. The hired labor cost includes regular hired labor and 
contact labor. Capital use is measured by the fixed value of building and farm 
                                                 
48 When translog production functions are specified, the estimated input elasticities in the mean level 
are negative for some inputs. As such, we specify two Cobb-Douglas production functions here. 
49 The output variable we used here is the same definition as Goodwin and Mishra (2004), who study 
the efficiency impact of farm households working off-farm decision. 
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equipment, excluding dwelling value. The estimates of two separate production 
functions are shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. However, we focus on the variable 
return to scale estimation for further analysis (Table 4.5).  
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Production Function Estimation (Variable Returns to Scale)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -4.373 0.578 -7.563 -4.778 0.270 -17.726
LGLAND 0.426 0.099 4.299 0.254 0.033 7.609
LGLC_C 0.262 0.087 3.006 0.495 0.049 10.088
LGLABOR 0.085 0.020 4.284 0.113 0.009 12.435
LGCA 0.349 0.090 3.882 0.198 0.033 5.945
IMR_CRP 0.131 0.072 1.820 0.193 0.098 1.967
IMR_WP -0.549 0.181 -3.040 -- -- --
RTS 1.122 1.061
Wald Test* 63.98 --
Sample 308 1,740
Adjust-R2 0.726 0.717
* The null hypothesis of Wald Test is: IMR_CRP=IMR_WP=0; 
   The critical value of x2(0.95,2)=5.99; x2(0,90,2)=4.61
 For Partial-CRP Farm  For NON-CRP Farm
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Table 4.6: Production Function Estimation (Constant Returns to Scale)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -3.547 0.244 -14.519 -4.491 0.098 -45.678
LGLAND 0.398 0.068 5.879 0.240 0.021 11.177
LGLC_C 0.266 0.048 5.490 0.495 0.020 24.875
LGLABOR 0.085 0.016 5.218 0.116 0.007 15.454
LGCA 0.251 0.061 4.118 0.149 0.021 6.988
IMR_CRP 0.111 0.101 1.099 0.097 0.101 0.965
IMR_WP -0.670 0.134 -5.008 -- -- --
RTS 1.000 1.000
Sample 308 1,740
Adjust-R2 0.718 0.715
* The null hypothesis of Wald Test is: IMR_CRP=IMR_WP=0; 
   The critical value of x2(0.95,2)=5.99; x2(0,90,2)=4.61
 For Partial-CRP Farm  For NON-CRP Farm
 
 
In Table 4.5, the coefficients of both functions on the Inverse Mills Ratio are 
statistically significant. The Wald test for joint Inverse Mills Ratios of the partial CRP 
farm group is 63.98, which is significant at the 5% level or higher. The t-value of the 
Inverse Mills Ratios of the non-CRP participant group is 1.967, which is also 
significant at the 5% level. Both of the results show it is necessary to consider the self-
selection problem of the production function estimation.      
It is also interesting to see that economies of scale in production are quite 
different between these two groups. Although the production functions for both groups 
exhibit increasing return to scale, farmers participating in CRP as the partial farms 
enjoy the higher economies scale (1.122 vs. 1.061). This result is not so surprising 
since the farm sizes of CRP participants are indeed larger than the non-CRP 
participants. The production elasticities for the inputs differ between groups as well.  
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Technical Efficiency and Productivity Comparison  
In order to identify the effects of CRP participation on technical efficiency, it is 
necessary to compare the performance between groups. After decomposing the error 
structures for frontier production functions for these two groups using the two-stage 
method of moments described in equations 4.13 through 4.24, we utilize the 
Malmquist TFP Index formula to estimate differences between groups, in terms of 
total factor productivity, technical and scale efficiencies, and production frontiers. All 
of these comparisons in Table 4.7 are based on the mean levels of each group. At the 
means of the data, the total factor productivity of the group of partial CRP participants 
appears to be slightly below that of the non-participant group; the ratio of the two total 
factor productivities is 0.981. This is partially explained by the fact that the CRP 
participants also appear to be less technically efficient than the non-participants. The 
ratio of the technical efficiency indices between partial CRP participants and non-
participants is 0.648. In determining the difference in TFP, this large difference in 
technical efficiency is offset by two other factors. First, the production frontier for the 
partial CRP participants is slightly above that for the non-participants; the ratio of 
these two frontiers is 1.15. Second, the partial CRP farms operate their firms closer to 
their technically optimal productive scales than the non-CRP participants. The ratio of 
scale efficiencies between these two groups is 1.317.  
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Technical Efficiency, CRP participants (VRS) 0.238
Technical Efficiency,non-participants (VRS) 0.367
Technical Efficiency, CRP participants (CRS) 0.310
Technical Efficiency,non-participants (CRS) 0.364
Technical Efficiency, TE1C(0) 0.474
Technical Efficiency, TE0C(1) 0.535
Technical Efficiency Index Ratio 0.648
Production Frontier Index Ratio 1.150
Scale Efficiency Index Ratio 1.317
Total Factor Productivity Index Ratio 0.981
* Note: Ratios are calculated based on non-participant group.
   TE1C(0) is used the non-participants' data to match CRS1
   TE0C(1) is used the CRP participants' data to match CRS0
Table 4.7: Productivity and Efficiency Com parisons 
 
 
Determinants of Technical Efficiency  
To further understand the difference in terms of technical, scale efficiencies 
and farm productivity between these two groups, it is crucial to understand the factors 
determining these measurements of each group. We only focus on the technical 
efficiency equation to discuss the factors determining the technical efficiencies of each 
group. 50  
Given production function estimates of the two groups based on the variable 
return to scale technology (VRTS), the technical efficiency index of each farm 
household within the each group, can be estimated based on the two-stage method of 
moment approach outlined above. The distribution of the technical efficiency 
                                                 
50 Ideally, it is necessary to discuss the factors determining not only technical efficiency but also scale 
efficiency of each group in order to explore the reasons of the differences between groups. However, 
our approach is not suitable to estimate the scale efficiency equation, since to calculate the scale 
efficiency requires the comparison of these two groups (see equation 4.24). As such, the scale efficiency 
index of each farm within each group is not available.  
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estimates for the groups are depicted in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. The distributions of 
the technical efficiency of both groups are quite different. The estimated technical 
efficiency index is for the non-CRP participants are more centralized compared to the 
partial CRP farm group. Given the estimated technical efficiency index of each farmer 
as the dependent variable, OLS regression is applied to estimate technical efficiency 
index for both the partial CRP farms and the non-CRP participants to a number of 
social economic factors (Table 4.8). For each group, the factors determining the 
technical efficiency are farm and farm household characteristics, government policy, 
operator’s characteristics, and environmental features.51
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Use of a second stage regression model to determine the factors the farm specific attributes in 
explaining technical efficiency have been suggested in a number of studies (e.g. Wadud and White 2000; 
Shafiq and  Rehman 2000). Although some authors (Battese and Coelli 1995) proposed the one-step 
approach (ie. specify the social characteristics explaining technical efficiency to stochastic production 
model and estimate it with MLE) to improve efficiency of the technical efficiency equation, this method 
can’t be applied to our study since the sequential CRP choice decision will complicate the MLE 
procedure of the stochastic production frontier model. 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of the Estimated Technical Efficiency Index for  
                    Partial CRP Farm  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Distribution of the Estimated Technical Efficiency Index for  
                    Non-CRP Participants  
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Table 4.8: OLS Estimation of Technical Efficiency Equations
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant 0.300 0.119 2.531
OP_AGE -0.007 0.002 -3.514
OP_ED_C 0.005 0.005 1.165
AMTA_A 0.003 0.001 2.250
OP_EXP 0.004 0.003 1.416
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 -0.520
RAISE_OP 0.004 0.037 0.106
TENANCY 0.037 0.008 4.508
H_SIZE13 0.040 0.017 2.327
LQH_96 0.197 0.048 4.132
Sample 303
Adjust R2 0.231
Constant 0.137 0.027 5.091
OP_RET -0.048 0.018 -2.637
OP_ED_C 0.013 0.002 6.789
OP_EXP 0.000 0.000 -0.808
RAISE_OP 0.025 0.011 2.197
H_SIZE13 0.034 0.006 5.475
LQH_96 0.189 0.019 9.699
CROPSIZ1 -0.019 0.007 -2.584
CROP17 -0.074 0.010 -7.211
AMTA_A 0.000 0.000 0.958
Sample 1,716
Adjust R2 0.117
 Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
 FOR PARTIAL CRP FARM
 FOR NON-CRP FARM
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Due to the differences in the distribution of estimated technical efficiencies, 
the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables are different for these two 
groups, but both of the results are consistent with our economic intuition.52 In general, 
farmer and household characteristics explain some difference in technical efficiency. 
The farmers of younger age, more farming experience and more educated are more 
efficient, although some of the factors are not statistically significant for the non-
participant group. Technical efficiency is higher for the farm operators raised on the 
farm in the non participant group. This is reasonable finding since it might capture the 
effect of the human capital (Huffman 2004). For the partial CRP farm group, the 
higher proportion of land owned by the farm household (as measured by the tenancy 
variable), the higher is the technical efficiency of the farm. Additionally, the farms 
receiving more decoupled payments are also more technical efficient. This might be 
reasonable because the farmer with higher payment from the government might invest 
in their farms to improve the farming efficiency. Also, the farms with a higher land 
quality index are more technical efficient. This result is consistent with the finding of 
Wadud and White (2000).   
Concluding Remarks  
Focusing on the CRP participation decision of the farm household, we identify 
those factors affecting both farmers’ decisions to participate in the CRP and the level 
of participation, and its impacts on technical efficiencies and productivities. We 
propose a three-stage econometric model for the empirical analysis. The first stage 
estimates a sequential choice model to account for both the CRP participation decision 
and whether or not the entire farm or only part of it is enrolled in CRP. To our best 
knowledge, no one has made this particular distinction studying CRP participation. To 
                                                 
52 We specify slightly different regressors of these two models based on the goodness of fit of each 
model.   
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validate the model specification, we test our empirical model to determine if other 
choices made by the farmer are exogenous, and therefore can be included as 
explanatory variables. In the second stage, we estimate both a CRP per-acre payment 
equation and a CRP acreage enrollment equation, correcting for sample selection bias. 
In the third stage, we estimate differences in technical efficiencies and factor 
productivities between partial CRP participants and non-participants using the two-
stage method of moment estimation. Since whole farm participants are no longer 
producing agricultural commodities, the comparison are relevant only for partial CRP 
farms CRP and non-participants. The measures of technical efficiency at the means of 
the data are compared between groups. The differences in factor productivity between 
the groups are also compared using the Malmquist TFP formula. 
Our empirical findings are encouraging. In terms of model performance, 
statistical tests confirm the need to control for sample selection. Further, statistical 
tests support the hypothesis that binary CRP choice and partial CRP enrollment 
decisions should be considered jointly but specify as two choice structures, since the 
factors affecting these two decisions are different. This evidence primarily supports 
our sequential CRP choice model specification. That is, a simple binary choice model 
that didn’t differentiate between part and whole farm participation would likely have 
resulted in a model misspecification. 
Furthermore, although farmers in areas where soil quality is high are more 
likely to participate in CRP, the level of participation (as measured by acreage enrolled) 
is higher in areas where land quality is relatively low. Since the coefficient on the 
predicted per-acre payment is positive and statistically significant in this acreage 
equation, the level of participation does increase with the payment level. However, it 
becomes negative in areas as the proportion of the low land quality increases. The 
overall price effect on CRP acreage is negative for the whole CRP enrollees. This is 
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perhaps an important distinction to recognize between partial and whole farm 
participations.  
We also find that farmers attempting to protect the future viability of their 
farming operations by participating in state or local agricultural district programs are 
located in an agricultural protection zone, etc. are less likely remove cropland from 
agricultural production by participating in CRP.  
Finally, based on estimated production functions and the decomposition to 
estimate the technical and scale efficiencies, we find that for those who participate in 
CRP are technical inefficient. However, the difference is offset by the higher scale 
efficiencies and production frontiers for the CRP participants. Thus, the differences in 
total factor productivities are small.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IDENTIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRP PARTICIPATION 
AND THE OPERATOR’S DECISION TO WORK OFF THE FARM  
Introduction 
There are three objectives in this chapter. First, we investigate the extent to 
which the off-farm labor decisions of the farm operator and the CRP participation of 
the farm household are made independently, are simultaneous, or are determined 
sequentially. This distinction is a critical link in a larger ongoing research effort to 
understand those factors that affect participation in environmentally related farm 
programs. We are particularly interested in how these decisions to work off the farm 
and participate in the CRP depend on the stock of human capital and risk attitudes of 
farm operators, as well as the composition of farm household income and wealth. It is 
also critical to identify how these decisions differ by region and how they are affected 
by land quality, farm size, and participation in other government programs. Once the 
appropriate decision making process has been identified, our second objective is 
investigate how these same factors affect the CRP acreage and hours worked off the 
farm by the operators. We are also interested in the impact of these two decisions on 
farm productivity and technical and scale efficiencies.   
Because decisions to work off the farm and to participate in CRP are 
effectively binary choices, the econometric models developed for the empirical 
analysis are based on a discrete choice framework. To identify the appropriate decision 
making process, we investigate two alternative families of choice structure. In the first, 
the farm households’ decisions to work off the farm and to participate in the CRP are 
determined simultaneously. The two major econometric approaches consistent with 
this simultaneous decision hypothesis are based on a multinomial logit model and a 
bivariate probit model. These two models differ in the assumptions imposed on the 
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error terms. We determine which specification is preferred on the basis of the 
likelihood ratio test proposed by Vuong for model selection under a non-nested 
hypothesis and test the Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IIA) assumption of 
multinomial logit model using the Hausman-Wu test.  
Second, we examine the possibility that the two choices are made sequentially: 
the farm household may first make the decision to work off the farm, after which the 
decision to participate in the CRP is made. Or, the reverse could also be true. Our 
strategy is to estimate separate models for each possible sequence and test the 
performance of each. Although a nested multinomial logit model (NLM), based on a 
generalized extreme value distribution for the error structure, is frequently used to 
model sequential choices, it is not particularly suitable in this application where the 
characteristics of the farm households in the sample differ, but the characteristics of 
the choices available do not. For statistical identification, it would have been 
necessary to normalize on one of the choices, resulting in a loss of information.  
To circumvent this potential difficulty, we take an alternative approach, which, 
to the best of our knowledge, has not been used to model sequential decisions such as 
those of interest here. We specify a sequential bivariate probit model that combines the 
strengths of both a treatment effects model and a bivariate probit model. It is similar to 
the sequential probit model proposed by Amemiya (1985); and applied by Tunali 
(1986), but in our case, we have fully observed regimes. In contrast to Amemiya’s 
model, our model also allows for correlation between these two sequential choices. We 
evaluate the performance of the two estimated models, each representing one of the 
two possible choice sequences, using a Likelihood Dominance Criterion (LDC); a 
non-nested test is also utilized to complete the analysis (Pollak and Wales 1991). 
Given the appropriate decision making process of the farm household toward 
CRP participation and the off-farm labor decisions, we are interested in the second 
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stage equations, including CRP payment, CRP acre, off-farm wage and hours worked 
off the farm. Moreover, we also analyze the economic impact of these two 
participation decisions in terms of farm productivity, technical and scale efficiencies, 
and technology.    
Econometric Framework 
The econometric framework contains three parts. The first part outlines the 
econometric strategy to determine the decision making process that underlies the off-
farm labor supply of farm households and participation in CRP. The empirical 
specification is motivated in part by the theoretical results in Chapter 3, but to avoid 
the misspecification of the econometric selection model, we propose several 
econometric strategies to characterize these decisions. In so doing, we compare the 
performance of two econometric structures, one that embodies a joint decision process, 
and the second that embodies a sequential decision process. Throughout, we discuss 
the model selection criteria by which to determine which choice structure 
(independent, joint, or sequential) is most appropriate for these two decisions by the 
farm households. The second part outlines the second-stage response given the 
appropriate decision making process; while the third part describes the methology for 
analyzing farm productivity and its decomposition.     
 Modeling the Joint Choice Structure  
When decisions are considered joint, polychotomous choice models are 
commonly used in empirical analysis. Generally, these models fall into two classes. 
The first class relies on multiple binary choice rules, defining each decision separately 
as the binary choice, but allowing for correlation between these binary decisions. If the 
correlation proves significant, the decisions are truly jointly determined; otherwise 
they can be regarded more simply as separate binary choices. This forms the basis for 
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testing whether the multiple choices should be regarded as independent or joint. This 
class of model is often referred to as the multivariate discrete choice model. If a joint 
normal distribution is assumed between these binary choices, a multivariate probit 
model is appropriate. Since we are only interested in the two decisions, we focus on 
the bivariate probit model to consider the joint decisions between CRP participation 
and off-farm work by the farm operator.    
The second class is the multinomial discrete choice model, based on the 
random utility framework (McFadden (1973; 1974); Dubin and McFadden (1984); 
Lee (1983)). In this class, the decisions are considered to be joint, without the 
possibility that each choice could be made separately. If the error term is assumed to 
have a Type I extreme value distribution, we have the multinomial logit model by 
McFadden (1974).53 We utilize the multinomial logit model as the alternative for 
analyzing the nature of joint decisions between CRP participation and the operator’s 
decision to work off the farm. Regarding model selection, in the case of participation 
in CRP and/or off-farm work, there are four distinct decisions—each represents one of 
the four regimes discussed in the section below and depicted at the bottom of Figure 
5.1. 
 
                                                 
53 Theil (1969) originally studied the choice of transportation mode; Barham et al. (2002) studied the 
adoption of rBST on U.S dairy farms.    
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Off-Farm & CRP CRP Only Off-Farm Only None 
(Regime 1-1) (Regime 1-0) (Regime 0-1) (Regime 0-0) 
 
Figure 5.1: Joint Decision Making Structure 
 
Bivariate Probit Choice Model 
The econometric framework of the bivariate probit choice model is the 
extension of the Heckman-Type two-stage method (Heckman 1979). We begin by 
defining the participation decisions, where each participation decision by the farm 
household is determined by the net benefit comparison between participation and non-
participation. Specifically, the CRP participation decision is determined by the 
reservation per acre return (perhaps risk adjusted as suggested in the theory from 
Chapter 3) to the farmer of retaining the land in production with the government’s 
potential payment for land in the conservation reserve program (CRP). The off-farm 
job decision is determined by comparing the potential off-farm market wage with the 
shadow value (perhaps also risk adjusted) of the farmer’s time in farm production.  
The specifications of these two equations are:    
(5.1)     and      rprprp
r eXHP += gpgpgpg eXHP +=
(5.2)     and     , rwrwrw
r uSHW += gwgwgwg uSHW +=
where Pr and Pg represent the reservation per acre payment, and the potential 
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government per acre CRP payment; Wr and Wg represent the shadow value of the 
farming time, and the market off-farm wage. The vectors Xrp, Xgp, Srp, and Sgp are the 
exogenous variables, and erp, egp, urp, and ugp are the random disturbance terms. The 
latent binary choice variables (I1*, I2*) for the participation decisions of each farmer 
can be defined as:54  
(5.3)  11111111 ')(''* eXHeeXHXHPPI rpgprprpgpgp
rg +=−+−=−=
        . 22222222 ')(''* eXHuuXHXHWWI rpgprprpgpgp
rg +=−+−=−=
Suppose the joint distribution of (e1, e2) follows a bivariate normal distribution, 
, where the correlation coefficient ()
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N ρ ) captures the joint nature of 
these two decisions. 
Since it is only the actual decisions, Ii that are observed, the observation rules 
for these two latent decision variables are: 
Ii  = 1 (the farmer participates in activity i) iff   Ii* > 0; and  
Ii  = 0 (the farmer participates in activity i) iff   Ii* < 0        i=1,2. 
Given the choice structure, there are four potential outcomes, or regimes that 
can be realized in the data. Since we observe the outcome of each regime, we can 
define the probability for each regime as (Greene 2002a):   
 (5.4) 
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54 For simplicity, subscript 1 refers to the CRP decision, and subscript 2 refers to the off-farm job of the 
operator.  
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distribution of (I1,I2). 
The probability of participating in each regime is determined by the 
observation rule. Since we can observe the four regime participation indexes from the 
data, the probability of each regime can be specified explicitly.  The bivariate probit 
model is estimated by maximum likelihood methods using the following log 
likelihood function (Greene 2002a): 
(5.5)  ]})12))(12[(()],')(12[()],')(12{[(loglog 21222111
1
1 ρ−−−−Φ=∑
=
IIXHIXHIL
N
i
Multinomial Logit Choice Model 
The Random Utility Model (RUM) model, proposed by McFadden (1974), has 
been used widely in applied econometrics; it is consistent with the maximization of 
utility by the household. Suppose the utility is discrete, and each farmer (i) has j 
alternatives available.55 The indirect utility of each alternative is: 
(5.6)   ijijij VU ε+=        i= 1..N ;        j= 1.. M 
                                                 
55 In our case, there are four: participate in neither CRP nor off-farm work; participate in CRP only; 
participate in off-farm work only; or participate in both as depicted in Figure 5.1  
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Each farmer makes a choice by comparing the utility level from each alternative.  
There are two components of the random utility framework. The first, Vij, is the 
deterministic part of the indirect utility function for alternative j, and the second 
part, ijε , represents the random nature of the indirect utility. If alternative s is chosen, 
we assume that the indirect utility of alternative s provides farmer i with the highest 
utility, when compared to the other alternatives. That is: 
(5.7)   ijijijisisis UVVU =+>+= εε              sj ≠∀  
We can re-write equation (5.7) as: 
(5.8)  ijisijis VV εε >+−  
 The probability that farmer i chooses alternative s is:  
(5.9)         ijijisijisijsjis dfVVFU εεεε )()()1Pr( ∫
∞
∞− ≠
+−<Π==
                              ijijisijisijsj dFdVVF εεεε )()(∫
∞
∞− ≠
+−<Π=
Up to this point, we have imposed no specific distributional assumption on the random 
errors of the discrete indirect utility functions. In order to derive tractable results, 
however, specific distributional assumptions are necessary. The most common 
assumption is the Type I extreme value distribution (McFadden 1974), and this yields 
the multinomial logit model. Under this multinomial logit model, the probability of 
farmer i choosing the alternative s can be further specified as (Maddala 1983): 
(5.10)   
∑
=
== M
j
ijij
ijij
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wr
wr
U
1
)'exp(
)'exp(
)1Pr(  
Given the specification of the probability for each alternative, the structural model can 
 94 
 
be estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The log likelihood function can 
be shown as: 
(5.11)     ∑∑
= =
==
n
i
J
j
ijij UdLogL
1 1
)1Pr(log
where d is the binary indicator for each choice; equal to one if alternative s is  chosen. 
Modeling the Sequential Decision Choice Structure  
 Although this joint decision framework above explores the correlation between 
the CRP and off-farm labor supply decisions, the fundamental assumption is that the 
two decisions are made simultaneously. In reality, these two decisions may be made 
sequentially. That is, the farm household might consider one of the decisions first, and 
makes the other decision sequentially depending on his first choice. Indeed, Lee and 
Maddala (1994) have noted that if one has no prior information about the decision 
making process of the decision maker, it is best to model both as a sequential process. 
Maddala (1983, p. 279) also suggests that it is important to distinguish joint and 
sequential decisions when applying multiple criteria for determining the appropriate 
specification.  Consequentially, we must examine both orderings of the CRP and off-
farm labor choices. 
We can again categorize the sequential choice models into two families: 
multiple and the multivariate choice structures. The nested multinomial logit model 
fits into the first category, as mentioned in the introduction, however, it is not 
appropriate for our decision problem because the characteristics of the farm 
households in the sample differ, but the characteristics of the choices available do not 
differ. Thus, for statistical identification, it would have been necessary to normalize on 
one of the choices, resulting in a loss of information. Therefore, as the only other 
alternative, we adapt a bivariate probit framework to accommodate the sequential 
decision process. Perhaps, the most straightforward way to analyze the sequential 
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decision making process is to define the nesting structures. These two decisions can be 
broken down into two levels. Since there is no prior information about the order of 
these two decisions, we illustrate the sequential decision structure in Figure 5.2 
assuming the off-farm work decision is made prior to the CRP participation decision.56  
 
 
Off-Farm_Yes Off-Farm_NO 
CRP_Yes CRPP_No CRP_Yes CRPP_No 
 
Figure 5.2: Sequential Decision Structure (if off-farm decision is made first) 
 
Nested Multinomial Logit Choice Model 
The most straightforward way to model the sequential choice is perhaps the 
nested multinomial logit model, which relaxes the IIA assumption of the multinomial 
logit model. Although there are several ways to relax the IIA assumption,57 the easiest 
way is to break down the choice set into several multiple-choice levels. In other words, 
                                                 
56 In the empirical application below, we test the two alternatives (tree structures) based on the model 
selection criterion. 
57 Alternatively, the multinomial probit model is also mentioned in the literature by assuming the joint 
distribution of the ( ijε ) are multivariate normal. Although this model has some nice features, it is 
empirically difficult to apply, since this requires the multiple integration of the multivariate normal 
distribution.  
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the total choice set is to be grouped into several subgroups instead. In so doing, we 
allow the variance to differ across the groups while maintaining the IIA assumption 
within subgroups, which yields a nested multinomial logit model.  
Similar to the multinomial logit model, the error term ( ijε ) is assumed to be 
i.i.d. and to follow the generalized extreme value distribution. In order to interpret this 
model, we follow our definition above and suppose the J alternatives (each represented 
by a twig on the tree) can be separated into L subgroups (or branches). Accordingly, 
each individual has to choose to participate first in one of the L branches, and then 
chooses one of the twigs of the branch.  
Given this nested decision structure, the indirect utility function can be 
specified as: 
(5.12)     ijlijijijij qwrVU εαε ++=+= '' , 
where wij is the vector of the observed attributes varying with both the branch and twig, 
and ql is the vector of the observed attributes varying only with the branches. The 
conditional and unconditional probability that the farmer chooses the alternatives J can 
be specified as: 
(5.13)     
∑
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where the IVl, the inclusive variable of the branch l, is equal to . 
The expression (
))'exp(log(
1
∑
=
M
j
ijij wr
ll IVτ ) captures the feedback between the twig and the branch of the 
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model, where the feedback structure is consistent with the sequential determination of 
the choice structure. This expression is also a measure of the correlation among the 
random error terms and can be used to test the validity of random utility maximization 
in the nested multinomial logit model (Herriges and Kling, 1996; Borsch-Supan, 
1990). Interestingly, the nested multinomial logit model reduces to the multinomial 
logit model if the parameter lτ  is equal to unity. Thus, testing if the parameter lτ  is 
equal to unity forms the basis for testing the IIA assumption from the nested logit 
model against the multinomial logit model. Alternatively, if the inclusive variable (IVl) 
is equal to zero, two twigs along the same branch are perfect substitutes. In this case, 
the choice of twigs within the same branch is independent of the farmer’s attributes. 
From this point of view, the parameter lτ  is a measure of the similarity between the 
twig choices of the same branch. As long as the probability of each alternative is 
specified, the structural model can be estimated using full information maximum 
likelihood estimation. The log-likelihood function we estimated can be shown as: 
(5.14)         ∑
=
===
n
i
llj UUL
1
/ )]1Pr(*)1log[Pr(log
Although the nested multinomial logit model is the most straightforward way 
to analyze the sequential choice structure, it might not be appropriate for the case that 
the characteristics of the farm households in the sample differ, but the characteristics 
of the choices available do not differ. For statistical identification purposes, it would 
have been necessary to normalize on one of the choices, resulting in a loss of 
information (Falaris 1987). The identification constraint can be illustrated in Figure 
5.3. Therefore, as the only other alternative, we adapt a bivariate probit framework to 
accommodate the sequential decision process.  
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Off-Farm_Yes Zero Coefficients 
CRP_Yes Zero Coefficients 
 
Figure 5.3: Normalization of the Nested Multinomial Logit Model 
 
Sequential Choice Model Based on the Bivariate Probit Framework 
Amemiya (1985) was the pioneer in adapting the probit model to sequential 
choices. He regards the sequential decision process simply as two uncorrelated binary 
probit choices for ease of computations. Abowd and Farber (1982), Poirier (1980), and 
Tunali (1986) have proposed similar models that allow for correlation between 
sequential decisions; their models include Amemiya’s original model as a special case.  
Because we want to allow for a correlation between a farmer’s decision to work 
off the farm and to participate in CRP, we propose a variation on the model by Tunali 
(1986). It is a sequential bivariate probit choice model. Since we have no prior 
information about the choice sequence, we illustrate our model for the case where the 
farmer makes the off-farm job decision prior to the CRP choice. In this case, the CRP 
decision, given that the farmer has already chosen to work off the farm, should be 
regarded differently than the decision to participate in CRP, given that the farmer has 
decided not to work off the farm. Thus, the unique feature of this formulation is that 
our model actually involves three choices. Each of them can be specified as a binary 
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probit model, but they are all correlated. The full model structure is: 
(5.14)        1111 '* ε+= rzD         D1 = 1 iff D1* > 0 
      2222 '* ε+= rzD       D2 = 1 iff D2* > 0, conditional on D1 > 0 
      3333 '* ε+= rzD        D3 = 1 iff D3* > 0, conditional on D1 < 0, 
where D1* is the latent variable for the off-farm labor decision; D2* is the latent 
variable for the CRP decision, given the operator works off the farm; D3* is the latent 
variable for the CRP decision, given the operator does not work off the farm. 
Following Amemiya (1985) and Tunali (1986), we assume the error terms ( 321 ,, εεε ) 
follow the trivariate normal distribution: ]]
10
01
1
[);0,0,0[(
13
12
1312
ρ
ρ
ρρ
N ; z contains the 
parameters of interest for each choice equation, and r is an individual characteristics.58 
Four regimes can be realized from the data: 
D1=1 and D2=1 when the operator participates in CRP, given the choice not to 
                          work off the farm; 
D1=1 and D2=0 when the operator does not participate in CRP, given  
                           the choice not to work off the farm; 
D1=0 and D3=1 when the operator participates in CRP, given   
                           the choice to work off the farm; and 
D1=0 and D3=0 when the operator does not participate in CRP, given 
                                                 
58 Our model differs from the one proposed by Tunali (1986) in that we define two different choice 
structures for the second stage, due to the sequential nature of the choice. More specifically, the 
correlation between D2* and D3* is zero, since these two outcomes are mutually exclusive. Our model 
also differs from the endogenous switching regression model (Lee 1978) since the second-stage 
equation in our model is the latent dependent variable, instead of the continuous one. This difference 
requires maximum likelihood estimation. 
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                           choice not to work off the farm. 
Under the trivariate normality assumption, the probabilities of each regime are: 
(5.15)  ),','()','Pr()1,1Pr( 12221122211121 ρεε rzrzrzrzDD Φ=−>−>=== ; 
            ),','()','Pr()0,1Pr( 12221122211121 ρεε −−Φ=−<−>=== rzrzrzrzDD ; 
            ),','()','Pr()1,0Pr( 13331133311131 ρεε −−Φ=−>−<=== rzrzrzrzDD ;              
            ),','()','Pr()0,0Pr( 13331133211131 ρεε rzrzrzrzDD −−Φ=−<−<=== . 
This model can be estimated by the full information maximum likelihoods methods 
using the following likelihood function: 
 (5.16)  
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where is the cumulative distribution function of the standard bivariate normal 
random variable.
(.)Φ
59  
 
Testing the Choice Structures and Model Selection Criteria 
One primary purpose of this chapter is to identify the choice structure that is 
the most appropriate for the farmer’s decisions to work off the farm and participate in 
                                                 
59 Since equation (5.16) is highly non-linear, the selection of the initial values might be crucial for 
estimation. Therefore, the initial values of the parameters for equation (5.16) are determined by 
estimating a Heckman-Type two-stage model. In the first stage, the standard binary probit choice model 
for off-farm work is estimated using maximum likelihood methods. Given the consistent estimators of 
the first stage, the second stage CRP participation is the conditional choice, based on the first stage off-
farm decision.  Two second-stage models, using the standard Heckman’s error correction, provide 
estimates of CRP participation, conditional on the first-stage decision. 
)'(
)'(')'|(')(
11
11
221112222 rz
rzrzrzErzDE Φ+=−>+=
φεε      
)'(1
)'(')'|(')(
11
11
331113333 rz
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CRP. To choose between the bivariate probit and multinomial logit decision structures, 
we use a non-nested test proposed by Vuong (1989) that is based on the likelihood 
ratio test. To test the nested tree structure for the sequential bivariate probit model, we 
utilize the “Likelihood Dominance Criterion” (LDC) proposed by Pollak and Wales 
(1991). The validity of the IIA property in the multinomial logit model is tested using 
a standard Hausman-Wu (1978) test.  
Model Selection Criterion between Two Joint (non-sequential) Decision Models 
To choose between the bivariate probit and multinomial logit decision 
structures, we use a non-nested test proposed by Vuong (1989) that is based on the 
likelihood ratio test. Given likelihood functions ),|( αii ryf  
and ),|( θii zyg corresponding to bivariate probit and multinomial logit models, 
respectively, we estimate of the variance of the difference between the two likelihood 
functions, defined as: 
   (5.17)    
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E , then there is no basis on which to prefer one model to the 
other. Under this null hypothesis that there is no difference, Vuong derived the test 
statistics as: )1,0(~
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n θα= . If this test statistic exceeds the critical value, 
and 0]
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[log >θ
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E , then the bivariate probit model is preferred to the 
multinomial logit model. If this test statistic exceeds the critical value, and 
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ryf
E , then the multinomial logit model is preferred to the bivariate 
probit model.  
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Although the multinomial logit model is used commonly by empirical 
economists in studying individual choices among different alternatives, the model 
implicitly has the property of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Under 
IIA, the introduction of an alternative will not change the log odds-ratio between the 
any pair of the existing choices. This assumption is thought to be a weakness of the 
model; therefore, we test the IIA property of the multinomial logit model using a 
standard Hausman-Wu test (e.g. Greene (2002a) and Maddala (2001)). If the IIA 
property is rejected, this model specification might not be appropriate for our choice 
situation.    
Test of the Nested Tree Structure for the Sequential Bivariate Probit Model 
To test the nested tree structure for the sequential bivariate probit model, we 
utilize the “Likelihood Dominance Criterion” (LDC) proposed by Pollak and Wales 
(1991). After having estimated both models by maximum likelihood, the comparison 
is based on the log likelihood values and the number of the parameters in each model. 
(e.g. Kling and Thomson, 1996) With no prior information, we must test the 
hypothesis: 
H0: CRP participation decision is made prior to the decision to work off the farm. 
H1: Off-farm work decision is made first before the CRP decision. 
The model selection criterion under the LDC test is (Pollak and Wales, 1991, p. 236): 
(i)       LDC prefers H0 to H1   if     L1-L0< [X (n1+1)-X (n0+1)]/2 
(ii)      LDC is indecisive if  [X (n1- n0+1)- X (1)]/2 >L1-L0>[X (n1+1)-X (n0+1)]/2  
(iii)     LDC prefers H1 to H0   if     L1-L0 > [X (n1- n0 +1) - X (1)]/2  
where L1, L0 are the log likelihood values, and n1, n0 are the numbers of the parameters 
in the two models, respectively. X (k) is the chi-square critical value with the degree of 
freedom of k for a 95% confidence interval.  
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Second Stage Equations Based on a Bivariate Probit Framework 60
Given the appropriate bivariate probit choice structure, we are interested in 
estimating equations for: the CRP per acre payment; acres enrolled; off-farm hourly 
wage; and hours working off the farm in the second stage equations. Based on this 
theoretical specification, the reduced forms for these equations can be empirically 
specified, respectively, as:  
(5.18)  ppp eXP += 'α  
(5.19)  aaap eXPA ++= 'αβ   
(5.20)  www eXW += 'α  
(5.21)  hhhh eXWH ++= 'αβ  
where (P, A, W, H) represents CRP price, CRP acreage, off-farm wage, and hours 
worked off the farm, respectively; (Xp, Xa, Xw,Xh) are vectors of the independent 
variables of the CRP payment and acres equations and the off-farm wage and hours 
equations, respectively; and ( hhwapp αβααβα ,,,,, ) are the vectors of the parameters 
to be estimated. 
These equations will not appear fully of each regime, depending on the 
bivariate probit selection rule. Given the corner solutions that arise in either the off-
farm participation or the CRP participation decision, the second stage equations of 
each of the four possible regimes exist as: 
Regime 1-1: P>0, A>0, W>0, H>0 (operator works off-farm and participates in CRP); 
Regime 1-0: P>0, A>0 (operator does not work off-farm, but does participate in CRP); 
Regime 0-1: W>0, H>0 (operator works off-farm, but does not participate in CRP); 
                                                 
60 Given the empirical evidence that the bivariate probit model is more appropriate to capture the joint 
decision making process (we will discuss it in the empirical section later), we only outline the second 
stage analysis here. The second stage analysis based on other decision models is shown in Appendix 5.1.  
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Regime 0-0: none (operator does not work off the farm, and no CRP participation). 
In order to apply Heckman’s (1979) two-stage approach to deal with possible 
sample selection bias, we must specify the error structures for each of the four second-
stage equation systems. The strategy we propose here is to simply assume each ej 
follows a trivariate normal distribution with (e1, e2), and the covariance ( 21 , jj σσ ), in 
order to have tractable and simple estimation. Based on this assumption, Heckman’s 
two stage estimation approach can be easily generated by including two inverse mills 
ratios--one for the CRP decision and another for the off-farm work decision--into the 
second-stage equations (Tunali 1986). For regime 1-1, the second-stage equations can 
be specified as: 
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A similar approach can be applied to derive the second-stage equations for other 
regimes. For example, the per acre payment equation and acre enrollment equation for 
regime (1-0) can be specified as: 
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            . 2211'ˆ λσλσαβ aaaap XP +++=
For regime (0-1), only the off-farm wage and hours equations are observed. 
Using the similar approach above, the off-farm wage and hour equations can be 
specified as: 
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             2211'ˆ λσλσαβ hhhhw XW +++=
  More importantly, the inverse mills ratios above for the bivariate probit 
selection model account for the correlation between these two choice decisions, but in 
so doing add to the complexity of the calculations. To simplify the calculations, some 
researchers (e.g. Abdulai and Delgado 1999; Findeis and Lass, 1994) regard the CRP 
and off-farm work decisions as uncorrelated. Under this assumption, one can easily 
see that the second-stage equation (use payment equation of regime 1-1 as an example) 
can be simplified as: 
 (5.25)   )','|(')1,1|( 22211121 XHeXHeeEXIIPE ppp −>−>+=== α                        
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Under this simplification, the second-stage equations are expected to be close to the 
binary choice model, but still contain an inverse mills ratio for each selection decision 
to correct for the nonrandom sample property. 61
Technical Efficiency and Farm Productivity 
To understand the differences in efficiency between participant groups, we 
estimate the technical efficiency based on a stochastic production frontier (Aigner et al. 
1977 and Meeusen and Broeck 1977), along with the bivariate probit choice model. In 
so doing, we are able to decompose the random shocks to production into two 
components: those that can be controlled by the farmer and those that are beyond the 
farmer’s control. The stochastic production frontier is estimated in two steps. In the 
first step, we estimate separate traditional production functions of each group, 
abstracting from any measure of technical efficiency. We next decompose the error 
term of the traditional production into a random component and a technical 
inefficiency component using a generalized method of moment estimation strategy. 
                                                 
61 The variance-covariance matrix for these second-stage equations must be corrected in order to 
account for both the endogenous selection and the heteroscedasticity problems. The corrected variance-
covariance matrix can be derived following the general procedures proposed by Heckman (1979), but 
accounting for the jointness in the decision, the computational algebra is more complex. Based on 
procedures from Greene (2002b), the matrix is: 
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Σ  is the asymptotic covariance matrix of the bivaruate probit estimation: 
],,[ 21 ρ
λ
HH
G jj ∂
∂=  ;    j =1,2 
The first term of {.} is the standard covariance accounting for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980); the 
second term is used to correct for the endogenous selection problem for the CRP decision, while the 
third term is used to correct for the off-farm work decision. As such, the asymptotic variance-covariance 
of the joint decision model should be adjusted for heteroscedasticity and the self-selection bias of both 
selections. 
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Finally, we decompose a measure of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) into relative 
differences in efficiency and technology for each group. 
The Production Functions  
It is possible to estimate a production function for each group based on the 
sample selection framework. Production levels are observed for each farmer. 
Depending on the bivarite probit choice equation for the CRP and off-farm work 
decisions, the production function of each group can be given as: 
 (5.26)  jjjj XY εβ += '              ;     j=1,2,3,4, 
where (Yj) is the observed production level of each group.  
Similar to the second-stage equations above, the conditional expected 
production of each group, under the trivariate normality assumption for ( jee ε,, 21 ), is: 
(5.27)  jjjjjjjjjj XIIEXIIYE 22112121 '),|('),|( λρλρβεβ ++=+=  
where λ1j and λ2j are inverse mills ratios corresponding to CRP and off-farm work 
decisions, respectively. With the correction for the bivariate probit selection problem, 
it can be shown easily that the OLS estimation of equation (5.27) for each group yields 
consistent estimators for ( jjj 21 ,, ρρβ ).  
To calculate technical efficiency, the error term of equation (5.26) is 
decomposed into its random error and technical inefficiency components, based on the 
estimators of each production function and an appropriate formulation of the 
stochastic frontier function specification: Equation (5.26) can be written as: 
(5.28)    jj
F
jjjjj uvYXY −+=+= εβ '
 where the variable ( ) is assumed to be the frontier production functions of each 
group. Following the standard assumption in the literature on stochastic frontiers 
(Aigner et al. 1977), the random variable (v
F
jY
j) is assumed to have a normal distribution, 
 109 
 
N~(0, σ2vj); the random variable (uj) is the technical inefficiency component, and it is 
assumed to follow a half normal distribution, N+~(0, σ2uj ). These two components are 
assumed to be independent.  
With this stochastic production frontier, we must first recognize that the 
expected values of the two one-sided error terms (E (uj)) do not equal zero. We must 
rewrite equation (5.28) as: 
(5.29)  , )]([)(ˆ'ˆˆ jjjj
F
jjjjj uEuvuEYXY +−+−=+= εβ
which implies that: 
(5.30)        and       )('ˆ j
F
jjj uEYX −=β )()]([ˆ jscfjjjjj uEeuEuv +=+−=ε  
         Using the predicted residuals ( jεˆ ) from equation (5.26), we can easily see that 
the parameters ( ) can be calculated based on the fact that the second and third 
central moments of (
2
vjσ
jεˆ ) should be equal to the second and third central moments of 
(vj-uj) since E(uj) is constant. As such, the parameters ( ) and the composite 
error can be calculated as: 
22 ˆ,ˆ vjuj σσ
(5.31)   3/232 )
)/41(2
(ˆ
ππ
σ
−
= muj  ; 222 ˆ)21(ˆ iuvj m σπσ −−=   ;   iuijscfe σπε ˆ
2ˆˆ −= . 
The details of the estimation based on the two-stage-method-of-moments (e.g. Byrnes 
1991; Huang et al. 2002) are found in Chapter 4. The estimators can be shown to be 
consistent, although they are not efficient.62  
Once this stochastic frontier has been estimated, the calculation of the 
                                                 
62 Alternatively, one could specify the conditional distributions for the components, (vi-ui | I1, I2), and 
estimate the stochastic production function along with the choice equation in one step with maximum 
likelihood method to gain the efficiency. However, this is challenging because the random variable u is 
assumed to be a one-sided error, and the joint distribution is multivariate. To the best of our knowledge, 
a solution to this particular problem has not been discussed in the literature on stochastic production 
frontier functions. Consequently, we extend the approach proposed by Huang et al. (2002) to construct 
the two-step strategy of a bivariate choice case. In so doing, we do obtain the consistent estimators from 
the endogenous switching regression model without the need to specify the distribution for u.    
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technical efficiency index requires point estimates for the random variable u of each 
farmer. Following Jondrow et al. (1982), the expected value of u given the composite 
error (v-u) under the assumption of a half-normal distribution is:  
(5.32)    ]
ˆ
)
ˆ
(1
)
ˆ
(
[
)1(
)ˆ|ˆ( 2 σ
λ
σ
λ
σ
λφ
λ
σλ scfji
scfji
scfji
scfjiji
e
e
e
euE −
Φ−+
=   ; j = 1,..,4 and i = 1,..,n 
 where    ,   2/122 )ˆˆ( vjuj σσσ +=
vj
u j
σ
σλ
ˆ
ˆ= .      
Once these conditional expected values are obtained, the technical efficiency index of 
each farmer can be calculated as (Kumbhaker and Lovell, 2000): 
(5.33)    . 
)ˆ|ˆ(
jiscf
euE
eTE
−=
Estimating Productivity and Efficiencies Differences between Groups 
One of the main objectives of this study is to examine the farm productivity 
differences between groups of farmers to understand how CRP participation and off-
farm labor supply decision affect productivity or efficiency. We cannot directly 
compare the technical efficiency indices from the estimation above because the 
production environment is assumed to differ by group. However, the above results do 
provide information on differences in technical efficiency for farms within each group. 
In order to further compare the difference of scale efficiency and productivity, we 
estimate the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) index proposed by Malmquist (1953) to 
see the relative productivity differences between groups.63 Using this approach, we 
can not only see the differences in TFP, but also identify the sources of the differences 
                                                 
63 Although the TFP index is usually applied to time series data to measure productivity changes 
through time, this concept can also be applied to the cross section data. In some resent studies, 
researchers have applied this approach to make cross-country comparisons in efficiency (Fare et al., 
1994; Thirtle et al., 1995; Fulginiti and Perrin, 1997) and make comparisons for different age groups 
(Tauer and Lordkipanidze, 2000).   
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by decomposing TFP into relative differences in technical and scale efficiencies and 
the relative differences in technology. 
If we consider non-participants as the base group, and use the generalized 
version of the TFP formula outlined in Coelli (2003) and Lovell (2003), the relative 
ratio of farm productivity between two groups can be shown as:  
(5.34)    
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡=
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*
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00
0
00
0
00
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xyTE
xyTE
xyTE
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jj
C
, 
where M(.) represents the relative TFP index of group j (except the non participants) 
relative to group 0 (non-participants). V and C superscripts refer to the variable returns 
to scale (VRS) and constant returns to scale (CRS), respectively. If M > 1, the TFP of 
group 1 is greater than that for group 0. The term TEkj (yj,xj) represents technical 
efficiency for group j using the level of inputs for group i. Total factor productivity is 
decomposed into three sources. The ratio outside the square brackets measures the 
relative difference in technical efficiency between groups 1 and 0, which actually 
measures the relative distance between actual production and the frontier function 
between groups for the VRS technology. The first term in brackets measures the ratio 
of scale efficiencies between groups. The second term in brackets measures the 
relative difference in technology, which is the comparison of the production frontiers 
between groups. If this term is greater than one, the production frontier of group 1 lies 
above that for group 0. If this is the case, the production frontier might be higher for 
farms participating in either both or one of the programs.    
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Empirical Results 
Our empirical results are organized in three sections. The first part provides the 
estimation results of four choice models (Tables 5.1-Table 5.6). All three models are 
included for completeness, and so the reader can compare their performances. 
However, it is only the empirical model for the preferred choice structure that is 
discussed. Given the estimation of each model, we then access the performance 
between these models in order to determine the appropriate decision making process 
of farm households to CRP participation and the decision to work off the farm by the 
operator. The test results about the joint and the sequential decision structures are 
summarized in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 based on Vuong’s test, Haussman-Wu specification 
test, and the LDC test. The third part contains a discussion of the second stage results 
of the appropriate choice structure (Tables 5.10-5.13). The third part discussed the 
impact of these two program participations in terms of farm productivity (Table 5.14-
5.16). The definitions for the variables in each of the estimated equations are reported 
in Table 2.4 in Chapter 2.  
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Table 5.1:  Bivariate Probit M odel Estimation
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -4.948 1.414 -3.499
OP_AGE 0.029 0.003 9.405
OP_ED_C 0.073 0.016 4.621
LQH _96 0.544 0.212 2.568
LQL_96 -1.072 0.327 -3.283
EQIP 1.130 0.409 2.762
AG DIST -1.163 0.266 -4.375
EBI 0.047 0.021 2.184
AM T A_A -0.030 0.005 -6.331
LDP_A -0.014 0.003 -5.057
RISK -0.057 0.018 -3.195
CRO P456 -1.921 0.265 -7.236
CRO PSIZ1 0.232 0.040 5.732
REGN 1 0.164 0.105 1.562
REGN 567 -0.386 0.144 -2.679
REGN 9 1.247 0.266 4.688
URBAN -0.014 0.002 -7.905
Constant -0.928 0.585 -1.586
OP_AGE 0.139 0.017 8.401
OP_AGESQ -1.633 0.147 -11.088
OP_ED_C 0.060 0.014 4.269
OP_EXP -0.018 0.004 -4.983
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 4.899
H_SIZE -0.087 0.030 -2.925
CRO PSIZ1 -0.597 0.032 -18.682
RAISE_OP -0.452 0.097 -4.645
M ANUF 0.020 0.006 3.614
T RAD E -0.041 0.015 -2.840
AM T A_A -0.007 0.002 -3.035
LDP_A -0.003 0.001 -1.908
RISK -0.017 0.014 -1.185
NET W O RT 1 -0.003 0.004 -0.879
SP_HM AK 0.250 0.073 3.415
CRO P456 -0.878 0.094 -9.356
REGN 3 0.287 0.132 2.170
REGN 567 -0.214 0.076 -2.795
T ENANCY -0.043 0.023 -1.886
RHO 0.121 0.053 2.292
Sample 2223
Log-likelihood -1872
LR test* 7.126
* The null hypothesis for LR test is: RHO=0, critical value of x 2  (0.95,1) is 3.84
   Variable definitions are listed  in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Correlation Coefficient
Estim ation for CRP Equation
Estim ation for O P Equation
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Table 5.2:  Multinomial Logit Model Estimation
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -8.403 4.524 -1.857
OP_AGE 0.060 0.088 0.686
OP_ED_C 0.153 0.041 3.732
LQH_96 1.732 0.606 2.857
LQL_96 -4.447 1.011 -4.400
EQIP 2.105 1.287 1.635
AGDIST -1.103 0.662 -1.666
EBI 0.079 0.052 1.527
AMTA_A -0.043 0.012 -3.700
LDP_A -0.029 0.008 -3.782
RISK -0.057 0.045 -1.281
CROP456 -3.827 0.865 -4.423
CROPSIZ1 0.225 0.118 1.913
REGN1 -0.142 0.286 -0.498
REGN567 0.044 0.391 0.112
REGN9 1.127 0.678 1.663
URBAN -0.007 0.006 -1.204
OP_AGESQ 0.132 0.697 0.189
OP_EXP 0.086 0.033 2.578
OP_EXPSQ -0.001 0.000 -2.972
H_SIZE -0.047 0.113 -0.420
RAISE_OP -0.179 0.343 -0.521
MANUF 0.042 0.017 2.449
TRADE -0.200 0.049 -4.056
NETWORT1 0.015 0.009 1.611
SP_HMAK -0.204 0.222 -0.920
REGN3 1.121 0.365 3.076
TENANCY 0.024 0.054 0.451
For CRP=1 Only
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Table 5.2:  (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -10.530 1.872 -5.625
OP_AGE 0.284 0.035 8.035
OP_ED_C 0.113 0.027 4.134
LQH_96 0.481 0.407 1.182
LQL_96 -0.423 0.436 -0.970
EQIP 0.206 1.240 0.166
AGDIST -0.150 0.299 -0.502
EBI 0.114 0.023 4.954
AMTA_A -0.006 0.005 -1.067
LDP_A -0.004 0.003 -1.196
RISK -0.016 0.028 -0.575
CROP456 -1.546 0.181 -8.556
CROPSIZ1 -1.764 0.201 -8.761
REGN1 -0.360 0.200 -1.803
REGN567 0.317 0.194 1.634
REGN9 -0.348 0.448 -0.778
URBAN 0.006 0.003 1.628
OP_AGESQ -3.327 0.345 -9.650
OP_EXP -0.025 0.007 -3.586
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 3.601
H_SIZE -0.208 0.052 -4.003
RAISE_OP -0.615 0.186 -3.300
MANUF 0.053 0.012 4.501
TRADE -0.063 0.031 -2.012
NETWORT1 -0.029 0.013 -2.162
SP_HMAK 0.461 0.146 3.146
REGN3 0.774 0.330 2.342
TENANCY -0.099 0.042 -2.322
For OP=1 Only
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 Table 5.2:  (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -17.648 6.383 -2.765
OP_AGE 0.247 0.057 4.318
OP_ED_C 0.153 0.039 3.872
LQH_96 0.409 0.577 0.709
LQL_96 -1.161 0.781 -1.486
EQIP 0.226 2.604 0.087
AGDIST -2.876 1.315 -2.187
EBI 0.255 0.095 2.684
AMTA_A -0.082 0.014 -5.690
LDP_A -0.026 0.007 -3.644
RISK -0.156 0.042 -3.758
CROP456 -6.764 1.957 -3.457
CROPSIZ1 -0.270 0.164 -1.642
REGN1 0.473 0.284 1.661
REGN567 -0.751 0.432 -1.739
REGN9 2.652 0.950 2.791
URBAN -0.021 0.005 -4.189
OP_AGESQ -2.504 0.528 -4.746
OP_EXP -0.016 0.010 -1.573
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 0.458
H_SIZE -0.097 0.079 -1.238
RAISE_OP -1.281 0.256 -4.995
MANUF 0.052 0.016 3.324
TRADE -0.153 0.042 -3.608
NETWORT1 0.005 0.018 0.259
SP_HMAK -0.023 0.236 -0.098
REGN3 0.600 0.368 1.632
TENANCY 0.018 0.045 0.416
Sample 2,223
Loglikelihood -1,744
Restrict loglikelihood -2,701
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
For CRP=OP=1 Only
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T able  5 .3 :  N ested M ultinom ial L ogit M odel E stim ation_O P com es first
Variable C oefficient Std b/Std
C onstant -12 .809 0 .438 -29 .216
O P_AG E 0.036 0 .000 75 .740
O P_ED _C 0.102 0 .002 46 .707
LQ H _96 -0 .274 0 .031 -8 .967
LQ L_96 -0 .795 0 .045 -17 .505
EQ IP -4 .476 1 .441 -3 .106
AG D IST -4 .516 0 .211 -21 .357
EB I 0 .178 0 .007 25 .835
AM T A_A -0 .062 0 .001 -82 .690
LD P_A -0 .016 0 .000 -41 .547
R ISK -0 .197 0 .002 -84 .651
C R O P456 -6 .201 0 .176 -35 .240
C R O PSIZ1 0 .645 0 .012 53 .866
R EG N 1 0.749 0 .015 50 .385
R EG N 567 -1 .672 0 .030 -56 .545
R EG N 9 3.127 0 .066 47 .423
UR B AN -0 .033 0 .000 -136 .278
C onstant -1 .729 0 .057 -30 .523
O P_AG E 0.255 0 .002 156 .066
O P_AG ESQ -3 .022 0 .016 -191 .947
O P_ED _C 0.092 0 .001 71 .370
O P_EXP -0 .028 0 .000 -88 .086
O P_EXPSQ 0.000 0 .000 87 .142
H SIZE -0 .138 0 .002 -55 .869
C R O PSIZ1 -1 .360 0 .008 -163 .252
R AISE_O P -0 .851 0 .009 -96 .613
M AN UF 0.033 0 .000 67 .965
T R AD E -0 .052 0 .001 -35 .562
AM T A_A -0 .007 0 .000 -24 .764
LD P_A -0 .004 0 .000 -23 .781
R ISK 0.002 0 .001 1 .659
N ET W O R T 1 -0 .001 0 .000 -1 .643
SP_H M AK 0.489 0 .007 68 .481
C R O P456 -1 .508 0 .009 -165 .466
R EG N 3 0.504 0 .014 36 .858
R EG N 567 -0 .205 0 .008 -26 .371
T EN AN C Y -0 .075 0 .002 -47 .236
O P_Y ES 0.498 0 .013 38 .870
O P_N O 1 -- --
Sam ple 2223
Loglikelihood -751 ,203
   Variable d efinitions are listed  in  T able 2 .4  of C hapter 2.
For C R P E quation
Inclusive  Variab le Param eters
For O P E quation
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Table 5 .4:  N ested M ultinom ial Logit M odel Estim ation_C R P com es first
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -6 .213 0.187 -33.261
O P_AG E 0.040 0.000 86.794
O P_ED _C 0.118 0.001 78.738
LQ H _96 0.849 0.021 39.725
LQ L_96 -1.629 0.036 -45.254
EQ IP -1.659 0.060 -27.614
AG D IST -2.282 0.049 -46.964
EBI 0.062 0.003 22.002
AM T A_A -0.041 0.001 -74.883
LD P_A -0.023 0.000 -80.691
RISK -0.140 0.002 -77.183
CRO P456 -2.308 0.090 -25.542
CRO PSIZ1 0.237 0.005 45.987
REG N 1 0.370 0.010 35.947
REG N 567 -0.953 0.017 -56.640
REG N 9 2.084 0.030 68.764
URBAN -0.015 0.000 -87.983
Constant -7 .800 0.249 -31.381
O P_AG E 0.516 0.008 61.635
O P_AG ESQ -5.343 0.074 -72.446
O P_ED _C 0.010 0.003 3.271
O P_EXP -0.065 0.003 -20.901
O P_EXPSQ 0.001 0.000 21.944
H SIZE 0.007 0.009 0.810
CRO PSIZ1 -0.670 0.009 -74.487
RAISE_O P -0.362 0.023 -15.808
M AN UF -0.007 0.001 -4.908
T RAD E -0.053 0.004 -14.445
AM T A_A -0.026 0.001 -18.735
LD P_A 0.015 0.001 18.496
RISK -0.122 0.004 -33.712
N ET W O RT 1 0.015 0.001 10.579
SP_H M AK -0.377 0.022 -17.294
CRO P456 3.939 0.133 29.619
REG N 3 -0.821 0.026 -31.786
REG N 567 -1.723 0.034 -50.022
T EN AN CY -0.030 0.007 -4.281
CRP_Y ES -0.143 0.008 -17.837
CRP_N O 1 -- --
Sample 2223
Loglikelihood -765,608
   Variable d efinitions are listed  in Table 2.4 of C hapter 2.
For CRP Equation
For O P Equation
Inclusive Variable Param eters
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Table 5.5:  Sequential Bivariate Probit Model Estimation_OP first
Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -1.185 0.605 -1.960
OP_AGE 0.140 0.017 8.180
OP_AGESQ -1.644 0.153 -10.771
OP_ED_C 0.066 0.015 4.504
OP_EXP -0.018 0.004 -4.802
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 4.739
H_SIZE -0.087 0.030 -2.904
CROPSIZ1 -0.566 0.036 -15.883
RAISE_OP -0.384 0.102 -3.768
MANUF 0.020 0.006 3.549
TRADE -0.037 0.015 -2.497
AMTA_A -0.008 0.003 -2.665
LDP_A -0.003 0.002 -1.894
RISK -0.019 0.014 -1.352
NETWORT1 -0.004 0.004 -1.154
SP_HMAK 0.260 0.074 3.521
CROP456 -0.848 0.110 -7.721
REGN3 0.253 0.131 1.937
REGN567 -0.235 0.083 -2.819
TENANCY -0.041 0.022 -1.837
Constant -0.473 0.698 -0.678
OP_AGE 0.003 0.001 2.076
OP_ED_C 0.019 0.005 3.678
LQH_96 -0.072 0.066 -1.089
LQL_96 -0.143 0.099 -1.443
EQIP -0.017 0.239 -0.073
AGDIST -0.076 0.116 -0.659
EBI 0.010 0.011 0.927
AMTA_A -0.006 0.001 -5.076
LDP_A -0.001 0.001 -1.786
RISK -0.022 0.005 -4.081
CROP456 -0.190 0.080 -2.384
CROPSIZ1 0.084 0.028 2.964
REGN1 0.107 0.032 3.317
REGN567 -0.091 0.050 -1.814
REGN9 0.513 0.118 4.362
URBAN -0.004 0.001 -6.480
Estimation for CRP Decision (given OP=1)
Estimation for OP Decision
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Table 5.5: (Continued)
Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant 0.084 0.353 0.237
OP_AGE 0.006 0.002 3.470
OP_ED_C 0.012 0.005 2.565
LQH_96 0.211 0.066 3.191
LQL_96 -0.340 0.111 -3.072
EQIP 0.271 0.131 2.077
AGDIST -0.219 0.069 -3.195
EBI 0.000 0.005 -0.025
AMTA_A -0.004 0.001 -7.607
LDP_A -0.003 0.001 -5.601
RISK -0.011 0.005 -2.062
CROP456 -0.118 0.055 -2.135
CROPSIZ1 0.030 0.015 2.042
REGN1 -0.053 0.030 -1.788
REGN567 -0.071 0.040 -1.769
REGN9 0.020 0.071 0.287
URBAN -0.003 0.001 -4.862
RHO(0,u) 0.027 0.126 0.626
RHO(1,u) 0.104 0.138 2.082
Sample 2223
Loglikelihood -1891
** RHO(0,u) is the correlation coefficient between OP and CRP|OP=0
     RHO(1,u) is the correlation coefficient between OP and CRP|OP=1
    Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Estimation for CRP Decision (given OP=0)
Coefficient Correlation Estimation
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Table 5.6:  Sequential Bivariate Probit Model Estimation_CRP first
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -4.733 1.547 -3.059
OP_AGE 0.030 0.003 9.141
OP_ED_C 0.074 0.017 4.451
LQH_96 0.471 0.222 2.125
LQL_96 -1.021 0.348 -2.932
EQIP 1.107 0.450 2.458
AGDIST -1.136 0.279 -4.075
EBI 0.043 0.023 1.846
AMTA_A -0.030 0.005 -5.765
LDP_A -0.013 0.003 -4.257
RISK -0.054 0.019 -2.943
CROP456 -1.977 0.284 -6.974
CROPSIZ1 0.215 0.052 4.096
REGN1 0.193 0.107 1.797
REGN567 -0.406 0.149 -2.733
REGN9 1.223 0.280 4.373
URBAN -0.015 0.002 -7.859
Constant 0.955 0.620 1.541
OP_AGE 0.041 0.019 2.141
OP_AGESQ -0.547 0.162 -3.375
OP_ED_C -0.005 0.008 -0.556
OP_EXP -0.016 0.007 -2.371
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 2.561
H_SIZE -0.008 0.022 -0.356
CROPSIZ1 -0.087 0.023 -3.859
RAISE_OP -0.161 0.055 -2.924
MANUF -0.002 0.003 -0.480
TRADE -0.011 0.008 -1.315
AMTA_A -0.010 0.003 -2.759
LDP_A 0.000 0.002 0.016
RISK -0.011 0.009 -1.182
NETWORT1 0.002 0.002 1.189
SP_HMAK -0.036 0.046 -0.775
CROP456 -0.436 0.279 -1.566
REGN3 -0.148 0.061 -2.406
REGN567 -0.181 0.087 -2.078
TENANCY 0.000 0.009 -0.014
Estimation for OP Decision (given CRP=1)
Estimation for CRP Decision
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Table 5.6: (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant 0.322 0.175 1.837
OP_AGE 0.034 0.005 6.856
OP_AGESQ -0.404 0.045 -8.880
OP_ED_C 0.024 0.005 4.977
OP_EXP -0.005 0.001 -4.163
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 4.081
H_
CR
RA
M
TR
A
LD
RI
NE
SP
CR
RE
RE
TE
RH
RH
Sa
L
** R
    R
      V
Estimation for OP Decision (given CRP=0)
 
 
SIZE -0.025 0.009 -2.824
OPSIZ1 -0.223 0.020 -10.920
ISE_OP -0.117 0.032 -3.662
ANUF 0.008 0.002 4.153
ADE -0.015 0.005 -3.139
MTA_A -0.002 0.001 -2.311
P_A -0.001 0.000 -2.936
SK -0.001 0.005 -0.230
TWORT1 0.001 0.000 6.539
_HMAK 0.087 0.024 3.645
OP456 -0.270 0.035 -7.765
GN3 0.094 0.049 1.902
GN567 -0.064 0.026 -2.506
NANCY -0.016 0.007 -2.196
O(0,u) 0.096 0.131 1.785
O(1,u) -0.019 0.234 -0.224
mple 2223
oglikelihood -1899
HO(0,u) is the correlation coefficient between CRP and OP|CRP=0
HO(1,u) is the correlation coefficient between CRP and OP|CRP=1
ariable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Coefficient Correlation Estimation
 
Table 5.7: Model Selection Criterion Between Models
Different in Loglikelihood Different in Para # Test Value Critical Value Model Selection
A. Joint Decision Models
BVP vs MNL* -- -- -1.6309 -1.69 No Preference
B. Sequential Decision Models
Sequential BVP**
OP vs CRP 8.51 3 -- 2.83 OP
C. Sequential BVP vs Nested**
OP vs OP 749312 20 -- 14.42 Sequential BVP
D. Joint vs Sequential Choices
Sequential BVP vs BVP** -19 18 -- 10.53 BVP
E. Jonit vs Independent Choices***
BVP vs (CRP&OP) 7.126 3.84 BVP
Note: *: Vuong Test; **: LDC Test; ***: LR Test
             OP refers to the case that off-farm decision is made first; CRP refers to the case that CRP decision is made first  
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T able 5.8:IIA  T est of M ultinom ial L ogit M odel 
D eleted G roup Test V alue (x 2 )
group 3 only 3.58
group 1 only 2.57
group 0 only 162*
group 2 and 3 9.44
group 1 and 2 18.39
group 1 and 3 2.83
group 2 and 0 92.8*
group 1 and 0 130*
Critical value is 41.33; *  is rejected  a t 95%  level
grou0: nonparticipants; group1: CR P = 1 only
group 2: O P = 1 only; group3: C RP = O P = 1  
Testing the Independent, Joint, and Sequential Decision Structures  
We summarize our test results about the joint and the sequential decision 
structures in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. Based on Vuong’s test in part A of Table 5.7, there is 
no clear preference between the bivariate probit model or the multinomial logit model. 
Although these results are inconclusive, we do reject the hypothesis of IIA (the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives) in the multinomial logit model according to 
the Hausman-Wu tests for four of the nine deleted group combinations involved in the 
test (Table 5.8).64 Therefore, on this basis, there is some reason to believe that the 
bivariate probit model best captures the joint nature of the decisions to participate in 
CRP and work off the farm.  
                                                 
64 The Type I extreme distribution assumption of the multinomial logit model implies that the J-log 
odds ratios between any two pair of alternatives can be computed as:  )(]
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This shows that the J-log odds ratio for a specific farmer depends only and the coefficients of these two 
alternatives and these are independent on other alternatives. In other words, the J-log odds ratio is the 
same of any two alternatives irrespective of the total number of the choices considered. From the 
behavioral point of view, the IIA constraint might not be very attractive. As such, it might be necessary 
to test the IIA constraints if multinomial logit model is utilized. 
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In testing the appropriateness of the sequential bivariate probit model, we must 
begin with the test for the order in which the two decisions are made. In this case, the 
results of the LDC test suggest that the decision to work off the farm is made prior to 
the decision to participate in CRP (Part B, of Table 5.7).65 In turn, part C of Table 5.7 
contains the LDC test that determines the appropriateness of the joint decision 
structure against the sequential decision structure. Since the LDC test from above 
suggests that the decision to work off the farm is made prior to the decision to 
participate in CRP, it is that version of the sequential bivariate probit model that is 
used in this test.  Our result of this test supports the selection of the bivariate probit 
model. This would reinforce our earlier conclusion that the joint decision model is 
better able to capture the process associated with decisions to participate in CRP and 
work off the farm working.  
This conclusion is confirmed once again by a test of this joint decision 
structure hypothesis against a null hypothesis that the two decisions are independent 
binary choices. This test involves testing the null hypothesis that the correlation 
coefficient between the decisions in the bivariate probit model is zero. The results of 
this test are in part D of Table 5.7. Based on the Likelihood Ratio test, we reject the 
hypothesis that this correlation between these two decisions is zero at the 5% level.  
To sum up, there is strong statistical evidence that decisions to participate in 
CRP and work off the farm are determined jointly, rather than in a sequential fashion 
or independently.        
Estimated Empirical Models 
Since the bivariate probit model is the preferred choice, we focus here 
exclusively the results for that model. The bivariate probit model is a straightforward 
                                                 
65 LDC had been used as the model selection criterion for testing the sequential structures under the 
nested multinomial logit model framework (Kling and Thomson 1996; Hauber and Parsons 2000). 
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extension of the binary choice case, but it allows for a correlation between each binary 
choice. This special characteristic also provides the basis for justifying the joint rather 
than an independent decision specification. 66  Table 5.1 presents the maximum 
likelihood estimation of the bivariate probit model. The parameter ( ρ ), the correlation 
between the error terms in the two participation equations does capture the joint nature 
of these two decisions: ρ is equal to 0.121, and it is statistically different from zero. 
More formally, the independence assumption between CRP and off-farm work 
decisions can be tested through a likelihood ratio test (LR) under the null hypothesis 
that the parameter ( ρ ) is equal to zero. The LR test value of our model is 7.1, which is 
greater than the critical value (3.8) at the 5% level.67   
Determinants of the CRP Participation 
Based on the results of bivariate probit model in Table 5.1, participating in 
CRP depends generally on some characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, land 
quality, and the circumstances in the local economy. There are also some differences in 
participation by major ERS production region. The probability of participation in CRP 
increases with farm size; the probability of participation is lower if the farm is 
primarily engaged in vegetable or nursery production, rather than cash grain 
production, which reflects the higher opportunity cost of the vegetable or nursery 
                                                 
66 Our bivariate probit specification is in contrast to some other current literature studying off-farm job 
participation that is based a Tobit specification (e.g. Mishra and Goodwin (1997); Goodwin and Mishra 
(2004); and El-Osta et al. (2004)), The one distinct advantage of this bivariate specification is that a 
separate set of variables can be specified not only to explain participation in CRP and off-farm work, 
but also to explain CRP payments, CRP acreage enrollment and off-farm wage and hours worked off the 
farm given participation. Relative to the off-farm work decision in particular Huffman (2004, page 738) 
argues that: ”.. in the Tobit model, the same set of variables determines the probability of off-farm work 
and hours of off-farm work, given that participation occurs. This, however, is never an appropriate 
econometric specification because the off-farm wage and reservation wage equations are not 
identified.”  
67 The LR statistics is calculated as: T*=-2*(logLR-logLUR), where logLR is the log-likelihood value of 
the restricted model, while logLUR is for the unrestricted model (bivariate probit model). To implement 
this test, we estimated separate equations for CRP and off-farm work, each specified as a binary probit 
model. The restricted log-likelihood value is the sum of the values for these two binary probit models.  
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farms removing land from production.  
In addition to the negative effect of the opportunity cost of land on 
participation, one could also hypothesize that the likelihood of participation would rise 
with the level of the annual CRP payments. Unfortunately, it is impossible to include 
such a variable in participation equations such as this, because of the sample selection 
problem. However, Park and Schorr (1997) argued that the maximum bid price ought 
to be one of the factors affecting CRP participation. We have no information on actual 
bids or bids accepted for our sample farms, but we do find that farm households that 
are located in areas where the EBI scores for land currently enrolled are high are more 
likely to participate in CRP, ceteris paribus. It is likely that in areas where the EBI 
scores were high, farmers might well expect to have higher bids accepted.  
Based on the measures of soil quality related to the general quality of the soil 
resource in the region described in Chapter 2, participation in CRP rises (falls) as the 
proportion of land in the surrounding county is classified as high (low) quality. These 
results suggest that CRP participation may be higher in areas where land is well suited 
for agriculture and lower in the areas less suitable for crop production.  
There are two variables that suggest participation in CRP has something to do 
with the life-cycle of the farm operator. The likelihood of CRP participation increases 
with age. Thus, as farmers get older, committing some land to CRP may be one way of 
reducing operator labor requirements. This may also be a way of holding onto 
farmland assets until they are needed for the retirement years, or so that they can be 
passed on through an estate. The fact that there is a positive correlation between the 
probability of farmers working off the farm and the probability of participation in CRP 
(as measured by ρ) may also be a way of reducing operator labor requirements. Finally, 
the probability of CRP participation increases as a farmer’s education level increases; 
this is perhaps an indication that investments in human capital might lead to increases 
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in CRP. To the extent that these investments also lead to a greater appreciation by 
farmers of the value of the environmental benefits from CRP, these effects square with 
the theoretical model in Chapter 3.  
In the theory discussed above, there are also several ways in which risk can 
affect the participation in CRP. As aversion to risk increases, the likelihood of 
participation in a program where payments are certain, such as CRP, will increase. 
This conclusion is supported by the negative sign on the variable “RISK” in Table 5.1 
(e.g. high values for “RISK” are associated with farmers who prefer more risk). 
Furthermore, by allowing for decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), our theory is 
also consistent with the fact that decoupled payments, “AMTA_A”, reduce the 
likelihood of CRP participation. With DARA, farmers are likely to be less concerned 
about diversifying into risk-free income opportunities as wealth increases through 
decoupled payments. 68  Finally, since commodity program related loan deficiency 
payments (LDP) reduce farm income variability, these payments also reduce risk 
averse farmers’ concerns for allocating farm resources to program, such as CRP.        
Participation in other programs also affects the likelihood for CRP 
participation. For example, if the farmer is enrolled in a voluntary agricultural district, 
subject to a farmland preservation easement, is located in an agricultural protection 
zone or an area zoned exclusively for agricultural use (the variable AGDIST), the 
farmer is less likely to participate in CRP. Many farmers participate in these types of 
programs (most of which are state or local programs) out of concern for maintaining 
their land in agricultural production in rapidly growing areas where there is 
competition for land for non-agricultural purposes. Therefore, it is hardly surprising 
that, ceteris paribus, these farmers would be less likely to enroll land in a program 
                                                 
68 By assuming non-constant absolute risk aversion, Hennessey’s (1998) framework is also consistent 
with our results in the sense that he shows that under these conditions, decoupled payments can affect 
crop production alternatives.     
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such as CRP that essentially takes land out of production. The fact that the likelihood 
of CRP participation falls as the proportion of population that is urban rises would 
seem to reinforce this explanation.69 In contrast, farmers who participate in EQIP are 
also more likely to participate in CRP. Participation in both EQIP and CRP could 
reflect a farmer’s stewardship for the environment (reflected in our theoretical section) 
by removing particularly venerable land from production, while at the same time using 
more environmentally friendly practices on land still in production. 
Determinants of the Off-Farm Work Decision 
 As expected, the decision of the farm operator to engage in off-farm work also 
depends on the characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, and the circumstances in 
the local economy (Table 5.1). As in much of the existing literature (e.g. Sumner 1982; 
Benjamin and Guyomard 1994; Abdulai and Delgado 1999), our results continue to 
confirm the fact that older farmers are more likely to work off the farm.70 However, 
the effect is nonlinear, with the likelihood of participation increasing with the 
operator’s age up to about age 44, but declining thereafter. Although the operator’s 
education has a positive effect on the probability of participation in off-farm work, the 
years of experience on the farm has a negative effect that increases at an increasing 
rate. Farm operators raised on farms are also less likely to work off the farm. Since 
returns to off-farm labor are likely to less variable than farm returns, the indication 
that the likelihood of off-farm participation is lower for farm operators willing to 
accept more risk (a negative coefficient on “RISK” in Table 5.1, a variable that 
increases as a farmer is willing to accept more risk) is consistent with the theory of 
risk averse behavior, but the effect is not statistically significant.  
The likelihood of working off the farm decreases with family size, but 
                                                 
69 Duke (2004) also found that the likelihood of participation in CRP is lower in highly urban areas.   
70 Our result is not consistent with the finding in Whittaker and Ahearn (1991), who found that young 
operators were more likely than older operators to work off the farm. 
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increases if the spouse is primarily a homemaker. This latter result may not square 
with the fact that the operator’s likelihood of working off the farm increases with the 
spouse working off the farm. To disentangle these results, we might well have to 
specify the characteristics of household size in greater detail and deal with the fact that 
the decision of the spouse to work off the farm may be endogenous. Attempts are 
made to disentangle these effects in subsequent chapters.  
The likelihood of participation in off-farm work declines with farm size and 
tenancy, and it is lower for vegetable or nursery operations. The negative effects on the 
likelihood of participation of both net worth and participation in government programs 
other than CRP may reflect wealth or scale effects on off-farm labor supply (Goodwin 
and Mishra, 2004). The negative effect of tenancy (as measured by the proportion of 
acreage owned) on the likelihood for off-farm job participation reflects a greater 
commitment to agricultural production (ceteris paribus) from operators that own their 
own land. Finally, there is some indication that the strength of the local economy, as 
measured by the proportion of jobs that are manufacturing, increases the likelihood of 
participation in off-farm work. The relative extent to which the local economy 
depends on jobs in the trade sectors reduces the likelihood of participation in off-farm 
work.  
Further Justification of the Bivariate Probit Model  
Before leaving our discussion of the bivariate probit choice model, it is 
important to address the issue of model misspecification. In this section, we focus on 
testing two primary assumptions imposed on the bivariate probit model. One issue is 
to investigate whether or not other variables than participation in CRP or off-farm 
labor supply decision of the operator that are associated with several explanatory 
variables are exogenous, and therefore can be included as exogenous regressors in the 
model. The results of related hypotheses tests affect the validity of any policy 
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conclusions involving these variables. Since the bivariate probit model is based on the 
assumption of a bivariate normal distributed error term, we test this hypothesis as well.  
Tests for Other Choices Being Exogenous 
As we discussed in Chapter 4, one might argue that some variables specified in 
both CRP and off-farm labor supply decisions might be endogenous to these two 
decisions. We test the null hypotheses that these variables are exogenous to the off-
farm labor supply decisions by utilizing the methods outlined in Chapter 4.71  The 
variables we test are the decision of the spouse to be a home-maker (SP_HMAK); 
decouple payment received of the farm household (AMTA_A); tenancy of the land 
ownership (TENANCY). The results presented in Table 5.9 is encouraging, since only 
the binary variable that whether the spouse is a home maker (SP_HMAK) might be 
endogenous to the off-farm working decision of the operator. However, it is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The tested results indicate that the null 
hypotheses for the other two variables are exogenous to the decision of the operator to 
work off the farm are not rejected.  
 
 
T able  5 .9 : T esting  fo r  E ndo g ene ity o f O P  C ho ice  E quatio n
V ariable T -V alu e P-V alu e
SP_ H M A K -1 .7 4 0 .0 8 2
A M T A _ A -0 .9 2 7 0 .3 5 4
T E N A N C Y 1 .0 9 9 0 .2 7 2
V ariable d efin itions are listed  in  T able 2 .4  o f C hapter  2 .  
 
                                                 
71 Since we specify the same variables with CRP choice equation as with CRP model in Chapter 4 and 
have encouraging results there. We only focus on testing the off-farm labor supply equation here. 
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Tests for the Bivariate Normality        
Since the bivariate probit model relies on the bivariate normality assumption of 
the error term, it is important to test this assumption as well. To test bivariate 
normality, we utilize a general non-parametric framework (Horowitz (1993) and 
Pagan and Ullah (1999)) by comparing the predicted value from the bivariate probit 
(parametric model) with a non-parametric estimation. If the bivariate probit is 
specified correctly, the difference between these two predicted values should be only 
from sampling error. In conducting the test, we compare the predicted probabilities 
between the bivariate probit model and a non-parametric regression. We discuss the 
tests in detail in Appendix 5B. To sum up, our result shows that the bivariate probit 
model is unlikely to suffer from a misspecification problem. 
The Second Stage Equations Based on the Bivariate Probit Model 
 After discussing the factors affecting the joint decisions to participate in the 
CRP and in off-farm work, we move on to the empirical results for the second-stage 
equations for CRP per acre payments; acreage enrolled in CRP; off-farm hourly wage; 
and hours worked off the farm. By correcting for the sample selection problems, we 
have estimated results for the appropriate subsets of these equations for the three 
decision regimes associated with the joint decision structure (Figure 5.1). 
To correct for the non-random sampling problem in this case, we demonstrated 
above that two Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR), one corresponding to each participation 
decision, must be estimated for each of the regimes. They are included in the 
respective equations. Given this regime structure, each one of the second-stage 
equations is estimated for two of the three regimes. It makes sense to compare the 
results across regimes.  
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 CRP Payment Equations 
CRP payment equations are estimated for the group of farmers that participates 
in both CRP and off-farm work (Regime 1-1), and the group of farmers that 
participates only in CRP (Regime 1-0). Following the standard approach for the wage 
equation in the labor economics literature, the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the per acre CRP payment. Table 5.10 presents the estimated results based on the 
linear regression. The model fits the data well, since the adjusted R2 is 0.41 (Regime 
1-1) and 0.50 (Regime 1-0). For both groups, the two appropriate Inverse Mills Ratios 
are statistically significant. The Wald test results for regime 1-1 and regime 1-0 groups 
under the null hypothesis that both IMR are equal to zero are 8.3 and 7.21, 
respectively. Both are greater than the critical value of the chi square distribution (x2 
(0.95,2)=5.99).   
 
Table 5.10: Estimated Acreage Payment Equations
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant 1.819 0.022 83.561 3.391 0.472 7.190
OP_EXP 0.020 0.001 38.703 0.039 0.015 2.590
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 -22.553 -0.001 0.000 -3.242
LQH_96 0.746 0.012 60.692 0.653 0.246 2.660
LQM_96 0.837 0.016 51.497 0.477 0.370 1.290
CROPSIZ1 -0.068 0.006 -12.346 0.010 0.048 0.205
H_SIZE -0.043 0.002 -26.007 -0.048 0.049 -0.964
REGN1 0.547 0.005 102.023 0.575 0.097 5.956
REGN567 0.025 0.012 2.035 -0.510 0.154 -3.322
CROP17 0.684 0.018 37.650 -0.623 0.209 -2.984
MANUF 0.022 0.000 80.327 0.013 0.006 2.000
IMR_CRP 0.305 0.005 65.434 -0.038 0.100 -0.382
IMR_OP 0.072 0.011 6.248 -0.229 0.143 -1.602
Sample 120 229
R2 0.588 0.533
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.507
Wald Test* 8.300 7.210
* Wald Test: H 0 : IMR_CRP=IMR_OP=0; critical value (x
2 (0.95,2)=5.99).
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Regime 1-1 (CRP=OP=1) Regime 1-0 (CRP=1)
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With respect to the factors that determine CRP payments, the results are quite 
consistent across groups, but the sizes of the effects of certain variables are quite 
different. To begin, farmers with more farming experience are likely to receive higher 
CRP payments, but the effect is non-linear. This experience may well contribute to 
these farmers’ effectiveness at bidding and selecting the most appropriate land to 
enroll and management practice to use on the CRP land.  
It is also encouraging that the size of the payment is directly related to the 
predominance of high and medium quality farmland in the surrounding area. This 
effect, however, is much larger for the group that participates in both CRP and off-
farm labor market. These results are reinforced by the regional dummy variables 
indicating that per acre payments are higher in the Heartland, but lower in the Eastern 
Uplands, the Southern Seaboard, and the Fruitful Rim. Unfortunately, we had no farm-
specific data that would relate the size of the payment to the quality of the land 
actually enrolled. 
There is one place in which the results for these two groups differ. The 
payments are higher for cash grain farmers participating in both CRP and off-farm 
work, but fall for cash grain farmers participating in CRP but not working off the farm. 
However, the latter is not statistically significant.  
Off-Farm Wage Equations 
 Off-farm wage equations (Table 5.11) are estimated for the group participating 
in both CRP and an off-farm job (regime 1-1) and for the group participating only in 
off-farm work (regime 0-1). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the off-farm 
wage, and the explanatory variables in the models differ somewhat by group. The 
performance of the equation for regime 1-1 is slightly better than for the other group. 
The adjusted R2 is slightly higher (0.271). The Wald test statistics under the null 
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hypothesis that both Inverse Mills Ratios are equal to zero for the two regimes are 9.9 
and 5.0, respectively. Both are greater than the 90% level critical value of the chi-
square distribution (4.61). These results suggest that the self-selection problems are 
significant in the wage equation of both groups.  
 
Table 5.11: Estimated Wage Equations
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant 1.012 0.023 44.854 1.577 0.016 96.343
OP_ED_C 0.117 0.001 104.118 0.084 0.001 142.973
OP_EXP_F 0.022 0.000 89.127 0.022 0.000 183.673
OP_TECH 0.049 0.008 6.202 0.180 0.003 63.241
OP_JOBR3 -0.058 0.009 -6.199 -0.175 0.005 -36.085
H_SIZE -0.038 0.002 -20.126 0.040 0.001 44.958
AGRIN -0.007 0.000 -33.906 -0.021 0.000 -90.783
CROPSIZ1 -0.193 0.005 -42.438 -- -- --
UNEMP -0.055 0.002 -30.003 -- -- --
TRADE -- -- -- -0.020 0.001 -28.756
URBAN -- -- -- 0.003 0.000 35.051
MILES -- -- -- -0.004 0.000 -45.003
IMR_CRP 0.094 0.006 16.169 -0.084 0.005 -15.967
IMR_OP 0.542 0.007 72.259 0.185 0.004 47.671
Sample 120 489
R 2 0.333 0.266
Adjust R 2 0.271 0.249
Wald Test* 9.910 5.000
* Wald Test: H0 : IMR_CRP=IMR_OP=0; critical value (x
2 (0.95,2)=5.99);  critical value (x2(0.90,2)=4.61).
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Regime 1-1 (CRP=OP=1) Regime 0-1 (OP=1)
 
 
 
From the estimated equations, the characteristics of the farm operator affect the 
off-farm wage for both groups. The fact that farm operators with more education are 
likely to receive higher wages, is consistent with finding in other studies (e.g., Mishra 
and Goodwin (1997); Abdulai and Delgado (1999)). Three variables related to the 
nature of the off-farm job also affect the off-farm wage. The off-farm wage is higher, 
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as one would expect, if the off-farm job is a technical job, but it appears that farmers 
are willing to accept lower wages if their primary motivation for off-farm work is to 
gain assess to health insurance or other benefits that are not necessarily available to 
farm households where everyone is working only on the farm. The off-farm wage is 
also related to the number of years of off-farm work experience.  
The conditions in the local economy in the previous year affect the off-farm 
wage for both groups. The off-farm wage falls with higher proportions of local labor 
employed in agriculture, although the effect at the margin is more pronounced for 
those farmers with off-farm jobs but do not participate in CRP. The operators with 
larger farms who participate in CRP and work off the farm receive lower wages, as do 
similar farmers in areas where the unemployment rate of the local economy is high. 
For the operators who work off the farm but do not participate in CRP, the off-farm 
wage declines with the distance that the farm household is from a town with a 
population of more than 10,000 or where there is a high percentage of urban residents 
or where there are large proportions of labor employed in the trade sector of the local 
economy. These results probably suggest that these off-farm jobs are more likely to be 
in very rural areas where wages are lower that in more urbanized areas.  
CRP Acreage Equations 
Farm operators participating in CRP and working off the farm enrolled on 
average 115 acres in CRP. This is quite a bit lower than the average of 172 acres for 
those farm operators participating only in CRP. In general these two equations 
performed well (Table 5.12). The high adjusted R2 (0.507, 0.502, respectively) are 
encouraging. In both equations the correction for sample selection are needed.  
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Table 5.12: Acreage Equation
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -792.679 35.664 -22.227 -758.591 35.244 -21.524
OP_AGE 27.020 0.854 31.656 50.338 0.916 54.952
OP_AGESQ -358.130 8.956 -39.987 -406.254 7.567 -53.689
OP_EXP -5.209 0.276 -18.906 -33.697 0.469 -71.896
OP_EXPSQ 0.204 0.005 37.730 0.486 0.007 73.557
LQH_96 -549.731 7.441 -73.874 -878.309 7.971 -110.189
LQM_96 -451.874 8.062 -56.047 -669.682 9.024 -74.214
CROP17 249.315 7.114 35.046 10.423 5.296 1.968
EBI 7.016 0.519 13.526 6.448 0.353 18.288
REGN1 -132.069 5.880 -22.461 -159.769 5.745 -27.811
CROPSIZ1 79.465 3.028 26.239 101.963 1.446 70.492
H_SIZE 6.252 0.750 8.339 11.874 1.308 9.081
AMTA_A -11.607 0.373 -31.106 -5.270 0.134 -39.335
MANUF -7.035 0.282 -24.937 -0.499 0.207 -2.416
UNEMP 38.220 0.587 65.155 -2.426 0.501 -4.845
OP_EXP_F -3.719 0.116 -32.011 -- -- --
PLQL -2.674 0.242 -11.050 -11.883 0.216 -55.058
P_HAT 4.263 0.208 20.456 5.176 0.148 34.910
W_HAT 2.827 0.204 13.882 -- -- --
WAMTA 0.818 0.030 26.901 -- -- --
IMR_CRP -90.579 2.728 -33.206 -38.257 2.914 -13.127
IMR_OP 106.070 6.134 17.291 138.094 4.430 31.170
Own price elas** 1.309 1.562
Cross price elas** 0.716 --
Sample 120 229
R 2 0.507 0.502
Adjust R 2 0.407 0.460
Wald Test* 6.540 8.270
* Wald Test: H 0 : IMR_CRP=IMR_OP=0; critical value (x
2 (0.95,2)=5.99)
**Own price elasticity and cross price elasticity are calculated based on sample mean.  
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Regime 1-1 (CRP=OP=1) Regime 1-0 (CRP=1)
  
 
The explanatory variables of these CRP acreage equations relate to operator’s 
characteristics, farm and family structure, environmental quality, and the local 
economy conditions. In order to capture the interaction between these two decisions, 
the off-farm wage and off-farm work experience are included in the CRP acreage 
equation for those who participate in both programs.  
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To begin, we focus on the CRP acreage in response to changes in CRP 
payments and off-farm wages.72 Consistent with the result from the binary CRP choice 
model (Chapter 4), the estimated CRP payments are positive and significant 
explanatory variables of both acreage equations.73 Thus, there are upward sloping CRP 
acreage supply functions in both cases. Since the own price elasticities for these two 
groups based on the sample mean of each group are 1.309, 1.562, respectively, farmers 
who participate in both programs are slightly less payment responsive. Because of the 
interaction between per-acre payment and low land quality (PLQL), the acreage 
response to payment falls and can become negative in areas where there is a high 
proportion of low quality land. We depict the marginal CRP acreage response to low 
land quality for both groups in Figures 5.4-5.5, respectively. For the group that 
participates only in CRP, the CRP acre response to payment is negative in areas where 
about 45% of the land is low quality. These results seem consistent with the belief by 
some that payments have been raised to attract high quality land in some areas, but are 
also consistent with farmers’ submitting lower bids to ensure that bids for low quality 
land are accepted.    
 
 
                                                 
72 Following the common practice in studies of labor markets (e.g., Wales and Woodland, 1980; 
Killingsworth. 1983; and Fernandez et al. (2001), we use the predicted per acre payment and per hour 
off-farm wage as the instruments for payment and wage variables of the acreage equations. 
73 This is consistent with Suter (2004), who found that annual incentive payments affect CREP 
enrollment in buffer strips, but this effect was apparent only after he used a refined estimate of eligible 
farmland derived from GIS data on the amount of agricultural land along streams in the target 
watersheds. However, it is inconsistent with much of the previous literature, particularly studies based 
on county-level analysis, where the acres enrolled fall as payments rise (e.g. Fleming, 2004 and 
Goodwin et al., 2004).  
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Marginal Effect of CRP Payment on CRP Acreage (Group 1,1)
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Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of CRP Price on CRP Acreage in Group (1, 1) 
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Figure 5.5: Marginal Effect of CRP Price on CRP Acreage in Group (1,0) 
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There is an inelastic, but positive, estimated cross price elasticity of CRP 
acreage with respect to the off-farm wage (0.716) for farmers participating in both 
programs. Thus, operators receiving higher wages appear to have an incentive to work 
less on the farm, but in so doing, they take additional land out of production and 
commit it to CRP. We found that the marginal effect of the off-farm wage on CRP 
acres also depends on decoupled payments (AMTA_A), and the effect increases 
dramatically if the farm household receives more decoupled payments (Figure 5.6).    
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Figure 5.6: Marginal Effect of Off-Farm Wage on CRP Acreage in Group (1,1) 
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Other factors included in these equations affect CRP acreage in much the same 
way for each group, but the magnitudes of the effects differ by group. Older farmers 
enroll more acres in CRP, although the effect is non-linear. CRP acreage also increases 
with both farm and family size, and for cash grain farms, but acreage decreases with 
the operator’s experience in farming, perhaps reflecting in part a higher opportunity 
cost of farm labor for more experienced operators.  
It is evident from Table 5.12 that CRP acreage is lower in areas where there is 
a high proportion of high quality land. This is somewhat at odds with the results from 
the CRP participation equation, where the likelihood of participation in CRP is 
increased as the proportion of land that is of high quality in a locality increases. This 
could be symptomatic of a problem in adverse selection. Given the decision to 
participate in CRP, farmers are less likely to enroll high or medium quality land into 
CRP; rather they keep it in crop production. This result would also seem to be 
reinforced by the fact that CRP participants in the Heartland tend to enroll less land in 
the program. It is difficult to know if these findings are consistent with one of the 
primary goals of CRP, the reduction of soil erosion and other environmental residuals 
associated with agricultural production. There is consistency only if it is the poorer 
quality land that is more subject to erosion and more environmentally venerable. In 
terms of the goals of CRP, it is encouraging that for regions with higher EBI scores, 
there is a tendency for CRP acreage to be higher as well. 
In terms of other farm programs, CRP acreage falls as decoupled payments rise. 
This reinforces the negative effect of decoupled payments on the probability of CRP 
participation. However, the marginal effect of decoupled payments on CRP acres 
depends on the off-farm wage, the indirect effect through the interaction term 
(WAMTA) of group (1,1). If the farm operator earns high off-farm wage rate, the 
marginal effect of decoupled payments on CRP acres could be positive (Figure 5.7).   
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Hours Worked Off the Farm 
 To complete our understanding of farm operators’ joint decisions to participate 
in CRP and to work off the farm, we estimate equations for the hours worked off the 
farm by operators who have chosen to do so (Tables 5.13). These equations did not 
perform as well as the other second-stage equations, particularly in terms of the 
adjusted R2. For both groups of farmers who have off-farm jobs, the joint tests of the 
two Inverse Mills Ratios are significant at least at the 10% level, suggesting that we 
have corrected for any sample selection problems.  
For both groups, the own-wage elasticities of hours worked off the farm are 
positive, 0.366 and 0.004 respectively. Although these small elasticities may seem 
surprising, they are consistent with earlier results by Huffman and Lange (1989).74 
One explanation may be the fact that many off-farm jobs have prescribed work 
schedules. In contract to earlier literature, we found that the marginal effect of the off-
farm wage on off-farm hours also depends on the decoupled payments received by the 
farm household. The indirect effect comes through the interaction term between the 
off-farm wage and the decoupled payments (WAMTA). However, both direct and 
indirect effects positively contribute to the off-farm labor supply (Figure 5.8). 
 
                                                 
74 Huffman and Lange (1989) analyze the off-farm labor supply for Iowa family farmers. The own price 
elasticity for the husband was 0.091.  
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Marginal Effect of AMTA on CRP Acreage (Group 1,1)
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Figure 5.7: Marginal Effects of decoupled payments on CRP Acres in Group 
(1,1) 
 
For those farmers both working off the farm and participating in CRP,  there is 
a positive cross-price elasticity of hours worked off the farm with respect to CRP 
payments (0.273), and it is slightly smaller than the own price effect. This result is 
consistent with the complementary cross-price effect in the CRP acreage equation. In 
this case, a logical interpretation of the result is: as CRP payments increase, the 
increase in CRP acreage reduces the demand for labor on the farm, thus making it 
available for off-farm purposes.  
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 Table 5.13: Equations for Hours Worked Off the Farm
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant 369.749 77.056 4.798 3136.368 29.958 104.691
OP_AGE 141.364 3.205 44.104 -6.772 1.187 -5.704
OP_AGESQ -1637.399 33.934 -48.252 56.595 13.940 4.060
OP_EXP_F -17.033 0.441 -38.616 -- -- --
RAISE_OP -491.684 8.403 -58.514 -- -- --
CROPSIZ1 -169.848 11.611 -14.629 -232.665 6.092 -38.191
H_SIZE -- -- -- -44.848 1.206 -37.186
TENANCY -53.188 2.562 -20.763 -- -- --
AMTA_A -123.664 1.442 -85.729 -4.377 0.136 -32.274
LDP_A -10.489 0.258 -40.669 -4.059 0.084 -48.090
RISK -50.413 1.433 -35.170 -13.816 0.659 -20.965
TRADE -68.783 1.356 -50.741 -19.044 0.816 -23.329
MANUF 2.689 0.558 4.823 13.319 0.283 47.006
UNEMP 9.899 2.337 4.236 -- -- --
REGN3 -26.434 10.175 -2.598 -1023.491 6.740 -151.864
SERV -- -- -- -4.986 0.368 -13.550
DIST_OP -- -- -- -0.357 0.009 -38.477
MILES -- -- -- 8.584 0.091 94.312
CROP17 -- -- -- -38.253 4.110 -9.308
REGN567 -- -- -- -296.027 3.598 -82.270
REGN9 -- -- -- 191.597 11.107 17.249
SP_HMAK -- -- -- 17.937 3.501 5.124
OP_RET -- -- -- -694.788 13.032 -53.315
NETWORT1 -- -- -- -3.586 0.299 -11.982
URBAN -- -- -- 0.803 0.102 7.883
W_HAT 7.522 0.824 9.127 0.528 0.235 2.247
P_HAT 11.820 0.249 47.555 -- -- --
WAMTA 8.777 0.115 76.543 -- -- --
IMR_CRP 143.477 10.438 13.745 614.979 8.654 71.066
IMR_OP 491.551 24.744 19.865 -384.610 9.513 -40.431
Own price elas** 0.366 0.004
Cross price elas** 0.273 --
Sample 120 489
R 2 0.451 0.502
Adjust R 2 0.353 0.460
Wald Test* 5.867 8.760
* Wald Test: H 0 : IMR_CRP=IMR_OP=0; critical value (x
2 (0.95,2)=5.99); critical value (x2(0.90,2)=4.61)
**Own and cross price elasticity and cross price elasticity are calculated based on sample mean.  
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Regime 1-1 (CRP=OP=1) Regime 0-1 (OP=1)
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Marginal Effect of the Off-Farm Wage on Hours (Group 1,1)
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Figure 5.8: Marginal Effect of Off-Farm Wage on Off-Farm Hours in Group 
(1,1) 
 
For both groups, the commitment of time to off-farm work is higher for the 
more risk averse farm operators. In contrast, both decoupled payments and loan 
deficiency payments reduce the downside risk to income from farm production. All 
else equal, farmers with off-farm jobs receiving these payments tend to work fewer 
hours off the farm; the magnitudes of these effects differ between the groups. However, 
we also found that the marginal effect of decoupled payments on off-farm labor supply 
depends on the off-farm wage rate, which can be regarded as the indirect effect along 
with the direct effect through (AMTA_A) for group (1,1). The off-farm labor supply 
can increase if the farm receives a relative high off-farm wage (Figure 5.9).   
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Marginal Effect of AMTA on Hour (Group 1,1)
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Figure 5.9: Marginal Effect of Decoupled Payments on Off-Farm Hours in 
Group (1,1) 
 
The effects of operator age on hours worked off the farm differ for the two 
groups. Older farmers working off the farm and participating in CRP tend to work 
more hours off the farm than younger farmers in the same group. Older farmers 
participating in off-farm labor market, but not in CRP, tend to work fewer hours off 
the farm. This latter result is consistent with that by Goodwin and Mishra (2004).  
Those farm operators with off-farm jobs and land in CRP tend to work fewer 
hours off the farm if they were raised on a farm. Those farmers with more farm 
experience and who own much of their farmland also tend to work fewer hours in their 
off farm jobs. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that these types of 
farmers are likely to be more heavily invested in farm-specific human capital, thus 
increasing the relative shadow price of farming.  
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The group of farm operators participating only in off farm work commit fewer 
hours to that job as farm household net worth increases. In contrast, farmers in this 
group tend to work longer hours if their spouse is primarily a homemaker. Finally, as 
one would expect, farm operators in this group that have an off farm job, but who 
classify themselves as retired, work fewer hours off the farm than others in the group.  
Estimating the Technical and Scale Efficiencies and Productivity 
As introduced above, we next identify the effect of CRP participation by first 
estimating four separate production functions, one for CRP participants and one for 
non-participants. The second step is to estimate the technical efficiency of each farm 
household by decomposing the compound error on the frontier function into technical 
efficiency and random shock components. Finally, we compare the different 
performance regarding the technical and scale efficiencies, production frontier, and 
total factor productivity of four groups.  
The Production Function   
To investigate differences in farm productivity, we specify the translog 
production functions for each group under the variable return to scale technology.75 All 
of the output and input variables are specified in logarithm. Gross cash sales are used 
as the measure of production, while there are four inputs, hours worked on the farm 
(LGHOUR), operated cropland (LGLAND), hired labor cost (LGLABOR), and capital 
(LGCA). The hired cost includes regular hired labor and contract labor; Capital is 
measured by the fixed value of building and farm equipment, excluding the dwelling. 
Table 5.14 contains estimates for four translog production functions, one for the group 
of CRP participants, one for the group working off the farm, one for the group doing 
                                                 
75 We specify the production function as a translog instead of the Cobb-Douglas because its flexibility. 
We test the translog production function against the Cobb-Douglas. Our LR test suggests utilizing the 
translog production function is appropriate. 
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both, and one for the group doing neither. These production functions are estimated 
within an endogenous switching regression framework. This identifies inherent 
differences in farm production by group. For three of the four groups, the Wald tests 
for the joint significance of the two Inverse Mills Ratios are statistically significant. In 
general, the translog production functions fit the data well. The estimated production 
elasticities, calculated based on the sample means, of the inputs based on the sample 
mean are all positive, but they are different across groups. For example, the economies 
of scale range from a high of 1.462 for the group participating in neither CRP nor off-
farm work, to a low of 0.85 for the group participating in CRP only.  
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Table 5.14: Translog Production Function by Groups
Variable Coefficient Std t-value Coefficient Std t-value
Constant -17.424 6.176 -2.821 -1.038 0.665 -1.561
LGHOUR 1.232 2.126 0.579 0.114 0.188 0.607
LGLAND -0.117 1.009 -0.116 -0.215 0.238 -0.900
LGLABOR 0.986 0.462 2.133 0.031 0.077 0.407
LGCA 2.831 1.702 1.663 -0.216 0.195 -1.109
HOURSQ -0.107 0.162 -0.663 0.006 0.016 0.396
LANDSQ -0.087 0.104 -0.840 0.107 0.020 5.346
LABORSQ 0.014 0.013 1.051 0.053 0.005 11.221
CASQ 0.198 0.127 1.559 0.036 0.015 2.382
HOURLAND 0.522 0.212 2.462 0.027 0.032 0.822
HOURLABR -0.160 0.048 -3.330 -0.031 0.013 -2.317
HOURCA -0.278 0.233 -1.192 0.033 0.027 1.241
LANDLABR 0.053 0.035 1.492 -0.039 0.011 -3.427
LANDCA -0.402 0.130 -3.091 -0.052 0.028 -1.842
LABORCA -0.036 0.057 -0.631 -0.001 0.012 -0.102
IMR_CRP 0.513 0.226 2.271 -0.031 0.185 -0.168
IMR_OP 0.510 0.256 1.994 -0.136 0.164 -0.825
Elasticity
Hour 0.168 0.013 12.856 0.341 0.068 5.032
Land 0.460 0.156 2.950 0.553 0.057 9.710
Labor 0.091 0.075 1.210 0.259 0.023 11.024
Capital 0.296 0.152 1.951 0.154 0.063 2.442
Reture to Scale 1.101 1.306
R 2 0.684 0.707
Adjusted R 2 0.627 0.699
Wald Test 7.42 1.36
For CRP=OP=1 For OP = 1 ONLY
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Table 5.14: (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std t-value Coefficient Std t-value
Constant -20.003 6.134 -3.261 -4.299 1.975 -2.177
LGHOUR 1.847 1.791 1.031 -0.865 0.330 -2.619
LGLAND 1.608 1.323 1.216 0.475 0.335 1.421
LGLABOR 0.492 0.280 1.754 0.615 0.094 6.566
LGCA 1.768 1.243 1.422 0.569 0.509 1.118
HOURSQ -0.128 0.185 -0.690 0.137 0.024 5.656
LANDSQ -0.277 0.098 -2.810 0.054 0.011 4.800
LABORSQ 0.011 0.008 1.414 0.040 0.003 14.484
CASQ -0.080 0.119 -0.673 0.095 0.033 2.828
HOURLAND 0.289 0.224 1.291 -0.011 0.046 -0.236
HOURLABR -0.049 0.056 -0.886 -0.031 0.014 -2.292
HOURCA -0.178 0.188 -0.950 -0.073 0.073 -0.995
LANDLABR -0.052 0.037 -1.382 -0.044 0.008 -5.197
LANDCA 0.106 0.163 0.650 -0.053 0.025 -2.111
LABORCA 0.038 0.036 1.061 -0.067 0.011 -6.153
IMR_CRP 0.251 0.150 1.678 0.145 0.123 1.182
IMR_OP 0.376 0.168 2.239 -0.463 0.083 -5.594
Elasticity
Hour_els 0.305 0.424 0.721 0.463 0.104 4.468
Land_els 0.019 0.216 0.089 0.307 0.042 7.244
Labor_els 0.179 0.076 2.340 0.382 0.024 16.147
Capital_els 0.347 0.153 2.271 0.310 0.056 5.538
RTS 0.850 1.462
R2 0.861 0.824
Adjusted R2 0.849 0.821
Wald Test 7.94 43.12
Wald Test: H0 :IMR_CRP=IMR_OP=0; critical value (x
2 (0.95,2)=5.99)
For CRP = OP = 0For CRP=1 ONLY
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T.E (CRP=OP=1) 0.536
T.E (CRP=1) 0.421
T.E (OP=1) 0.474
T.E (None) 0.428
T.E Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 1.253
T.E Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 0.984
T.E Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 1.106
T.E Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 0.995
T.E Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 1.126
T.E Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 1.013
P.F Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 0.670
P.F Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 0.838
P.F Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 0.889
T.F.P Ratio (CRP=OP=1 vs none) 0.834
T.F.P Ratio (CRP=1 vs none) 0.928
T.F.P Ratio (OP=1 vs none) 0.996
* Note: ratio is calculated based on non-participant group.
Ratios of Total Factor Productivities
Table 5.15:  Comparisons of Technical Efficiency and Productivity
Technical Efficiency for Each Group
Ratios of Technical Efficiencies
Ratios of Production Frontiers
Ratios of Economic Scale Efficiencies
 
 
Productivity and Efficiency Comparisons  
We utilize the Malmquist TFP Index formula to estimate differences between 
groups, in terms of technical and scale efficiency, the production frontier, and total 
factor productivity. The results are in Table 5.17. 
In comparing all of the four groups, the average technical efficiency is the 
highest for the group of farmers participating in CRP and off-farm work: the ratio of 
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technical efficiencies between this group is about 1.253 to the (0,0) group. The group 
only participating in CRP is slightly less technical efficient than the reference group (a 
ratio is 0.984). On this basis, it appears that participation in CRP has only a modest 
detrimental effect on technical efficiency. However, that is not the case for the group 
participating in off-farm work only. The decision to work off the farm appears to 
improve farm technical efficiency (the ratio is 1.106). One possible explanation might 
be that for the farm households who participate in the off-farm labor market are more 
likely to hire professional labor for farming, thus increase the technical efficiency. Our 
finding is consistent with the finding in Paul and Rehring (2005) and Rehring et al. 
(2005) who utilized a psedo panel data to analyze the off-farm decision of farm 
productivity.76   
The story is somewhat different in terms of the scale efficiency and frontier. 
CRP participation and the off-farm work decisions appear to improve the scale 
efficiency, but lower the production frontier. Our result suggests that participating in 
CRP or committing in off-farm work of farm households might operate their farms 
closer to the technically optimal productive scale. In sum, total factor productivity, as 
measured by the ratio of T.F.P. relative to the group participating in neither, is down 
for all three groups as well. For example, the ratios of T.F.P. for the groups who 
participate only in CRP or only work off the farm are 0.928 and 0.996, respectively, 
compared to the non-participants. There is an only modest difference for these two 
groups, but the difference is more pronounced for the group participating in both 
activities. Part of the reason for this lower TFP for the group participating in both, is 
that its estimated production frontier lies significantly above the ones for either the 
CRP participants or the group participating in nether CRP or off-farm work. 
                                                 
76 Our model differs from these two studies in analyzing the technical efficiency along with the 
bivariate probit choice model.  
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Determining the Farm Technical Efficiency  
In order to provide insight into the difference in terms of technical efficiency 
by group, we estimate the technical efficiency equations for each farmer within each 
group, and discuss the factors determining the technical efficiency and the 
distributions of the technical efficiency index within the groups. In so doing, we are 
able to acquire more information to explain the difference between groups in terms of 
technical efficiency. As a snapshot, we first look at the distribution of the estimated 
technical efficiency index of each group (Figures 5.10-5.13). The distribution of the 
technical efficiency is very diverse between groups. For example, the technical 
efficiency of farmers in the non-participants group is more centralized; while for the 
group of farmers who commit only to the off-farm job is skewed to the right.    
 We report the OLS estimation results in Table 5.16 for each group.77 In general, 
the specifications of the technical efficiency equations fit the model well, since the 
adjusted R2 are reasonable. For example, the adjusted R2 for each group is 0.415, 
0.385, 0.124 and 0.119, respectively. The factors determining the technical efficiency 
index are operators’ characteristics, government payments, and farm characteristics. 
However, the effects of these variables on technical efficiency are slightly different 
between groups. Operator’s age is negatively related to technical efficiency, with a 
non-linear effect, for the groups (1-1) and (1-0). However, the effect is positive for 
group (0-1) and (0-0), although it is not statistically significant. The education level 
and the farming experience of the operator are also positively related to technical 
efficiency, except for the group (0-1).  
 The effects of tenancy and farm size differ between groups. For groups (1-0) 
and (0-0), farm tenancy is positively related to technical efficiency, but the effect is 
                                                 
77 The approach we utilize here is similar to the second stage estimation to determine the farm specific 
attributes in explaining the technical efficiency (Wadud and White 2000; Shafig and Rehman 2000).  
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negative for group (0-1). The contribution of farm size to the technical efficiency also 
differs different. For groups (1-1) and (1-0), technical efficiency increases with farm 
age. However, this effect is negative for the other two groups. Human capital, as 
reflected in operators’ raised on the farm (RAISE_OP) unambiguously increases 
technical efficiency of all groups. Farm households receiving decoupled payments 
(AMTA_A) or other government payments (LDP_A) seem to be also more technically 
efficient.     
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Figure 5.10: Technical Efficiency Index of Group (1,1) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Technical Efficiency Index of Group (1,0) 
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Figure 5.12: Technical Efficiency Index of Group (0,1) 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Technical Efficiency Index of Group (0,0) 
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Table 5.16: OLS Estimation for Technical Efficiency Equations
Variable Coefficient Std t-value Coefficient Std t-value
Constant 1.735 0.578 3.001 1.417 0.265 5.354
OP_AGE -0.060 0.016 -3.756 -0.036 0.008 -4.666
OP_AGESQ 0.538 0.159 3.386 0.338 0.066 5.088
OP_ED_C 0.017 0.068 0.257 -0.058 0.024 -2.444
OP_EDSQ -0.001 0.003 -0.324 0.002 0.001 2.211
OP_EXP 0.017 0.005 3.421 0.014 0.004 3.488
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 -2.636 0.000 0.000 -4.474
AMTA_A 0.003 0.002 1.236 0.002 0.001 2.486
LDP_A 0.004 0.001 3.853 0.003 0.001 4.894
TENANCY -0.016 0.011 -1.371 0.020 0.011 1.795
CROPSIZ1 0.040 0.017 2.295 0.017 0.006 3.036
RAISE_OP 0.049 0.049 0.999 0.075 0.024 3.094
Sample 107 194
Adjust R2 0.415 0.385
Constant 0.399 0.039 10.114 -0.020 0.104 -0.193
OP_AGE 0.000 0.001 0.630 0.002 0.002 0.736
OP_AGESQ -0.008 0.007 -1.121 -0.027 0.019 -1.419
OP_ED_C 0.010 0.005 1.845 0.063 0.014 4.433
OP_EDSQ 0.000 0.000 -1.613 -0.002 0.001 -4.051
OP_EXP 0.000 0.000 1.926 0.000 0.000 -0.781
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.000 -1.775 0.000 0.000 0.846
AMTA_A 0.000 0.000 2.697 0.001 0.000 3.334
LDP_A 0.000 0.000 3.233 0.001 0.000 5.207
TENANCY -0.005 0.001 -4.043 0.005 0.001 3.706
CROPSIZ1 -0.018 0.003 -5.504 -0.023 0.005 -4.378
RAISE_OP 0.003 0.003 0.945 0.014 0.011 1.201
Sample 577 1,150
Adjust R2 0.124 0.119
Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
For CRP=1 and OP=1 For CRP=1 and OP=1
For OP=1 For CRP=OP=0
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Concluding Remarks 
To better understand the interaction between the farm business and the farm 
household, this chapter identifies those factors that explain participation in these two 
major non-production related sources of income for farm households: off-farm 
employment and the Conservation Reserve Program.  
 It appears that these two decisions by the farm operator are determined jointly, 
rather than independently or in a sequential fashion. For this reason, we model this 
joint decision process using a bivariate probit model, and find that a significant 
correlation between the two decisions of 0.12.  
Participating in CRP depends generally on some characteristics of the farm 
(including the type of farm), the farm operator (including age, experience, and 
attitudes to risk), land quality, and the circumstances in the local economy. There are 
also some differences in participation by major ERS production region. As one would 
expect, decisions to work off the farm are related to many of these same factors, 
although the direction and magnitude of some of the effects are quite different.  It is 
also true that both decisions are affected by participation in other farm programs.  
To determine the level at which farmers participate in these two activities, we 
also estimate equations for CRP payments, off-farm wage, CRP acreage, and hours 
worked off the farm. All four equations are estimated for the group of farmers engaged 
in both activities, while only CRP payments and acreage equations are estimated for 
the group that participates only in CRP. Equations for the off farm wage and hours 
worked off the farm are estimated for the groups that work off the farm but do not 
have land in CRP. In all cases, there was a need to correct for sample selection bias.  
As one can imagine, many of the same factors affecting the decisions to 
participate in off-farm employment and commit land to CRP also affect the level of 
participation once the commitment is made to the activity. In many cases, the effects 
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are reinforcing, while in others they may seem at odds, although frequently there are 
plausible explanations. One important finding here is that the acreage committed to 
CRP is affected by the CRP payment. This is in contrast to much of the existing 
literature, but it has policy implications. Furthermore, although the elasticities of hours 
worked with respect to the off farm wage are very low, the cross price elasticities of 
CRP acreage and hours worked are positive for the group engaged in both activities.  
Thus, operators receiving higher wages appear to have an incentive both to work less 
on the farm, but in so doing, they take additional land out of production and commit it 
to CRP. The flip side of this coin is that as CRP payments increase, the increase in land 
in CRP reduces the demand for labor on the farm, thus making it available for off-farm 
purposes.   
On this basis of our examination of farm production efficiency, it appears that 
participation in CRP lowers the technical efficiency, but the effect is minor. We also 
find that farms of this group operate their farms closer to the technically optimal 
productive size than the non-participants. But that is not the case for the group 
participating in both CRP and off-farm work and the group who only participate in the 
off-farm work. Farm operators who commit to off-farm work seem to have higher 
technical and scale efficiencies. In sum, that total factor productivity is down 
significantly for these groups due to the lower production frontiers. 
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Appendix 5A: Econometric Framework of Second Stage Equations for Other    
             Choice Models 
In this appendix, we outline the empirical strategy to estimate the second stage 
equations based on the multinomial logit (nested multinomial logit) and sequential 
bivariate probit models for completeness.  
Second Stage Analysis of Multinomial and Nested Logit Model 
If the multinomial logit or nested multinomial logit model were selected as the 
appropriate model based on the model selection criterion, it would be necessary to 
estimate the second stage equations. We first outline the estimation strategy using the 
multinomial logit model as an example. To estimate these equations, we follow Lee’s 
(1983; 1995) methodology for correcting the selection bias problem under the 
multinomial logit framework, which is built on the Heckman-Type sample selection 
framework, but utilizing a transformation method.78 We introduce his idea in detail 
below using the regime 1-1 as an example.  
In regime 1-1, the farm household is assumed to participate in off-farm work 
and in CRP. As such, four equations are contained in the second-stage equation system:  
(5A.1)  ppp eXP += 'α ;              aaap eXPA ++= 'αβ   
             www eXW += 'α ;            hhhw eXWH ++= 'αβ  
Note that if regime 1-1 is chosen, it means that: 
(5A.2)    0*)( 1111 >+−=−+− iijiijiiji VVVV εεε  
we can rewrite this as: 
                                                 
78 Besides Lee’s approach, Dubin and McFadden (1984) propose an alternative for calculating the 
selection bias term based on the linearity conditional expectation assumption under multinomial logit 
model.  However, there are two drawbacks of their approach. First, this method can likely be affected 
by multicolinearity as several bias correction terms may be introduced (Schmertmann 1994). Besides, it 
is a lot of computation demanding for the asymptotic variance covariance matrix (Maddala 1983). As 
such, we follow the method proposed by Lee (1983; 1995). 
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(5A.3)    11* iiji VV −>ε  
Equation (5A.3) will hold for some strictly increasing function J. That is: 
(5A.4) )()*( 11 iiji VVJJ −>ε  
Recall that the distribution function of 1*iε  is F(.), which is also equal to the 
probability that farmer chooses regime 1-1. Define 1*~ iε   = )*( 1iJ εΦ  and 
. The function  is left-continuous, and strictly increasing. 
Thus, the transformed random variable,
)()( 1 uFuJ −Φ Φ= )(uJΦ
1*iε , is easily seen to be a standard normal 
random variable. Based on this transformation, we can rewrite equation (5A.3) as: 
(5A.4)    regime 1-1 is chosen if )(*~ 11 iiji VVJ −> Φε  
Now, by assuming a joint normal distribution for the pairs of the random variables, 
)*~,(),*~,(),*~,(),*~,( 1111 ihiwiaip eeee εεεε , we can apply the standard two-stage sample 
selection approach proposed by Heckman (1979) to specify the conditional second-
stage equations as: 
(5A.5)   
)11Pr(
))((
'
)(
))((
')11|( 11
1
1
1 −
−+=−
−+=− ΦΦ
regime
VVJ
X
VVF
VVJ
XregimePE iijppp
iij
iij
ppp
φσαφσα  
)11Pr(
))((
'ˆ
)(
))((
'ˆ)11|( 11
1
1
1 −
−++=−
−++=− ΦΦ
regime
VVJ
XP
VVF
VVJ
XPregimeAE iijaaap
iij
iij
aaap
φσαβφσαβ   
 
)11Pr(
))((
'
)(
))((
')11|( 11
1
1
1 −
−+=−
−+=− ΦΦ
regime
VVJ
X
VVF
VVJ
XregimeWE iijwww
iij
iij
www
φσαφσα  
)11Pr(
))((
'ˆ
)(
))((
'ˆ)11|( 11
1
1
1 −
−++=−
−++=− ΦΦ
regime
VVJ
XW
VVF
VVJ
XWregimeHE iijwwww
iij
iij
wwww
φσαβφσαβ
 
where kwap 1111 ,,, σσσσ  are the covariance terms between the choice and the second-
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stage equations. As long as the utility function is specified as the function of 
explanatory variables of interest, equation (5A.5) can be estimated based on the 
estimated value of the coefficient from the first-stage multinomial logit model. The 
procedure for estimating the second-stage equations for the other regimes can be 
derived in a similar fashion. The details need not be reported here.5A1  
Lee’s approach is not only applicable for the multinomial logit selection case. 
It can be applied widely to the choice decisions with arbitrary distributed assumptions, 
and transform it into the standard normal distribution. In so doing, the standard 
Heckman-type sample selection approach can be applied. For the empirical purposes, 
this method reduces the computational difficulty (Schmertmann, 1994).  
Second-Stage Analysis of the Sequential Bivariate Choice Model 
The second stage outcomes of interest are the wage, hour, per-acre payment, 
and acre enrollment equations. Four possible regimes are realized from the choice 
outcomes, and the number of equations need to be estimated depends on the 
observable conditions. The second-stage equations are similar to those for the 
bivariate probit model. There is a modification, since the difference is that we specify 
two mutual exclusive choice equations in the second-stage. For regime 1-1 and 1-0, 
                                                 
5A1 The estimated variance covariance matrix should be adjusted since the second stage estimation 
depends on the estimated results of the multinomial logit model (the first stage). The estimated variance 
covariance matrix can be derived based on the delta method, and shown as (Lee et al 1980; Greene 
1998):        1*2221* )]('')('[)( −− ∇+∆−= jjjjjjjjjjjjjj XXXGGXXIXXXV
jj
θρσ
where Xj is the matrix of regressors in the second stage equation, including the IMR; jj ρσ ,  are 
standard deviation and the correlation coefficient of the second stage equation to the error term of the 
multinomial choice;  is the diagnose matrix of ; j∆ ))_(Pr(* 12 jregmIMRIMR jj −Φ+ jθ is the 
estimated coefficient of IMR; Gj is the partial derivative of IMR to the estimated coefficients of 
multinomial logit model; and is the estimated asymptotic variance matrix of the multinomial logit 
model.  
∇
The first term in [.] is used for correcting the heteroscedasticity, similar to the standard sample 
selection model proposed by Heckman (1979). Along with the first term, the second term focuses on the 
sample selection correction, although it is more cumbersome than the standard model of Heckman. As 
long as these two issues are considered, the variance covariance can be adjusted.    
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the second-stage equations are exactly the same as equation (5.22) and (5.23). 
However, the second stages for regime 0-1 are (5A.6), compared to equation (5.24):  
(5A.6) )','|(')1,0|( 33311131 XHeXHeeEXIIPE PPP −>−<+=== α                        
            
]
1
''
[
),','(
)'(
]
1
''
[
),','(
)'(
'
2
13
331311
133311
33
3
2
13
111333
133311
11
1
ρ
ρ
ρ
φσ
ρ
ρ
ρ
φσα
−
+−Φ−Φ+
−
−Φ−−Φ
−−=
XHXH
XHXH
XH
XHXH
XHXH
XH
X
P
PPP
 
               2311' λσλσα PPPP X ++=  
         )','|(')1,0|( 33311131 XHeXHeeEXIIAE aAA −>−<+=== α                        
            
]
1
''
[
),','(
)'(
]
1
''
[
),','(
)'(
'ˆ
2
13
331311
133311
33
3
2
13
111333
133311
11
1
ρ
ρ
ρ
φσ
ρ
ρ
ρ
φσαβ
−
+−Φ−−Φ+
−
−Φ−−Φ
−−+=
XHXH
XHXH
XH
XHXH
XHXH
XH
XP
A
AAAp
 
              2311'ˆ λσλσαβ AAAAp XP +++=
As in the case of bivariate probit model, the variance-covariance of the estimated 
second stage equations is incorrect. The correction method is very similar to the 
bivariate probit choice model.  
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            Appendix 5B: Reconsidering Normality of the Bivariate Probit Model 
The intuition behind the normality test based on the non-parametric framework 
is that if the parametric model is specified correctly, the predicted value of the 
parametric model should lie in the uniform band of the non-parametric estimation. 
Although this test had been applied to the binary choice model (Horowitz 1993), to 
our best knowledge, an application to test the bivariate choice model has not been 
proposed. As such, we test the bivariate normal assumption of the bivariate probit 
choice model in two ways. First, we directly apply the methodology proposed by 
Horowitz (1993) to two binary choice cases (CRP and off-farm labor supply) 
separately based on the estimates of the bivariate probit model. By comparing the 
predicted probability of each binary choice model to its non-parametric alternative, we 
are able to resolve model misspecification issues. In so doing, we are testing two 
necessary conditions of the bivariate normality assumption: each marginal distribution 
should be a normal distribution.5B1 Second, we depict the bivariate kernel density 
functions based on the estimates of the bivariate probit models as another justification 
of the bivariate normality assumption. 
In Figure 5B.1, the curve with the circle symbol is the cumulative normal 
distribution of CRP binary choice, and the thin curve is the non-parametric alternative, 
including the 95% uniform confidence band (the dashed lines) after trimming 1% of 
the data in tails. The quadratic density is selected as the kernel density with bandwidth 
of 0.6255.5B2 By inspection of Figure 5B1, we see that the parametric estimate 
performs similarly to the non-parametric alternative, particularly for probabilities less 
                                                 
5B1 If the bivariate normal case stands, the marginal distribution should be normal. However, the inverse 
is not necessary true. So this is only a necessary condition to check bivariate normality.  
5B2 The formula of the kernel density is:
∑
∑
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11
, where K(.) is the kernel 
function; H’X is the estimators signal index from the bivariate probit model. The bandwidth (h) is 
calculated as 0.53288 of this case according to the rule-of-thumb rule.  
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than 0.50. The two predictions are less consistent for probabilities greater than 0.5, but 
they still lie within the non-parametric confidence band. In order to acquire 
information on the distribution, we depict two density functions (univariate normal 
density and kernel density) based on the CRP choice in Figure 5B.2. The shape of the 
density distribution is similar, but the mean level is slightly different. On this basis, we 
might be able to conclude that the binary normality assumption for CRP choice cannot 
be rejected. This is one of the necessary conditions to ensure the bivariate normality 
assumption of the bivariate probit model.   
Another necessary condition to ensure the bivariate normality assumption is to 
test if the off-farm labor supply binary choice decision is univariate normal. We apply 
the same approach as the CRP case to the off-farm labor supply and depict the results 
in Figure 5B.3 and Figure 5B.4. The curve with the circle symbol of Figure 5B.3 is the 
cumulative normal distribution of off-farm labor supply binary choice, and the thin 
curve is the non-parametric alternative, including the 95% uniform confidence band 
(the dashed lines). The univariate density between parametric and non-parametric 
estimation are very similar, both in terms of the mean and the shape of the distribution. 
In general, the parametric model performs well, except it overestimated the 
participation rate in the low probability area.  
Due to the difficulty for deriving the confidence band of the nonparametric 
bivariate density, we can’t test the bivariate probit model against the nonparametric 
alternative directly. However, it is possible to depict the bivariate density function 
non-parametrically by applying the bivariate kernel density function estimation. We 
provide several 3-dimensional graphs, with different angles looking at the distributions 
from above, of the estimated bivariate kernel density function based on the indexes 
estimated by the bivariate probit model in Figure 5B.5-5B.8. 5B3  
                                                 
5B3 Multivariate quartic kernel function is specified with the bandwidth choice 1.0574 and 0.9561. The 
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Figure 5B.1: Comparison of the predicted probability for CRP Binary Choice 
 
 
Figure 5B.2: Kernel Density Functions of CRP Binary Choice 
                                                                                                                                            
bandwidth is determined based on the rule-of-thumb bandwidth for multivariate density estimation 
Scott (1992).    
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 Figure 5B.3: Comparison of the predicted probability for off-farm Binary Choice 
 
 
Figure 5B.4: Comparison the density functions of off-farm Binary Choice 
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 In these graphs, the y axis is the signal index of CRP participation and the x 
axis is the signal index of the off-farm labor decisions; both of them are estimated 
from the bivariate probit model. The bivariate kernel density is generally symmetric 
and has the bell shape. These two features are likely consistent with the bivariate 
normal density function. Mapping the bivariate kernel density to the univariate kernel 
density, we find that: Figure 5B.7 is consistent with Figure 5B.2. That is, the marginal 
kernel density is likely to follow the normal distribution; Figure 5B.8 is consistent 
with Figure 5B.4, the case of off-farm labor decision. Again, we find that the marginal 
kernel distribution for off-farm labor supply is more likely to follow normal 
distribution.   
In this appendix, we carefully check the model specification issue of the 
bivariate probit model by comparing the performance against non-parametric 
alternative. In general, we might be able to conclude that the specification of the 
bivariate probit choice unlikely to be mis-specified.   
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Figure 5B.5: Bivariate Kernel Density Estimation (graph A) 
 
 
Figure 5B.6: Bivariate Kernel Density Estimation (graph B) 
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 Figure 5B.7: Bivariate Kernel Density Estimation (graph C) 
 
 
Figure 5B.8: Bivariate Kernel Density Estimation (graph D) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DETERMINING THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG DECISION FOR CRP 
PARTICIPATION AND OFF-FARM LABOR SUPPLY OF FARM 
OPERATORS AND SPOUSES 
Introduction 
The focus of Chapter 5 was on decisions to participate in CRP and off-farm 
work decision by the operator. We extend that analysis and generalize our approach to 
the case where three decisions are considered by the farm household. Previous 
research has found that the off-farm work decisions by the farm operator and the 
spouse are likely to be determined jointly (Huffman and Lange (1989); Kimhi (1994); 
Lim-Applegate et al. (2002); Kwon et al. (2002)). Furthermore, Duke (2004) found 
that the participation decisions by farm households in Delaware’s land preservation 
programs and federal environmental programs, including CRP and EQIP, should be 
considered jointly.  
Although it is important to test jointness when more than two choices are 
considered, there is a high cost in terms of model estimation because it requires high 
dimension computations associated with multivariate distributions. In this chapter, we 
outline a framework for analyzing the multiple decision process and their efforts to the 
farm production. Our econometric framework is the multiple choice model sample 
selection model based on Heckman’s two-stage method, combined with the 
endogenous switching regression model. The first step focuses on the estimation of the 
multiple choice structure; we investigate whether these choices (CRP participation and 
operator and spouse off-farm work) are joint decisions or are sequential. By modeling 
these two decision processes, we are able to determine the appropriate choice structure. 
Given the appropriate choice structure, we focus on the estimations of the off-farm 
work hours for both the operator and the spouse and the CRP acre enrollment in the 
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second stage. Initially, we introduce the entire econometric framework for the joint 
decision process, and then we outline the approach for the sequential choice.  
Econometric Framework Based on the Joint Decision Process  
Similar to the bivariate probit model, we begin by defining each participation 
decision as a binary probit choice, but we allow for the correlation between choices. 
The model structure is depicted in Figure 6.1.   
 
 
σopsp
σcrpsp σcrpop
SP=1 or 0 OP=1 or 0 
CRP=1 or 0 
 
Figure 6.1: Trivariate Probit Model Specification 
 
Each participation decision is assumed to be determined by the net benefit 
comparison between participation and non-participation of each activity. More 
precisely, the CRP participation decision is determined by the reservation per acre 
return to the farm household of retaining the land in production with the government’s 
potential payment for land in the conservation reserve program (CRP). The off-farm 
job participation decisions of the farm operator and the spouse are determined by 
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comparing the potential off-farm market wage with the shadow values of time in 
farming.  
The specifications for these three equations are as follows:    
(6.1)           and      rrr
r eXAP += gggg eXAP +=
(6.2)     and      ropoprrop
r
op uSBW += gopgopgopgop uSBW +=
(6.3)      and      rsprspspr
r
sp uSBW += gspgspgspgsp uSBW +=
where Pr and Pg represent the reservation per acre payment, and the potential 
government per acre payment of CRP; (Wopr, Wopg) represent the shadow values of the 
farming time, and the market off-farm wage of the operator;  (Wspr, Wspg) represent the 
shadow values of the farming time, and the market off-farm wage of the spouse. The 
vectors Xr, Xg, Srop, Sgop, Srsp, and Sgsp are the exogenous variables, and er, eg , urop, ugop, 
ursp, and ugsp, are the random disturbance terms. The latent binary choice variables (I1*, 
I2*, I3*) of the participation decisions can be defined as:79  
(6.4)  1111 ')(''* eXHeeXAXAPPI rgrrgg
rg +=−+−=−=
         2222 ')(''* eXHuuSBSBWWI ropopgropropgopgop
r
op
g
op +=−+−=−=
         3333 ')(''* eXHuuSBSBWWI rspgsprsprspgspgsp
r
sp
g
sp +=−+−=−=
If the joint distribution of (e1, e2, e3) follows a trivariate normal distribution following 
the standard sample selection model (Heckman 1979; Tunali 1986), the joint 
distribution of these three error structures can be specified as: 
                                                 
79 For simplicity, subscript 1 refers to the CRP decision; subscript 2 and 3 refers to the off-farm job of 
the operator and spouse.  
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where the correlation coefficient between any two choices ( ρ ij) captures the joint 
nature of any pair of decisions. In reality, it is only the actual binary indicator of each 
decision, Ii , that is observed. Accordingly, the observation rules for these three latent 
decision variables are: 
Ii  = 1 (the farmer participates in activity i) iff   Ii* > 0 ; and  
Ii  = 0  (the farmer does not participate in activity i) iff   Ii* < 0        i=1,2,3 
Given this choice structure, eight potential outcomes (or regimes) can be 
realized in the data. Based on the observed outcome of each regime, we can define the 
probability for participating in each regime as a trivariate cumulative normal 
distribution. For example, the probability of the regime for those households who 
participate in all three activities can be shown as:   
 (6.5)  
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where  is the cumulative distribution of the trivariate normal distribution. (.)Φ
By defining constants, k1, k2 and k3 as (2I1-1), (2I2-1), and (2I3-1), respectively, we can 
indicate the regime in which the farm household participates. The generalization of the 
probability of each regime can be shown as: 
          ],,,',','[ 233213311221333222111 ρρρ kkkkkkXHkXHkXHkΦ  
Combining the probability of these eight regimes, the three-choice model can be 
estimated based on the maximum likelihood method based on the log likelihood 
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function: 
(6.6)        ],,,',','[loglog 233213311221333222111
1
ρρρ kkkkkkXHkXHkXHkL n
i
Φ= ∑
=
Although equation (6.6) is a straightforward extension of the bivariate probit model 
and is theoretically attractive, the computations are demanding. To estimate equation 
(6.6), we need to evaluate multi-dimensional integrals of normal density functions. 
Two solutions have been proposed to simplify the computational problem. The first 
practical solution, a quasi-maximum likelihood approach (QML), is to approximate 
the multivariate likelihood function with a sequence of bivariate specifications.80 The 
second approach is based on simulation techniques, which have facilitated evaluation 
of the multiple probability integrals and revived interest in earlier likelihood methods. 
By simulating the multivariate normal probability in the likelihood, this approach 
provides a practical alternative to numerical evaluation of the probability integrals. 
Several simulation methods have been advanced recently in the literature, including 
Stern’s method (Stern 1992), a frequency method (Lerman and Manski 1980) and the 
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator.81 Among all of the simulators, the 
GHK simulator had proven to be preferred to others (Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 
1993; Chen and Cosslett 1998). It is unbiased for any given number of replications, 
and it generates substantially smaller variances than the frequency simulator and the 
Stern simulator. Furthermore, it is shown to be the most unambiguously reliable 
method for simulating normal probabilities (Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud 
1996). Empirically, the GHK simulator has been applied very recently to estimate a 
censored demand system (Dong et al. (2004) and Yen et al. (2003)). Based on these 
evaluations of alternative simulation methods, we also utilize the GHK simulator for 
                                                 
80 Yen and Lin (2002) applied the same method to a food consumption demand system. 
81 See a comprehensive review in Train (2003) of all available simulators for empirical analysis. 
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estimating the likelihood function (6.6).   
Econometric Framework Based on the Sequential Decision Process 
When multiple decisions are discussed, the sequential decision making process 
is clearly an alternative to the joint decision structure. If we have no prior information 
about the decision making process of the farm household, it is important to compare 
both joint and sequential decisions (Lee and Maddala 1994). In so doing, we are able 
to determine the appropriate model by comparing the differential performance of the 
two models. We now outline the econometric model of the sequential decision process 
when three choice decisions are considered.  
 Although the nested multinomial logit model is perhaps a straightforward way 
to model the sequential choice, this approach requires normalization for some nodes to 
be zero for model identification purposes. More importantly, the cost of identification 
is high as we have seen in the two decision choice case reported in Chapter 5. As such, 
it is necessary to propose an alternative strategy to model the sequential decision 
process. Perhaps the easiest way is to simplify the decision tree into only two levels. In 
contrast to previous chapter, we propose a new strategy for modeling this sequential 
choice by combining the binary probit model and the multinomial logit model. This 
can be regarded as the partial sequential decision process.  
First, we assume that the decision tree can be broken down into two levels: the 
first level is the binary choice for the decision assumed to be made first; the second 
level includes the joint decisions for the other two choices. We illustrate our model 
structure assuming the operators’ off-farm decision is considered prior to the others in 
Figure 6.2.  
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 Figure 6.2: Partial Sequential Decision Process (the off-farm decision of the 
operator is considered prior to other two decisions) 
 
The empirical specification of the first stage is a binary choice decision (the 
same as equation (6.4)). The second stage choices can be modeled based on the 
multinomial logit model framework for the entire sample by including the correction 
term for self-selection calculated from the first stage binary choice as an extra 
variable.82  
                                                 
82 The reason we focus on the entire sample estimation is as follows: if we focus on the sub-sample 
given the first stage choice (i.e participants and non-participants of the first choice as two groups), we 
have to model two multinomial logit models of each group and each of them should include the inverse 
mills ratio to account for the self-selection problem. There are two potential problems for this approach. 
First, the formula of the appropriate inverse mills ratio to be included in the multinomial logit model is 
unknown. One should note that the Heckman type inverse mills ratio requires the bivariate normality 
assumption between selection equation and the outcome equation. In our case, the first level choice is 
specified as a binary probit model, while the second level choice is specified as the multinomial logit 
model, which assumes the error term is Type I extreme value function (McFadden 1974). As such, it is 
hard to believe that the error terms of two level decisions can be regarded as bivariate normal, and thus 
the standard approach of Heckman (1979) can’t be followed directly. Another disadvantage comes from 
an empirical concern. One should note that this modeling strategy might be inappropriate if some 
regimes of the multinomial logit model suffer from small numbers of observations, which might result 
in singularity of the data matrix, and thus impede the maximum likelihood estimation for the 
multinomial logit model. Given these difficulties in focusing on the sub-sample, what might be an 
alternative? If we focus on the entire sample for the second level decision, only one multinomial logit 
model for the entire sample is estimated. In so doing, the singularity problem can likely be avoided. If 
the entire sample is used, the self-selection problem can be overcome by utilizing the predicted 
probability from the first stage binary probit model estimation as the instrumental variables to the 
second stage choices.  
OP_YES OP_NO 
CRP_YES 
SP_YES 
CRP_YES CRP_NO CRP_NO 
SP_NO SP_YES SP_NO 
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The first binary choice can be shown to be the same as equation (6.4) we 
defined before: 1111 '* eXHI += , where I1 is the indicator observed. I1=1 iff I1*>0. 
There is nothing new in this stage, since this is the standard binary Probit model 
specification. In the second stage, we assume the multinomial logit model for the 
entire sample can be specified as: 
(6.7)   
∑
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The novelty of equation (6.7) is that we include the binary indicator (I1) in the 
multinomial logit model specification. In so doing, we can make the linkage between 
the first and second level decisions. The estimated parameter jλ  also is the 
fundamental feature for testing if the sequential choice is specified properly. However, 
one should find the instrumental variable for the indicator I1 in order to avoid the 
endogeneity problem from unobservable correlation. Borrowing an idea from the 
endogenous treatment effect model, the most straightforward candidate for the 
instrument would be the predicted probability from the first stage: . This 
instrumental variable is independent of the distribution assumption between equations 
(6.4) and (6.7), but it is correlated with the binary indicator specified in equation (6.7). 
Given the specification of the probability for each alternative at the second level, the 
structural model can be estimated using the full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) method. The log likelihood function for the second stage can be shown as: 
)'( 11 XHΦ
(6.8)     ∑∑
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where d is the binary indicator for each regime, which is equal to one if the j-th 
alternative is chosen. The maximum likelihood estimates of equation (6.8) are 
consistent, albeit not efficient (McFadden 1974).  
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 After estimating equations (6.4) and (6.8) by maximum likelihood estimation, 
we have to adjust the variance-covariance matrix, since the second level estimation 
utilized the information (predicted probability) from the first level. We utilize the 
formula proposed by Murphy and Topel (1985) to calculate the adjusted variance-
covariance matrix for the second stage estimators.83 Murphy and Topel (1985) have 
shown that if the standard regularity conditions are met for both steps’ likelihood 
functions, then the second step maximum likelihood estimator is consistent and 
asymptotically normally distributed with asymptotic covariance matrix: 
   (6.9)   2111222 ]'''[* VRCVCRVCCVVVV −−+=     
where V1,V2 are the asymptotic variances of the first stage and second stages. If 1θ and 
2θ represent the consistent estimators of each stage, C and R can be shown as: 
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Given the maximum likelihood functions of these two steps specified as a binary 
probit model and the multinomial logit model, one can derive the specific functional 
form for matrix C and R as follows (Greene 2002b): 
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83 Another way to deal with the standard error adjustment is to follow the approach of Maddala (1983). 
However, this approach is more cumbersome than the one Murphy and Topel (1985). Both should 
generate similar results (Greene 2002a). Thus, we follow the latter for our analysis. 
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To sum up, we outline the procedure above for estimating the sequential choice 
model:  
(i) Estimate the binary Probit model with the entire sample for the choice 
which we assume to be considered first.  
(ii) Calculate the predicted probabilities based on the estimators of the first 
step, and include these as new explanatory variables in the multinomial 
logit model specification.  
(iii) Estimate the multinomial logit model with full information maximum 
likelihood estimation based on the entire sample.  
(iv) Calculate the adjusted variance-covariance matrix based on equations (6.9) 
and (6.10). 
Second Stage Analysis Based on the Joint Decision Model 84
In the second stage, we are interested in estimating equations for the CRP acres 
enrolled, hours of work off the farm of the operator, and the hours of work off the farm 
of the spouse. Each equation should correspond to the choice decision we specify 
above. Based on the theoretical specification, the reduced forms for these equations 
can be empirically specified, respectively, as:  
(6.11)  aaa eXA += 'α  
                                                 
84 Based on the empirical results below, the joint decision model ends up preferred to the sequential 
choice model. Therefore, we limit our attention on the second stage analysis given the joint decision 
process. Readers who are interested in the second stage analysis of the sequential model we proposed 
above can refer to Appendix 5A of the previous Chapter.  
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(6.12)  opopopop eXH += 'α  
(6.13)  spspspsp eXH += 'α     
where Xa, Xop, and Xsp are vectors of the independent variables for the CRP acres 
equation, the off-farm hours equation of the operator, and the off-farm hours equation 
of the spouse, respectively; and aα , opα and spα  are the vectors of the parameters to be 
estimated.  
Given the choice decisions, equation system (6.11)-(6.13) should be considered 
differently by regime to account for self-selection bias. Ideally, we should focus on the 
sub-sample and account for the non-random sampling problem by including the 
inverse mills ratio for each regime. This approach is a straightforward extension of the 
bivariate choice sample selection method we discussed in the last chapter. This 
approach is based on the conditional expectation of equation (6.11)-(6.13) depending 
on the joint choice decisions. However, it is very computational cumbersome in the 
case of more than two choices, since the expectation operator of the truncated 
multivariate normal distribution is complicated due to the consideration of the 
correlation coefficients. 85  Alternatively, one can focus on the unconditional 
expectation estimation of equation (6.11)-(6.13) by analyzing the entire sample 
(Amemiya 1985; Maddala 1983). This full sample approach has not received much 
attention in empirical studies because the procedure does not necessarily produce more 
efficient results than those focusing on the sub-sample (Su and Yen 2000). However, 
Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) argued that in the multiple choice case, this approach 
might be invaluable due to the different censoring rule of each choice. As such, they 
propose a simple two stage approach by focusing on the unconditional expectation 
analysis as the second stage for the multiple-choice sample selection model. The 
                                                 
85 To the best of our knowledge, the formal of inverse mill ratio had not been studied from previous 
literature for two choices case. 
182 
primary advantage of their method is to simplify the computational task, although their 
approach suffers from inefficiency, albeit it is consistent. There is little alternative but 
to follow their approach to estimate the second stage equations.86  
For each choice, the unconditional expectation of equations (6.11-6.13) can be 
rewritten (6.11)’-(6.13)’ based on the Bayes’ rule:     
(6.11)’  )0(Pr*)0|()1(Pr*)1|()( 1111 ==+=== IobIAEIobIAEAE  
(6.12)’  )0(Pr*)0|()1(Pr*)1|()( 2222 ==+=== IobIHEIobIHEHE opopop  
(6.13)’  )0(Pr*)0|()1(Pr*)1|()( 3333 ==+=== IobIHEIobIHEHE spspsp  
Given the formula for the conditional mean expectations and the predicted probability 
of program participations considered separately, the unconditional expectations of 
equations (6.11)’-(6.13)’ can be further derived as: 
(6.11)’’   )'ˆ(')'ˆ()( 11111 XHXXHAE aa φδα +Φ=
(6.12)’’   )'ˆ(')'ˆ()( 22222 XHXXHHE opopop φδα +Φ=
(6.13)’’   )'ˆ(')'ˆ()( 33333 XHXXHHE spspsp φδα +Φ=
where  and (.)Φ (.)φ  are the cumulative and density probability function of the normal 
distribution. The second stage equation system (6.11’-6.13’) is the one we are going to 
estimate.  
The second stage equations can be estimated based on a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) technique suggested by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). This SUR 
estimate can generate consistent estimates of the parameters, but the standard errors 
                                                 
86 Empirically, their approach had been used for correcting the censoring problem in several recent 
studies of different economic issues. Goodwin, et al. (2004) applied this approach to correct for a 
censoring problem of the CRP acreage enrollment; Yen, Kan, and Su (2002) used it to analyze the fats 
and oil consumption behavior; Su and Yen (2000) used it for cigarette and alcohol consumption 
behavior; Earnhart (2003) focused on the transportation problem; and Schmit, et al. (2002) extended the 
method to the panel data case for studying the advertising effect on fluid milk and cheese demand.       
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are inconsistent since the predicted value of the first stage choice model is unclear. 
Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) outlined the procedure for adjusting the variance 
covariance estimates based on the asymptotic theory of Murphy and Topel (1985). 
However, Shonkwiler and Yen’s approach for adjusting the variance covariance is 
computationally cumbersome and not commonly applied for Heckman type sample 
selection model.87 Moreover, the variances of the estimators depend on the conditional 
mean function (equation (11)), and therefore increase beyond all limits in the absolute 
size of the signal index of each choice (H1’X1, H2’X2, H3’X3). This appears to be a 
severe drawback compared to the standard Heckman’s sample selection model 
(Tauchmann 2005). Another alternative for adjusting the variance-covariance 
estimators is to apply the bootstrap method. For large samples, the bootstrap sampling 
method is shown to generate the similar result as the one derived from the asymptotic 
theory (Efron 1987). Furthermore, unless the explanatory variables are specified 
identically for the selection and second stage equations, the bootstrap standard error 
matches finite sample variability better than nominal standard error computed by 
asymptotic covariance matrices (Hill, Adkins, and Bender 2003).88 Also, the bootstrap 
method is supported by the asymptotic theory and thus yields the similar results as the 
asymptotic variance estimates (Efron 1987; Horowitz 2001).89 Therefore, we apply the 
bootstrap procedure to estimate the variance covariance matrix for the second stage 
                                                 
87 When the Heckman-type sample selection model is utilized, White’s sandwich variance matrix was 
suggested to correct the heteroscedasticity and self-selection problems (Lee et al. 1980; Lee 1983; Long 
and Ervin 2000).  
88 Another advantage for using bootstrap is related to the special sampling design of the ARMS data. An 
important feature of the ARMS data is relates to the stratified nature of the sampling used to collect the 
data. So far, two different estimation strategies have been suggested for problems such as this involving 
stratification. The simplest way involves the delete-group jackknife procedure, whereby the alternative 
sub-samples are dropped from the analysis (Dubman 2000). However, there is no asymptotic theory 
behind the delete-group-jackknife procedure and it has been shown to yield inconsistent statistic 
estimators (Kim et al. 2004). An alternative strategy is to utilize the bootstrap method for estimating the 
second stage (Goodwin and Mishra 2004; Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magne 2003). 
89 Efron (1987) discussed the use of Monte Carlo bootstrapping for obtaining consistent variance-
covariance estimates and confident intervals for estimated parameter. They showed that the bootstrap 
method provided a direct and analytically simplified approach to obtain consistent estimates.  
184 
equation system with 500 replications in the empirical section.  
To sum up, the two stage procedure we propose to estimate the second stage 
equation is as follows:  
(i) We first estimate the trivariate probit choice model of equation (6.6) with 
simulated maximum likelihood estimation method based on the GHK 
simulator.90  
(ii) We calculate the predicted probability and index of each choice, and then 
estimate the second stage system (6.11)’’-(6.13)’’ based on seemly 
unrelated regression (SUR) method proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen 
(1999). 
(iii) We have to adjust the variance covariance matrix to account for self-
selection problem of the error terms based on the bootstrap method. 
Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis includes three parts. In the first part, we focus on 
understanding the interrelationship among CRP participation and the off-farm work 
decisions of the operator and the spouse. We estimate these three choice decisions both 
as joint and sequential decisions, and compare this performance in order to determine 
the appropriate decision making process of the farm household. The results of this part 
are presented in Tables (6.1-6.5). Given the appropriate decision making process, we 
focus on the second stage equations in CRP acreage, and hours off the farm work for 
the operator and spouse (Tables 6.6-6.7). The definitions of the variables used in the 
analysis are introduced in Table 2.4 on page 21-24 of Chapter 2. 
                                                 
90 Shonwiler and Yen (1999) estimate each choice separately by a binary Probit model, which imposes 
the uncorrelated assumption between choices. However, they mentioned that this simplification is 
nevertheless consistent, but not efficient (footnote 4, page 974). In order to improve the efficiency, we 
estimate the choice structure jointly. An analysis of the possible joint correlation is one of the primary 
objectives of our study, and we are also able to test the independence assumption.  
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Empirical Results for the Joint Decision Process  
 In this section, we report the results of the joint decision choice model based 
on the multivariate probit model framework and estimated with GHK simulators. The 
explanatory variables we specified in CRP and operator’s off-farm work decision 
equations are the same as the bivariate choice model of previous chapter for 
comparison purpose. Similar to the operator’s work off the farm equation, the spouse’s 
characteristics, farm and family characteristics and location variables are specified for 
the off-farm work decision of the spouse. The results from the model are very 
encouraging (Table 6.1).   
To begin, let us focus on the correlation coefficients between each pair of 
choices. From Table 6.1, the CRP participation decision is statistically significant and 
positively correlated with the off-farm work decisions of both the operator and the 
spouse. The correlation between CRP and the operator’s off-farm work decision is 
0.174, and it is consistent with our finding for the two decision case in the previous 
chapter. The spouse’s decision for off-farm work is highly correlated to the operator’s 
working off the farm decision (0.252).91 Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that there is 
also correlation between CRP and the spouse’s off the farm work decision. However, it 
is somehow lower (0.116).  
These results are strong evidence that the decisions are joint. To justify the 
joint decision framework rather than the case where these choices are regarded as 
three single independent decisions, we utilize the likelihood ratio test (LR) to test if 
the correlation coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The idea behind the test is that: if 
these decisions can be regarded as independent, the log-likelihood value of the 
trivariate probit model should be equal to the sum of the log-likelihoods of these three 
                                                 
91 Our finding is consistent with the finding of the literature focusing on the joint decision for off-farm 
work between the farm operator and the spouse (Huffman and Lange 1989; Lim-Applegate and Olfert 
2002) 
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binary probit models under the null hypothesis. To implement the LR test, we 
estimated three independent binary probit models first and calculated the log-
likelihood value. Our result shows that the LR test value is 53.86, which is much 
higher than the critical value under 5% level of significance (7.815). Based on this 
result, a trivariate probit model is likely more appropriate for reflecting the farm 
household behavior regarding these three decisions.  
Let us now focus on the equations for the CRP participation and the off-farm 
work decision of the operator. The effects of the explanatory variables in these two 
equations are similar to the results of the bivariate probit model. In order to avoid 
unnecessary duplication, we skip the economic interpretation of these effects here. The 
most interesting results here are the new ones related to the spouse’s off farm work. 
The characteristics of the spouse, family and farm structure, and location affect the 
choice of the spouse to work off the farm. The spouse who is older and more educated 
is more likely work off-farm, but the effect is nonlinear in age for the former factor. 
We also find that the farming experience of the spouse is statistically significant and 
decreases the likelihood for working off the farm. This might reflect the opportunity 
cost for off-farm job as we have found for the operator’s case. This is perhaps 
consistent with the negative effect of farm size on the spouse work off-farm. It is also 
true that the number of children in the farm household is related to the spouse off-farm 
work decision. Our results show the spouse of farm households with larger numbers of 
kids is less likely to participate in the off-farm labor market; it is reasonable to predict 
that the spouse will spend more time for taking care of the family. Finally, the local 
area around the farm household whose economies have a higher manufacturing index 
likely provides more opportunities for off-farm work, and this increases the likelihood 
of the spouse to work off the farm.  
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T a b le  6 .1 :  T r iv a r ia te  P r o b it  M o d e l E s t im a t io n
V a ria b le C o effic ien t S td b /S td
C o n sta n t -3 .6 7 4 0 .6 9 9 -5 .2 6 0
O P _ A G E 0 .2 4 4 0 .0 2 1 1 1 .7 1 9
O P _ A G E S Q -2 .5 9 0 0 .1 8 3 -1 4 .1 8 3
O P _ E D _ C 0 .0 6 4 0 .0 1 5 4 .3 8 5
O P _ E X P -0 .0 5 1 0 .0 1 0 -5 .2 9 1
O P _ E X P S Q 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 4 .2 4 4
H _ S IZ E -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 3 4 -0 .0 5 8
C R O P S IZ 1 -0 .5 4 9 0 .0 3 1 -1 7 .4 2 7
R A IS E _ O P -0 .4 7 3 0 .1 0 4 -4 .5 5 5
M A N U F 0 .0 1 5 0 .0 0 6 2 .5 2 5
T R A D E -0 .0 4 4 0 .0 1 5 -3 .0 4 0
A M T A _ A -0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 3 -2 .8 5 0
L D P _ A -0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 -1 .0 6 5
R IS K -0 .0 2 5 0 .0 1 5 -1 .7 0 3
N E T W O R T 1 -0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 4 -2 .0 6 7
S P _ H M A K 0 .4 9 5 0 .0 8 3 5 .9 8 1
C R O P 4 5 6 -0 .8 7 9 0 .0 9 9 -8 .9 0 9
R E G N 3 0 .0 4 1 0 .1 4 9 0 .2 7 3
R E G N 5 6 7 -0 .1 6 5 0 .0 8 1 -2 .0 3 8
T E N A N C Y -0 .0 4 5 0 .0 2 8 -1 .5 9 6
C o n sta n t -5 .7 0 1 1 .4 7 9 -3 .8 5 4
O P _ A G E 0 .0 3 1 0 .0 0 3 9 .5 7 3
O P _ E D _ C 0 .0 7 8 0 .0 1 6 4 .8 5 1
L Q H _ 9 6 0 .5 4 5 0 .2 3 2 2 .3 5 2
L Q L _ 9 6 -0 .9 5 9 0 .3 4 3 -2 .7 9 3
E Q IP 1 .1 1 0 0 .4 0 1 2 .7 6 7
A G D IS T -1 .1 7 6 0 .2 5 8 -4 .5 4 8
E B I 0 .0 5 5 0 .0 2 2 2 .4 9 0
A M T A _ A -0 .0 2 9 0 .0 0 5 -5 .9 1 6
L D P _ A -0 .0 1 5 0 .0 0 3 -5 .2 3 9
R IS K -0 .0 6 0 0 .0 1 9 -3 .1 4 2
C R O P 4 5 6 -1 .9 6 3 0 .2 6 2 -7 .4 8 3
C R O P S IZ 1 0 .2 2 6 0 .0 4 1 5 .5 5 5
R E G N 1 0 .1 8 5 0 .1 1 0 1 .6 8 3
R E G N 5 6 7 -0 .3 0 1 0 .1 4 8 -2 .0 3 1
R E G N 9 1 .3 0 8 0 .2 7 4 4 .7 7 2
U R B A N -0 .0 1 4 0 .0 0 2 -7 .4 5 2
F o r  O P  C h o ic e  E q u a tio n
F o r  C R P  C h o ic e  E q u a tio n
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Table 6.1: (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
Constant -2.845 0.731 -3.890
SP_AGE 0.126 0.027 4.665
SP_AGESQ -0.002 0.000 -6.919
SP_ED_C 0.160 0.018 9.022
SP_EXP -0.006 0.003 -1.877
H_SIZE -0.101 0.034 -2.992
H_SIZE06 -0.263 0.091 -2.895
CROPSIZ1 -0.142 0.055 -2.600
RAISE_SP 0.138 0.071 1.939
MANUF 0.015 0.006 2.691
AMTA_A -0.004 0.003 -1.243
LDP_A -0.001 0.002 -0.387
NETWORT1 -0.005 0.005 -0.993
CROP456 -0.880 0.093 -9.449
REGN3 0.141 0.165 0.855
REGN567 0.125 0.076 1.640
RHO(OP,CRP) 0.174 0.055 3.164
RHO(OP,SP) 0.252 0.048 5.275
RHO(CRP,SP) 0.116 0.058 2.001
Log-likelihood -2,792
Sample 2,102
LR Test* 53.86
  *The null hypothesis of LR Test:H 0 :RHO(OP,CRP)=RHO(OP,SP)=RHO(CRP,SP)=0
    The critical value is: (x 2 (0.95,3)=7.815)
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
For SP Choice Equation
Correlation Coefficients
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Determining the Sequential Decision Process 
To further test the nature of the decision structure, we also estimate two models 
based on different sequential structures. One of them is that the off-farm decision of 
the operator is considered prior to other decisions, and the other of them is to consider 
the spouse’s decision of the off-farm work is prior to other decisions.92 Tables (6.2) 
and (6.3) contain the estimated results from these two sequential models.  
The initial focus of our discussion is on the validation of the sequential 
structure setting of each model. We evaluate the model performance from two 
perspectives. First, we test whether there is a linkage between the first (probit) and 
second stage (multinomial logit) choices. This can be implemented by testing whether 
the predicted probabilities, estimated from the first stage binary probit model, can be 
jointly to zero in the second step multinomial logit specification. Our results show that 
either the operator’s decision to work off the farm (Table 6.2) or the spouse’s decision 
to work off the farm (Table 6.3) as the first stage decision is the appropriate first step 
decision, since the F test values (7.25 and 88.48, respectively) are statistically 
significant at a 10% level. The second criterion to determine the nature of the 
sequential structure is based on the non-nested test. Again, we perform the Likelihood 
Dominance Criterion (LDC) test for model comparison which we have introduced in 
previous chapter. Our result shows that the test value is 60.458, which is greater than 
the critical value (1.766) in Table (6.4). Thus, if we have to choose between these two 
sequential structures, the sequential model assuming the off-farm work decision of the 
operator is considered first is preferred to the other specification.  
                                                 
92 In reality, the alternative that CRP decision might be also possible to made first prior to the operator’s 
and spouse’s working decision. However, our estimation suffers from the singularity problem due to the 
few observations and thus impedes the estimation procedure of the multinomial logit model. We are not 
able to include this sequential decision model in this study.  
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T a b l e  6 . 2 :  S e q u e n t i a l  C h o i c e  M o d e l _  I f  O P  i s  c h o s e n  f i r s t  
V a r i a b l e C o e f f i c i e n t S t d t - v a l u e
C o n s t a n t - 3 . 4 0 5 0 . 6 9 4 - 4 . 9 0 9
O P _ A G E 0 . 2 4 2 0 . 0 2 3 1 0 . 6 5 9
O P _ A G E S Q - 2 . 5 5 7 0 . 2 1 3 - 1 2 . 0 2 4
O P _ E D _ C 0 . 0 5 2 0 . 0 1 4 3 . 6 3 3
O P _ E X P - 0 . 0 5 0 0 . 0 1 0 - 5 . 2 0 0
O P _ E X P S Q 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 3 . 8 6 2
H _ S I Z E 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 3 0 0 . 1 2 5
C R O P S I Z 1 - 0 . 5 4 3 0 . 0 6 5 - 8 . 4 0 5
R A I S E _ O P - 0 . 4 7 7 0 . 0 9 6 - 4 . 9 7 5
M A N U F 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 0 5 2 . 7 2 0
T R A D E - 0 . 0 4 9 0 . 0 1 5 - 3 . 3 4 3
A M T A _ A - 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 3 - 2 . 6 4 3
L D P _ A - 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 2 - 1 . 0 9 7
R I S K - 0 . 0 2 2 0 . 0 1 5 - 1 . 4 8 8
N E T W O R T 1 - 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 5 - 1 . 3 4 1
S P _ H M A K 0 . 2 8 9 0 . 0 7 5 3 . 8 3 1
C R O P 4 5 6 - 0 . 8 4 1 0 . 0 9 6 - 8 . 7 2 0
R E G N 3 0 . 0 5 5 0 . 1 4 8 0 . 3 6 9
R E G N 5 6 7 - 0 . 1 7 2 0 . 0 7 7 - 2 . 2 3 7
T E N A N C Y - 0 . 0 4 3 0 . 0 1 8 - 2 . 4 1 2
L o g _ l i k e l i h o o d - 1 0 2 4
P r e d i c t e d  R a t e 7 3 %
O P _ A G E - 0 . 0 9 0 0 . 0 3 0 - 3 . 0 4 0
O P _ E D _ C 0 . 0 5 6 0 . 0 8 2 0 . 6 8 6
L Q H _ 9 6 - 0 . 4 1 9 0 . 5 6 7 - 0 . 7 3 9
L Q L _ 9 6 - 1 . 1 5 2 0 . 6 5 8 - 1 . 7 5 2
E Q I P 1 . 0 6 8 2 . 4 8 1 0 . 4 3 1
A G D I S T 0 . 7 9 5 0 . 4 6 7 1 . 7 0 2
E B I - 0 . 1 3 2 0 . 0 2 8 - 4 . 7 1 1
A M T A _ A - 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 0 2 7 - 0 . 6 7 2
L D P _ A - 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 0 1 4 - 0 . 3 3 8
R I S K - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 8 6 - 0 . 0 4 3
C R O P 4 5 6 - 2 . 5 2 2 0 . 6 3 2 - 3 . 9 9 1
C R O P S I Z 1 - 1 . 2 6 1 1 . 0 0 3 - 1 . 2 5 7
R E G N 1 0 . 3 6 4 0 . 2 9 5 1 . 2 3 6
R E G N 3 0 . 6 1 1 0 . 8 5 4 0 . 7 1 6
R E G N 5 6 7 - 0 . 4 3 3 0 . 5 2 0 - 0 . 8 3 3
R E G N 9 - 1 . 4 6 8 1 . 6 3 6 - 0 . 8 9 7
U R B A N - 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 5 - 1 . 3 9 7
M A N U F 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 4 7 1
S P _ A G E 0 . 6 7 5 0 . 0 8 7 7 . 7 3 4
S P _ A G E S Q - 0 . 0 0 7 0 . 0 0 1 - 8 . 4 3 8
S P _ E D _ C 0 . 2 9 8 0 . 0 5 2 5 . 6 7 3
S P _ E X P - 0 . 0 4 9 0 . 0 2 0 - 2 . 4 0 3
H _ S I Z E 0 6 - 0 . 5 2 4 0 . 3 2 5 - 1 . 6 1 1
N E T W O R T 1 - 0 . 0 2 5 0 . 0 7 8 - 0 . 3 2 1
P R O B _ O P - 5 . 3 8 0 1 . 2 2 3 - 4 . 3 9 8
S e c o n d  S t a g e  M u l t i n o m i a l  L o g i t  M o d e l
F o r  S P = 1  O n l y
F i r s t  S t a g e  E s t i m a t i o n  P r o b i t  M o d e l
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Table 6.2: (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
OP_AGE 0.081 0.024 3.367
OP_ED_C 0.295 0.072 4.069
LQH_96 -1.202 0.685 -1.754
LQL_96 -4.913 1.147 -4.284
EQIP 2.461 2.236 1.100
AGDIST -2.179 1.357 -1.606
EBI -0.017 0.040 -0.424
AMTA_A -0.045 0.019 -2.374
LDP_A -0.029 0.011 -2.535
RISK -0.181 0.060 -3.022
CROP456 -4.750 1.751 -2.712
CROPSIZ1 0.110 0.169 0.647
REGN1 1.288 0.309 4.169
REGN3 1.248 0.459 2.719
REGN567 -0.692 0.394 -1.757
REGN9 1.299 1.517 0.857
URBAN -0.021 0.006 -3.539
MANUF -0.015 0.018 -0.825
SP_AGE -0.096 0.083 -1.167
SP_AGESQ 0.001 0.001 0.951
SP_ED_C -0.137 0.060 -2.275
SP_EXP -0.004 0.013 -0.343
H_SIZE06 -0.268 0.449 -0.598
NETWORT1 0.013 0.012 1.120
PROB_OP -0.229 1.245 -0.184
For CRP=1 Only
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 Table 6.2: (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
OP_AGE -0.051 0.030 -1.714
OP_ED_C 0.115 0.072 1.594
LQH_96 1.043 0.632 1.650
LQL_96 -1.521 1.049 -1.450
EQIP 2.151 2.844 0.756
AGDIST -1.168 0.739 -1.582
EBI -0.057 0.034 -1.686
AMTA_A -0.075 0.025 -3.014
LDP_A -0.033 0.013 -2.535
RISK -0.057 0.076 -0.751
CROP456 -6.063 1.323 -4.583
CROPSIZ1 -0.402 0.636 -0.633
REGN1 0.355 0.303 1.171
REGN3 0.516 0.724 0.712
REGN567 -1.711 0.582 -2.942
REGN9 0.002 1.505 0.001
URBAN -0.032 0.006 -5.182
MANUF 0.058 0.024 2.380
SP_AGE 0.348 0.077 4.539
SP_AGESQ -0.004 0.001 -5.597
SP_ED_C 0.152 0.060 2.538
SP_EXP -0.040 0.016 -2.488
H_SIZE06 -0.718 0.332 -2.164
NETWORT1 0.012 0.010 1.270
PROB_OP -3.879 0.505 -7.682
Loglikelihood -1,670
F test* 7.25
Standard error is adjusted with Murphy & Topel's method
* The null hypothesis: 3 terms of PROB_OP are jointed equal to zero
    critical value x2(0.95,3)=7.81; x2(0.90,3)=6.25
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
For CRP=SP=1 Only
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T a b l e  6 . 3 :  S e q u e n t i a l  C h o i c e  M o d e l  ( I f  S P  i s  c h o s e n  f i r s t )  
V a r i a b l e C o e f f i c i e n t S t d t - v a l u e
C o n s t a n t - 3 . 0 4 2 0 . 6 5 0 - 4 . 6 8 0
S P _ A G E 0 . 1 2 8 0 . 0 2 3 5 . 4 2 7
S P _ A G E S Q - 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 - 7 . 9 3 4
S P _ E D _ C 0 . 1 4 6 0 . 0 1 7 8 . 7 2 8
S P _ E X P - 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 3 - 1 . 9 1 3
H _ S I Z E 0 6 - 0 . 3 3 4 0 . 0 7 8 - 4 . 2 7 4
C R O P S I Z 1 - 0 . 1 4 6 0 . 0 5 4 - 2 . 7 1 5
M A N U F 0 . 0 1 5 0 . 0 0 5 2 . 9 4 4
A M T A _ A - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 0 3 - 1 . 3 6 2
L D P _ A 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 - 0 . 2 7 7
N E T W O R T 1 - 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 5 - 1 . 2 4 6
C R O P 4 5 6 - 0 . 8 9 0 0 . 0 8 4 - 1 0 . 6 0 1
R E G N 3 0 . 1 3 8 0 . 1 5 0 0 . 9 2 3
R E G N 5 6 7 0 . 1 6 6 0 . 0 7 5 2 . 2 0 3
L o g _ l i k e l i h o o d - 1 0 3 7
P r e d i c t e d  R a t e 7 2 %
O P _ A G E 0 . 2 9 7 0 . 0 4 5 6 . 5 8 1
O P _ A G E S Q - 3 . 3 3 6 0 . 4 7 2 - 7 . 0 7 1
O P _ E D _ C 0 . 0 6 8 0 . 0 2 9 2 . 3 4 5
O P _ E X P - 0 . 0 4 1 0 . 0 2 0 - 2 . 1 1 0
O P _ E X P S Q 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 3 8
H _ S I Z E - 0 . 0 7 0 0 . 0 5 7 - 1 . 2 3 3
C R O P S I Z 1 - 1 . 8 2 3 0 . 2 1 2 - 8 . 6 0 6
R A I S E _ O P - 0 . 9 3 8 0 . 1 9 0 - 4 . 9 3 9
M A N U F 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 1 2 2 . 2 6 9
T R A D E - 0 . 1 7 4 0 . 0 3 1 - 5 . 6 8 4
U R B A N 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 4 1 . 7 3 7
A M T A _ A - 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 5 - 0 . 9 0 9
L D P _ A - 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 3 - 0 . 9 1 9
R I S K - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 2 9 - 0 . 1 5 1
N E T W O R T 1 - 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 1 4 - 2 . 0 5 7
S P _ H M A K 0 . 6 0 5 0 . 1 5 8 3 . 8 2 9
C R O P 4 5 6 - 1 . 4 6 9 0 . 2 2 5 - 6 . 5 3 6
R E G N 1 - 0 . 0 9 3 0 . 1 9 7 - 0 . 4 6 9
R E G N 3 0 . 6 3 2 0 . 3 6 1 1 . 7 5 0
R E G N 5 6 7 - 0 . 3 0 0 0 . 1 6 8 - 1 . 7 8 4
R E G N 9 - 1 . 6 4 1 0 . 6 3 9 - 2 . 5 6 8
T E N A N C Y - 0 . 1 3 6 0 . 0 6 2 - 2 . 1 8 5
L Q H _ 9 6 0 . 4 1 9 0 . 4 0 6 1 . 0 3 2
L Q L _ 9 6 - 0 . 6 9 3 0 . 4 5 3 - 1 . 5 3 1
E Q I P 0 . 3 6 1 1 . 2 4 3 0 . 2 9 0
A G D I S T - 0 . 2 8 9 0 . 3 3 0 - 0 . 8 7 5
E B I - 0 . 0 1 9 0 . 0 1 6 - 1 . 1 7 0
P R O B _ S P 0 . 3 1 1 0 . 5 3 2 0 . 5 8 5
S e c o n d  S t a g e  M u l t i n o m i a l  L o g i t  M o d e l
F o r  O P = 1  O n l y
F i r s t  S t a g e  E s t i m a t i o n  P r o b i t  M o d e l
 
194 
 Table 6.3: (Contined)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
OP_AGE -0.008 0.073 -0.110
OP_AGESQ 0.603 0.648 0.931
OP_ED_C 0.156 0.044 3.521
OP_EXP 0.105 0.036 2.915
OP_EXPSQ -0.002 0.001 -3.290
H_SIZE -0.049 0.117 -0.419
CROPSIZ1 0.217 0.120 1.807
RAISE_OP -0.336 0.355 -0.946
MANUF 0.034 0.017 1.997
TRADE -0.258 0.054 -4.783
URBAN -0.003 0.006 -0.579
AMTA_A -0.041 0.018 -2.293
LDP_A -0.029 0.010 -3.086
RISK -0.050 0.047 -1.065
NETWORT1 0.009 0.044 0.212
SP_HMAK -0.290 0.280 -1.035
CROP456 -4.080 0.923 -4.419
REGN1 0.072 0.289 0.248
REGN3 1.217 0.383 3.179
REGN567 -0.341 0.381 -0.895
REGN9 0.397 1.376 0.289
TENANCY 0.034 0.051 0.669
LQH_96 1.753 0.663 2.645
LQL_96 -3.572 1.153 -3.099
EQIP 1.934 1.295 1.494
AGDIST -1.234 0.654 -1.887
EBI -0.001 0.034 -0.028
PROB_SP -0.588 0.780 -0.753
For CRP=1 Only
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Table 6.3: (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
OP_AGE 0.296 0.080 3.676
OP_AGESQ -3.161 0.809 -3.907
OP_ED_C 0.153 0.043 3.533
OP_EXP -0.025 0.028 -0.881
OP_EXPSQ 0.000 0.001 0.367
H_SIZE 0.030 0.089 0.340
CROPSIZ1 -0.360 0.728 -0.495
RAISE_OP -1.479 0.285 -5.183
MANUF 0.047 0.017 2.684
TRADE -0.205 0.054 -3.821
URBAN -0.021 0.005 -4.059
AMTA_A -0.085 0.019 -4.517
LDP_A -0.029 0.009 -3.304
RISK -0.164 0.045 -3.666
NETWORT1 0.019 0.047 0.417
SP_HMAK -0.004 0.286 -0.012
CROP456 -8.916 3.516 -2.536
REGN1 1.007 0.268 3.753
REGN3 0.319 0.553 0.577
REGN567 -1.720 0.437 -3.937
REGN9 0.339 0.790 0.429
TENANCY 0.057 0.048 1.185
LQH_96 -0.160 0.634 -0.253
LQL_96 -1.416 0.835 -1.696
EQIP 0.280 2.871 0.097
AGDIST -3.075 1.530 -2.010
EBI 0.001 0.036 0.038
PROB_SP -1.734 0.905 -1.916
Loglikelihood -1,622
F test* 88.48
Standard error is adjusted with Murphy & Topel's method
* The null hypothesis: 3 terms of PROB_SP are jointed equal to zero
    critical value x2(0.95,3)=7.81; x2(0.90,3)=6.25
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
For OP=CRP=1 Only
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As we have discussed in the two choice case earlier, one of the primary 
criticisms of the multinomial logit model is the IIA property, which might imply that 
the relative ratio of participation of any two pair alternatives is independent from other 
alternatives.  This is a strong assumption and it can be tested by using the Haussman-
Wu test (Greene 2002b). Our test results show that the IIA assumption is rejected.93 
Since the IIA property should be one of the model selection criterions for justifying 
the sequential choice model, we conclude that the partial sequential decision model is 
not appropriate to capture a three choice decision making process. This result is also 
consistent with our finding in last chapter when two decisions are considered: Joint 
decision is preferred to the sequential choice process. 
 
 
 
Table 6.4:Testing for Sequential Choice Models
Different in LogL Test Value Model Selection
OP vs SP first 60.458 1.766 OP first
Deleted Group Test Value* Result
 (0,0) of OP Model 227 Reject IIA
  * the critical value x 2 (0.95,1) is equal to 37.65
Likelihood Dominant Criterion Test_Sequential Decision
IIA Test for Second Stage Multinomial Logit Model
 
                                                 
93 If the non-participant group (not participate in either CRP or off-farm decision of the spouse) was 
eliminated from the sample, the Haussman-Wu test value was 227, which is greater than the critical 
value (x2(0.95,1)=37.65). As such, the IIA property was rejected (See Table 6.4). 
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Testing for Endogeneity of the Choice Equations 
Another issue to be discussed in model specification is the endogeneity issue. 
Indeed, one might argue that some variables specified of the three choice equations as 
the explanatory variables might be endogenous to the choices. Since the specifications 
of the CRP participation and the off-farm work decision of the operator are the same 
as the two choice case, and we have implemented the endogeneity test for these two 
equations in previous chapter, we focused on the endogeneity test to see whether two 
explanatory variables (AMTA_A) are endogenous to the spouse’s decision for off-
farm work based on the framework of Smith and Blundell (1986). Since the detail of 
the test can be found in previous chapter, we skip the content here to avoid duplication. 
The test result is presented in Table (6.5). The result is somehow encouraging, since 
the two variables are not statistically endogenous to the spouse’ off-farm decision.   
 
          
T a b l e  6 . 5 :  E x o g e n e i t y  T e s t  f o r  S P  E q u a t i o n
V a r i a b l e s T  V a l u e P - V a l u e
A M T A _ A - 1 . 2 8 2 0 . 2 0 0
* *  N o t e :  C a l c u l a t e d  b a s e d  o n  S m i t h  &  B l u n d e l l  ( 1 9 8 6 )  
Empirical Results of the Second Stage System  
The second stage equation system of interest (Table 6.6) contains equations for 
the acres enrolled in CRP, the hours worked off the farm by the operator and the 
spouse. In contrast to the procedure we discussed in previous chapters, we estimate 
these three equations directly by specifying the observed CRP per acre payment, off-
farm wage of the operator and spouse as one of the explanatory variables in the second 
stage equations, without estimating these three price equations and using the predicted 
prices as instrumental variables in the acre and hours equations.94 In so doing, we are 
                                                 
94 One might argue the endogeneity problem between quanity and price variables in our specification. 
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able to derive the own and cross-price effect or elasticity.   
For the perspective of model specification, the self-selection problem is 
analyzed by testing if the coefficients of the predicted normal density function of each 
equation are jointly equal to zero. The F test value is 127, which is greater than the 
critical value under the 5% level of significance (7.81). As such, we are able to 
conclude that the sample selection problem exists in our data.  
The explanatory variables which are statistically significant in the operator’s hour 
equation are the off-farm working experience, farm size, risk preference, and the 
employment structure of the local economy. We have interpreted the economic 
intuition of these factors in the last chapter, and ignore the duplication context here. 
The CRP acres enrolled are determined by the operator’s characteristics, farm and 
family structure, environmental quality, and the local economy conditions. The 
explanatory variables we specify in this equation are identical to the one of the 
bivariate choice case. The interesting case here is the factors affecting the hours 
working off the farm of the spouse. The spouse performs more non-farm labor as she 
ages, but at a decreasing rate. Off-farm labor supply of the spouse is negatively and 
significantly affected by both the farm size, tenancy system of the farm, and the 
government payments. Interestingly, the risk preference of the operator also affects the 
labor supply of the spouse. If the operator is more risk averse, the off-farm labor 
supply of the spouse increases. This might be true since the more risk averse operator 
would like to participate in the off-farm job, and thus increases the labor supply of the 
operator. The positive correlation of the off-farm participation decisions between the 
                                                                                                                                            
However, Shonkwiler and Yen (1999)’s approach is not appropriate if instrumental variables (predicted 
price variables) are used in the second stage equations. The reason is that the traditional IV approach is 
validated if and only if the estimated second stage system is linear (equation (11)). Unfortunately, the 
second stage system is a non-linear system in our case. If the predicted price variables are served as IV 
of equation (11), their approach would yield inconsistent estimates (West and William III 2004, page 
556; Bound et al. 1995). 
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operator and the spouse is likely to increase the off-farm labor supply of the spouse. 
T a b le  6 .6 :   S e c o n d  S ta g e  S y s te m  E s t im a tio n
V a r ia b le C o effic ien t S td t-v a lu e
C D F _ O P 4 .7 1 4 7 1 7 .5 5 0 0 .0 0 7
O P _ A G E 3 0 .5 5 4 3 1 .0 4 5 0 .9 8 4
O P _ A G E S Q -3 4 2 .4 8 0 3 1 4 .0 4 0 -1 .0 9 1
O P _ E X P _ F -0 .1 6 1 0 .1 0 6 -1 .5 1 8
O P _ R A IS E 8 6 .9 1 2 1 1 6 .1 5 0 0 .7 4 8
C R O P S IZ 1 -4 8 9 .1 6 9 7 3 .4 3 7 -6 .6 6 1
T E N A N 2 .8 4 2 2 1 .6 8 7 0 .1 3 1
A M T A _ A -2 .5 0 2 2 .5 7 3 -0 .9 7 2
L D P _ A -1 .1 5 3 1 .5 0 8 -0 .7 6 4
R IS K -4 0 .2 4 3 1 3 .5 7 9 -2 .9 6 4
T R A D E 2 .6 8 8 1 1 .1 4 6 0 .2 4 1
M A N U F 2 1 .9 8 9 5 .4 2 3 4 .0 5 5
U N E M P -2 1 .4 1 5 1 4 .7 1 4 -1 .4 5 5
R E G N 3 -9 2 9 .5 9 0 1 7 8 .1 4 0 -5 .2 1 8
P D F _ O P 3 9 1 .6 2 7 1 7 1 .0 1 0 2 .2 9 0
L G W A G E O P 6 1 5 .8 6 9 2 3 .8 7 4 2 5 .7 9 7
L G P C R P 2 0 .6 8 9 1 9 .2 2 2 1 .0 7 6
L G W A G E S P -3 3 .8 6 0 2 1 .8 4 6 -1 .5 5 0
R 2 0 .4 0 0
A d ju s te d  R 2 0 .3 9 5
C D F _ C R P 2 8 6 .8 3 6 2 0 5 .9 7 0 1 .3 9 3
O P _ E X P -4 .2 2 7 2 .2 7 5 -1 .8 5 8
O P _ E X P S Q 0 .1 5 8 0 .0 5 1 3 .1 1 8
O P _ A G E 1 .9 8 1 5 .6 6 4 0 .3 5 0
O P _ A G E S Q -6 0 .3 1 2 4 5 .6 1 7 -1 .3 2 2
L Q H -5 2 0 .0 8 2 5 0 .4 1 5 -1 0 .3 1 6
L Q M -4 0 1 .7 7 8 6 0 .5 6 2 -6 .6 3 4
R E G N 1 -4 .9 6 9 1 8 .3 6 9 -0 .2 7 1
R E G N 3 1 0 5 .2 7 3 4 8 .0 7 9 2 .1 9 0
R N 5 6 7 1 5 0 .0 7 1 5 9 .5 2 3 2 .5 2 1
R E G N 9 -1 5 .9 7 5 2 6 .1 7 9 -0 .6 1 0
C R O P 1 7 1 2 9 .1 7 0 2 6 .4 1 3 4 .8 9 0
C R O P S IZ 1 1 0 0 .4 6 2 1 4 9 .6 5 0 0 .6 7 1
A M T A _ A -3 .2 7 9 1 .3 1 9 -2 .4 8 6
E Q IP -3 1 0 .9 6 4 8 7 .0 0 1 -3 .5 7 4
M A N U F -5 .7 9 6 1 .0 3 3 -5 .6 0 9
H S IZ E -1 4 .8 8 7 7 .1 3 0 -2 .0 8 8
P D F _ C R P 8 7 .9 0 0 3 8 .2 7 4 2 .2 9 7
L G W A G E O P 3 .7 6 5 0 .9 4 4 3 .9 8 9
L G P C R P 6 8 .1 0 7 3 .9 7 7 1 7 .1 2 3
L G W A G E S P 0 .1 5 5 0 .9 9 5 0 .1 5 6
R 2 0 .6 8 5
A d ju s te d  R 2 0 .6 8 2
O P  H o u r  E q u a tio n
C R P  A c r e a g e  E q u a tio n
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Table 6.6: (Continued)
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std
CDF_SP -703.435 561.800 -1.252
SP_AGE 103.632 23.276 4.452
SP_AGESQ -1.253 0.289 -4.341
SP_RAISE -61.935 49.806 -1.244
LDP_A -1.831 0.856 -2.139
CROPSIZ1 -223.764 34.010 -6.579
TENAN -31.597 5.327 -5.931
RISK -31.703 13.747 -2.306
TRADE -31.563 11.596 -2.722
MANUF 2.942 4.141 0.710
UNEMP -38.769 11.291 -3.434
REGN3 68.927 64.735 1.065
PDF_SP 1285.652 237.560 5.412
LGWAGEOP -90.872 25.191 -3.607
LGPCRP -7.931 14.867 -0.533
LGWAGESP 612.382 24.495 25.000
R 2 0.331
Adjusted R 2 0.327
F test* 127
stand error is calculated with bootstrap methiod with 500 replications
*Test IMR: H 0 : PDF_OP=PDF_CRP=PDF_SP=0; critical value=7.81[x
2 (0.95,3)]
   Variable definitions are listed in Table 2.4 of Chapter 2.
Hour_SP Equation
 
     
Based on the estimation results, we can derive the price elasticity of CRP acres, 
labor supply for off-farm labor of the operator and the spouse. The elasticities 
calculated at the means of the data are listed in Table 6.7. 95 The CRP acre elasticity is 
estimated at 0.46, which means an increase of 0.46% acre enrolled in CRP 
corresponding to 1% increase in CRP per acre payment. The off-farm labor supply 
elasticity of the operator and the spouse are estimated as 0.33 and 0.36, respectively. 
                                                 
95 The formula to calculate the elasticity follows the approach of Su and Yen (2000). 
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Our result suggests that the spouse is more responsive to changes in the marginal 
returns to labor. This finding is consistent with the finding of Abdulai and Delgado 
(1999) with the Northern Ghana farm household. The cross-wage elasticity of 
operator’s wage on hours worked off the farm by the spouse and the spouse’s wage on 
hours worked off the farm of the operator are -0.05 and -0.02, respectively. These 
finding suggest the slight cross-wage effect between spouse and operator albeit they 
are statistically significant. The off-farm wage increases 1% will increase the CRP 
acre enrollment by 0.03%. This is consistent with our expectation, since increasing 
off-farm wage of the operator will increase the hours worked off the farm, and thus 
reduce the farm labor hours. Given the hours worked on the farm decrease, it is likely 
to see less cropland in production.  
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std b/Std P_Value
W AGE_OP 0.33 0.01 31.40 0.00
PAYMENT_CRP 0.01 0.01 1.12 0.13
W AGE_SP -0.02 0.01 -2.02 0.02
W AGE_OP 0.025 0.018 1.440 0.075
PAYMENT_CRP 0.458 0.036 12.577 0.000
W AGE_SP 0.001 0.019 0.054 0.479
W AGE_OP -0.053 0.009 -5.738 0.000
PAYMENT_CRP -0.005 0.010 -0.446 0.328
W AGE_SP 0.359 0.011 32.195 0.000
**standard error is calculated by delta method based on the sample mean
Table 6.7:  Price Elasticity Estimation
Hour_OP Response
Acreage_CRP Response
Hour_SP Response
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Concluding Remarks        
  This chapter focuses on the extension of the two decision case by considering 
the interrelationship between CRP participation, off-farm labor supply decision of the 
operator and the spouse of the farm household. Following the two stage approach 
proposed by Heckman (1979), we first analyze the decision making process of the 
farm household toward these three decisions by applying the trivariate probit model 
and the sequential decision model we propose. Under the joint decision framework, 
we find the positive and significant correlation between these three decisions, 
especially the higher correlation between off-farm work decisions of the operator and 
the spouse. When the sequential decision is assumed, it is more likely that the off-farm 
decision of the operator is considered prior to CRP decision and the spouse’s decision 
working off the farm. However, the sequential decision model suffers from the IIA 
assumption imposed on the multinomial logit model, and is rejected by our data. As 
such, our result supports the hypothesis that that these three decisions are more 
appropriately described as the joint decision rather than sequential. They are also not 
independent decisions. 
 Given the joint decision process, we also analyze the CRP acre enrollment, 
hours worked off the farm by the operator and the spouse. Our result provides a 
positive evidence of the self-selection problem. We also find a positive price elasticity 
of the CRP acre response, hours worked off the farm of the operator and the spouse, 
although none of them is greater than one. The cross-price effects of these three 
decisions are very small, but statistically significant. Generally, increasing the off-farm 
wage of the operator will increase the acres enrolled in CRP.         
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In order to quantify the effects of recent changes in farm policy on the 
decisions of farm households, we focus on three participation decisions: Conservation 
Reserve Program participation and the off-farm work opportunities of the farm family. 
All of these are important sources of farm household income. The overall purpose of 
this research is to analyze the relationship of these three participation behavior of farm 
households. Specific objectives are given: 1) to identify factors related to decisions to 
participate in CRP; 2) to identify the extent to which off-farm labor decisions of the 
farm family members are related to CRP participation: are these two decisions 
determined jointly, sequentially or independently? 3) to identify the factors that 
determine the extent of CRP participations and off farm work as measured by the 
acreage commitment to CRP and off-farm hours worked; and 4) to quantify the effect 
of these participation decisions on the farm productivity and technical and scale 
efficiencies. 
We motivate the study by developing a rather complex agricultural household 
production model. There are three major components to the empirical analysis, each 
involving a more complex discrete choice structure. The empirical analysis is based on 
data from the 2001 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) from the US 
Department of Agriculture. This is the annual national survey of farm households that 
contains information about both farm business and farm household characteristics.  
The theoretical framework is based on agricultural household models by 
incorporating price and production risk and technical efficiency as well as the 
environmental factors. The framework for farm households includes: Conservation 
Reserve Program and off-farm work opportunities and the possible receipt of 
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decoupled payments. The finding of the theoretical analysis can be summarized as 
follows: price variability, the risk attitude of farm households toward price and 
production risk, technical efficiency, policy variables and the environmental 
characteristics jointly determine farm households’ optimal choices. The CRP acres and 
off-farm hours tend to increase with the variability of prices and production, or when 
production is less technical efficient. However, because of the correlation between 
price and production risk the effect on CRP acres and off-farm hours remain 
undetermined. Another interesting finding from the theory relates to the policy 
implication of decoupled payments. Specifically, the effects of decoupled payments on 
the CRP acres and off-farm hours do not vanish if the risk attitude of the farm 
household exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Moreover, if the 
environmental value to the farm household of CRP is ignored or is small, CRP acreage 
and off-farm work decrease, and farm work increase with higher decoupled payments. 
If risk preferences are CARA, increasing decoupled payments results in more CRP 
acreage.      
To study the decision making processes of farm households and the factors 
determining the CRP acres and off-farm hours and the impact of these decisions on 
farm productivity, we use the theoretical framework to form three econometric models 
in the empirical analysis. Each of the models is based on the generalized sample 
selection model framework and estimated with a two-stage approach.  
In the first econometric model, we focus on the CRP participation decision and 
its impact on farm productivity and technical efficiency. In contrast to previous 
literature, we consider the CRP decision as a sequential decision process: the farm 
household decides whether or not to participate in CRP as the first stage decision. 
Given the choice of CRP participation, the next decision is whether to enroll the entire 
farm or only part of it in CRP. Our empirical results show the importance of 
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considering these two choices as sequential, but not two independent decisions. To 
avoid the endogeneity between per-acre CRP price acreages, we use an instrumental 
variable approach by estimating the per-acre CRP price equation first and then 
calculate the predicted price as the instrument of the CRP acre equation. To analyze 
the economic impact on farm productivity of the sequential CRP participation decision, 
we utilize a two-stage-method-of-moment approach to estimate the technical 
efficiency within groups based on the stochastic production frontier framework. This 
estimation provides the consistent estimates of the technical efficiency along with the 
sequential CRP choice structure. Furthermore, we compare the different performance 
of CRP participation decisions in terms of technical and scale efficiency, and 
production frontier difference by utilizing the Malmquist total factor productivity 
(TFP) Index. 
The emphasis of the second econometric model is on two decisions of the farm 
household: CRP participation and the off-farm work decision by the farm operator. 
The context of the empirical analysis can be categorized in two parts. In the first part, 
we test three different decision making hypotheses for these two decisions: are they 
joint, sequential or independent? To avoid model misspecification, we estimate the 
two potential econometric models for both joint and sequential decisions. Under the 
joint decision hypothesis, we model the CRP participation and the off-farm work 
decision as a bivariate probit and a multinomial logit model; the nested multinomial 
logit and a new proposed sequential bivariate probit model are utilized to estimate the 
sequential decision hypothesis. The performance of these models is compared based 
on two non-nested tests: likelihood dominance criterion (LDC) and Vuong’s test. Our 
empirical results promote the joint decision structure as an appropriate decision 
making process. Furthermore, the performance of the bivariate probit model 
dominates the multinomial logit model. To validate the empirical specification of the 
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bivariate probit model, we test to see if other choices included in the models can be 
viewed as exogenous. The tests are based on Vella (1993) and Smith and Blundell 
(1986)’s methods. Our empirical results are encouraging since we reject the 
hypothesis that other variables are endogenous to these two decisions of interest. 
Similar to the CRP choice, we focus on the CRP acres response and off-farm hours of 
the operator in the second stage analysis, and compare the impact on farm productivity 
and technical efficiency. The approach we utilized here is similar to the one we have 
discussed in the sequential CRP model.  
In the final econometric model, we extend our analysis by incorporating the 
spouse’s decision for off-farm work along with these two other choices. Similar to the 
two-choice case, we propose two econometrics models for joint and sequential 
decisions, respectively. The trivariate probit model is specified as the joint decision 
model, and a new model combining the strength of binary probit and multinomial logit 
model is specified as the sequential decision model. Our empirical results suggest that 
the three-decision model is more appropriate than a sequential choice decision. That is, 
CRP participation and off-farm work decisions of the farm household are joint, rather 
than sequential decisions. Due to the difficulty in analyzing the CRP acres, off-farm 
hours of the operator and spouse based on the sample selection framework, we focus 
on the entire sample for the second stage analysis to derive the consistent estimates.  
Model Comparison 
 Each of these three econometric models in this study has its own strengths. It is 
difficult to propose a generalized model incorporating all of the specialties of each 
model, since there is always a trade-off between computational demands and the 
model generalization. This is the reason that we proposed three different econometric 
models and estimate them in three different sections. Focusing on the CRP choice 
model, treating off-farm decision of the farm household as exogenous, we are able to 
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explore the potential of a sequential CRP participation where we distinguish between 
enrolling all or only part of the farm in CRP. In so doing, we could compare farm 
productivity of non-participants with that of only partial CRP farm participants. Since 
whole CRP farm participants are no longer produce farm outputs, they must be 
excluded from any farm productivity comparisons.  
Focusing on two decisions of the farm household toward CRP and operator’s 
work off the farm, we are able to examine the decision making process in greater 
detail and explore information in terms of the various decision making process, along 
with the impact on farm productivity. When the model is extended to incorporate the 
spouse’s work off the farm decision, an alternative empirical strategy is necessary due 
to the computational difficulty. The primary conclusion derived from our analysis 
suggests that the off-farm working decision of the farm family and the CRP 
participation are jointly determined, which is validated in the two-choice and three-
choice estimations. These results all seem to support a joint decision structure, but 
since the analysis is based on cross sectional data, it is difficult to know how the 
results might have changed had we had access to panel data containing information 
about the actual timing of these two decisions. What is perhaps clear from the analysis 
is that these two decisions are not made independently, a finding that should have 
important policy significance.   
The effects of the factors determining the participation decisions of these three 
choice models are quite robust across models. As such, we might promote the usage of 
the two-choice model for empirical analysis since this model allows us to discuss not 
only the decision making process in great detail, but also implement the second stage 
analysis and examine farm productivity in a comprehensive fashion. The primary 
difficulty to analyze the farm productivity of the three-choice model is related to the 
specification of the correction terms for self-selection problem (Inverse Mills Ratio) 
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explicitly. With the case where there are more than two choices of the farm 
households involved, the algebra for deriving Inverse Mills Ratio requires to calculate 
the conditional expected value and variance of the multivariate truncation distribution, 
which is computational cumbersome. Without these, we are not able to focus on the 
group estimations and compare the performance in terms of acreage response or 
productivity between groups. Although focusing on the unconditional expected value 
and variance of the multivariate truncation helps for analyzing the second stage and 
productivity, it explores less information than the case if each participation group is 
focused and analyzed. To our best knowledge, the methodology to estimate the 
performance of each group within the sample selection framework had not been 
proposed in the literature.      
Primary Finding of the Empirical Analysis 
Regardless of the model specification, several factors determine the 
participation decisions of CRP and off-farm jobs of farm households. CRP 
participation depends generally on some characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, 
land quality, and the circumstances in the local economy. There are also some 
differences in participation by major ERS production region. One interesting finding is 
the CRP acreage response in terms of CRP per-acre payment. We do find the positive 
evidence of CRP acre response but it decreases with the increase of low land quality 
index. If the proportion of the low land quality is high, the CRP acreage response to 
per-acre price might be negative. This result helps to explain the contradiction of the 
previous studies in terms of the CRP acreage response. Environmental factors play a 
role of CRP participation. One obvious example is the EBI score. That farm 
households located in areas where the EBI scores for land currently enrolled are high 
are more likely to participate in CRP, since in areas where the EBI scores were high, 
farmers might well expect to have higher bids accepted.  
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The empirical evidence of risk attitude of the farm household to the CRP 
participation is consistent to our theory, even though the measure of risk attitude with 
ARMS data is rather ad hoc. As aversion to risk increases, the likelihood of 
participation in a program where payments are certain, such as CRP, will increase. Our 
theory is also consistent with the fact that decoupled payments reduce the likelihood of 
CRP participation. Finally, since commodity program related loan deficiency 
payments and decoupled payments reduce farm income variability, these payments 
also reduce risk averse farmers’ concerns for allocating farm resources to programs, 
such as CRP.   
As expected, the decision of the farm operator to engage in off-farm work also 
depends on the characteristics of the farm, the farm operator, and the circumstances in 
the local economy. Our results confirm the fact that older farmers are more likely to 
work off the farm; the operator’s education has a positive effect on the probability of 
participation in off-farm work, the years of experience on the farm has a negative 
effect that increases at an increasing rate. Farm operators raised on farms are also less 
likely to work off the farm. Since returns to off-farm labor are likely to less variable 
than farm returns, the indication that the likelihood of off-farm work participation is 
lower for farm operators willing to accept more risk is consistent with the theory of 
risk averse behavior.  
Another interesting and unique finding of this study is the qualification of the 
impact on farm productivity of CRP participation and the off-farm work decision of 
the farm operator. We find that participating in CRP appears to lower the technical 
efficiency but raises the scale efficiency. We also find that participating in off-farm 
work increases technical efficiency and scale efficiency. These results may imply that 
efficiency is more adversely affected when land is withdrawn from production without 
also withdrawn labor. The reverse is not true.   
210 
Some Policy Lessons 
Several policy implications related to CRP policy design are found in this study. 
First, targeting at the EBI score is important since EBI determines not only the CRP 
participation decision but also the acreage enrolled in CRP. The farms in the area with 
higher EBI score are likely to participate in CRP and enroll more acreage in CRP. 
Second, we also find that the positive and statistically significant upward sloping CRP 
acreage supply functions. However, the acreage response to per-acre payment falls and 
can become negative in acres where there is a high proportion of low quality land. 
These results seem interesting since these are consistent with the belief by some that 
per-acre payments have been raised to attract high quality land in some areas, but are 
also consistent with farmers’ submitting lower bids to ensure that bids of low quality 
are accepted. Finally, we find evidence of a positive relationship between CRP and the 
off-farm work decisions of the farm household and it is reinforced by the positive 
effects of off-farm wage on CRP acreage. Increasing the opportunities for the off-farm 
work seems to increase not only the probabilities of participation in CRP, but also the 
acres enrolled. Due to the nature of the joint decision between CRP participation and 
off-farm work, the design of CRP policy can’t ignore the factors that might affect 
decisions to work off the farm by farm households.       
Several policy implications also might be inferred from our study in terms of 
decoupled payments. Promoting decoupled payments program, as a substitute for 
conventional commodity programs, seems to be the direction of agricultural policy 
designs in the future. The first policy implication comes from the importance of 
decoupled payments on both CRP participation and off-farm work decisions by farm 
households. Increasing decoupled payments would generally decrease the probability 
for CRP participation and off-farm work decisions.  
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Finally, since participation in both CRP and off-farm work affects the 
allocation of farm household resources between farm and non-farm economic 
activities, there are important effects on the technical and scale efficiencies of farm 
production. However, the implications of these policies that affect the choices can be 
fully understood only by comparing their effects on the efficiency of total farm 
household production when compared with farm productivity. Through this extended 
analysis, it will be possible to determine the effects of these decisions on overall farm 
household income and well-being. It is in this area that further research should be 
directed.   
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